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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The process of institutional transition from one coordination mechanism to another
one is an important period in the evolution of any society. Transitions are associated
with fundamental political, legal, economic and social changes (Danis et al. 2010)
affecting all aspects of life (Peng 2003). The transition from planned to open-market
economy that has taken place in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), East Asia, and the
newly independent states of the former Soviet Union represents an institutional
transition.
An environment that goes through transition is characterized by high level of
vulnerability and uncertainty which impacts all actors evolving in it, including the
organizations (Peng 2003). The dynamic relationship environment-organization is
reflected in the concept of legitimacy.  Legitimacy is a pertinent concept to study the
transition stage since it exists on the borderline between the organization and its
environment.
In transition environments, the processes of deinstitutionalization of the old structures
and the reinstitutionalization of the new ones coexist. This leads to a lack of
institutional framework to guide behavior of actors or a situation called institutional
vacuum. Since institutions regulate economic exchanges (North 1990), the lack of
them leads to elevated costs for all actors due to the proliferation of opportunistic
behavior (Meyer 2001). In such environments, demonstrating legitimacy becomes
crucial for the survival of structures and actors. Legitimation is sought by new elites
(Raychev and Stoichev 2008), the government (Peng 2000a), the new laws, decrees
and regulations (Stark 1992), and the private organizations (Peng 2000a).
The success of the transition directly depends on the strategies of organizations
evolving in such environments (Peng 2000). Small and medium-size enterprises
(SMEs)1 play an important role as catalysts of the process of change (McIntyre 2003:
1) since they are expected to spur economic growth and employment (Peng 2000a),
1 The terms small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and small organizations/firms are used
interchangeably in this research.
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and maintain social peace (McIntyre 2003: 1). Despite their central role in transition
environments, little is known about the challenges SMEs face and the actions that can
be undertaken in order to overcome them (Danis, Chaburu and Lyles 2010).
One of the main challenges of SMEs in transition environments is to demonstrate that
they are legitimate players implying that they comply with the expectations of
relevant stakeholders’ groups. The main objective of this study is to shed some light
on how SMEs in transition environments gain organizational legitimacy necessary for
obtaining stakeholders’ support. The interest of the study lies in the fact that if
organizational legitimacy is problematic for all organizations due to changing norms,
beliefs, and stakeholders’ expectations over time (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), it is
even more problematic for small organizations in transition environments since the
norms, beliefs and expectations are not clearly defined.
In order to address the legitimacy needs of small organizations2 in transition
environments, I propose a signaling theory of legitimacy, which postulates that the
legitimacy-claiming entities can rely on valid signals in order to demonstrate
(communicate) their adherence to the requirements of the evaluating audiences. In
general, the signaling theory of legitimacy should hold for any organization facing a
liability  -  the  discount  the  evaluating  audiences  place  on  it  in  comparison  to  its
potential competitors. Organizations in transition environments face liability of origin
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000) – a discount that the evaluating audiences (both domestic
and  foreign)  may  place  on  them  based  on  their  context  of  origin.  For  small
organizations3, the challenges resulting from liability of origin are even bigger
because of their size, they are more prone to import instability from the environment.
The  higher  level  of  vulnerability  of  small  firms  encourages  them   to  engage  in
opportunistic behavior. Hence, demonstrating their legitimacy is a key issue for SMEs
operating in transition environments.
2 All economic actors experience the elevated level of uncertainty and vulnerability inherent to the
transition environment. Small organizations are more prone to import instability from the environment
due to their liability of smallness and lack of slack which can absorb part of the instability.
3 By small organizations I mean small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). The two terms are used
interchangeably in the text.
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Organizational legitimacy becomes especially important when organizations engage
in  long-term  arrangements  since  this  requires  an  assessment  of  the  organization  not
only  in  terms  of  its  products/services  but  also  in  terms  of  its  ongoing  access  to
resources and capabilities as well as its reliability as a partner. In order to address the
legitimacy needs of small firms evolving in transition environments and trying to
obtain long-term partnerships, a new legitimacy typology is proposed. It is comprised
of two types – functional and relational legitimacy. Functional legitimacy represents
the adherence to the evaluating audiences’ requirements regarding relevant resources
and capabilities. Relational legitimacy is the conformity with the evaluating
audiences’ expectations regarding the reliability of an organization as a partner.
Hence, this study addresses two research questions:
1. What are the dimensions (and valid signals) of functional and relational
legitimacy (for small organizations in transition environment)?
2. Does using signals of specific types of legitimacy (depending on the liability
faced) enhance organizational legitimacy?
This  doctoral  research  examines  the  legitimacy  challenges  of  SMEs  in  transition
environments trying to obtain long-term arrangements. In the first part of the study,
the  two  types  of  legitimacy  -  functional  and  relational  legitimacy  -  are  constructed.
Similar to organizational legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter 2005), functional and
relational legitimacy are also multidimensional constructs comprised of different
facets.
In the second part, I examine whether the signals of functional and relational
legitimacy help SMEs in transition environment gain organizational legitimacy. The
research model is tested on data collected from the information technology (IT) sector
in Bulgaria.
Based on the data analysis and results, this research has several theoretical and
methodological contributions. The results also have practical implications for the
managers of small organizations in transition environments as well as the public
policy agents.
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The theoretical contributions are  associated  mainly  with  the  signaling  theory  of
legitimacy.   It  looks  at  how  organizations  can  overcome  certain  liabilities  by
communicating their adherence to the expectations of relevant stakeholders’ groups.
Organizations can demonstrate their conformity to the evaluating audiences’
requirements by using valid signals – organizational characteristics that can be
observed, are costly to imitate and are based on shared meaning between the sending
and the receiving party.
In addition, the study contributes to the literature on transition environments by
looking at the particular case of SMEs and their attempt to demonstrate that they are
legitimate players when trying to engage in long-term arrangements.
The methodological contribution lies in the way the two types of legitimacy
(functional and relational) are measured via formative measurement constructs
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Jarvis et al. 2003) under the partial least
squares (PLS) technique. Formative constructs are associated with causality that goes
from the manifest (directly observable) variable to the latent construct or in other
words, the manifest variables cause/build the latent construct (Diamantopoulos 1999).
This made possible to match the legitimacy claims of organizations from once side
based on the functional and relational signals and the legitimacy granted by relevant
stakeholders’  groups,  on  the  other  side.  In  addition,  the  research  contributes  to  the
growing number of studies in strategic management that use PLS as a structural
equation modeling technique (Birkinshaw et al. 1995; Cool et al. 1989; Fornell et al.
1990; Johansson and Yip 1994; Tsang 2002).
The practical implications of  this  research  shed  some  light  on  which  signals
(organizational characteristics) are important for managers of small organizations in
transition environments. Signals are costly and since all organizations (and especially
small firms) have limited resources, managers have to know which signals to invest
in. It is important to note that many managers disregard the relational aspect of their
legitimacy claims which (based on the results of the study) are more important in the
communication process between the legitimacy-claiming and legitimacy-granting
entities.
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Overall, this study represents a fertile area for future research. Researchers can test the
signaling theory of legitimacy in other contexts – i.e., other transition environments
(Eastern Europe vs. China), as well as compare the signals used by organizations in
transition environments and developed economies. Researchers can also test the
signaling theory of legitimacy on organizations facing different liabilities (i.e. liability
of market newness) and try to extend the existing legitimacy typologies. In addition,
future studies can focus on issues of meaning construction (based on signals) in the
communication process between organizations.
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CHAPTER 1: ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY
Organizational legitimacy is a concept, which exists on the borderline between the
organization and its environment (Baum and Rowey 2003: 6). It reflects the
conformity of an organization to broadly accepted norms, values, standards (Scott
2003). The question that arises is: when those norms, values, standards are not clearly
defined (as in transition environments due to the existing institutional vacuum), what
can organizations do in order to be granted legitimacy? Herein, I adopt the view that
even in transition environments where the standards based on which legitimacy-
granting entities evaluate organizations have not been established yet, the latter can
still demonstrate their legitimacy by employing valid signals (organizational
characteristics).
Small organizations in transition environments looking for long-term contracts can
use signals of two types of legitimacy – functional and relational legitimacy.
Functional legitimacy is related to demonstrating that the organization has the
necessary resources and capabilities. Relational legitimacy is associated with
demonstrating that the organization is a reliable partner. As a result, signaling
functional and relational legitimacy can help small organizations in transition
environments gain the active support of stakeholder groups.
The chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, I look at the different theoretical
approaches to organizational legitimacy in management science, followed by
description of organizational environment in terms of its elements and dimensions
with a special focus on the transition environments. In section 2, I discuss legitimacy
typology and introduce the types of legitimacy relevant to the current research. In
section 3, I make the distinction between the determinants and the antecedents
(sources)  of  legitimacy.  Lastly  (in  section  4),  I  examine  the  consequences  of
legitimacy and emphasize its impact on organizational performance.
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1. The Concept of Legitimacy in Management Science
In management science, there are two main approaches towards organizational
legitimacy - evaluative and cognitive. The two of them are based on the Open System
Perspective.
1. 1. Organizations as Open Systems
Organizations are collective actors (Scott 2003: 7) oriented towards the attainment of
certain goals (Parsons 1960: 17), functioning as repositories of resources (Hannan and
Freeman 1984) and infused with value (Selznick 1957). As social systems,
organizations are different from the environment (Luhmann [1984] 1995: 17). But in
order to accomplish their objectives, organizations need to develop relationships with
the environment since they procure resources (inputs), have a set of mechanisms to
process them, and last but not least, realize their output back in the environment
(Parsons 1960: 17). In addition, any organization needs to import meaning from the
environment (Scott 2001), in order to be understood. For all these reasons,
organizations depend on the environment and their actions and structure reflect this
dependence (Luhmann [1984] 1995: 183; Katz and Khan 1978: 3). Thus,
organizations develop dynamic, complex and vital relationships with the natural and
socio-cultural environment, in which they exist (Katz and Khan 1978: 63; Scott 2003:
24).
This view on organizations is reflected in the Open System perspective,4 which
perceives organizations as “activities involving coalitions of participants with varying
interests embedded in wider material-resource and institutional environments” (Scott
2003: 29-30). In comparison to the other approaches adopted by organizational
theorists over the years (such as the Rational and Natural Systems Perspectives), the
Open System approach emphasizes the adaptive nature of organizations and views
them as organisms intertwined with the environment (Baum and Rowey 2003: 6).
4 The idea of open systems is based on the work of the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1956), who
contributed to the creation of the general system theory (GST). GST is applied not only to natural
systems but also to social systems (Katz and Khan 1978: 22). Furthermore, it was extended to
organizations. The latter are perceived to be a special type of open systems (Katz and Khan 1978: 68).
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Indeed, Scott (2003) presents a combination of different perspectives on organizations
and introduces the concept of “open-natural system models5” (Scott 2003: 115). This
concept emphasizes the importance of the environment on the structure, behavior and
survival  of  organizations  and  at  the  same  time  questions  the  rationality  of
organizations as economic actors (Scott 2003: 115). Since organizational
environments are important for understanding organizational structures and actions,
one must examine the context in which this behavior takes place (Pfeffer and Salancik
[1978] 2003: 1). In the section below, the elements and the dimensions of the
organizational environment are examined.
1.2. The Environment
The elements (i.e. clients, suppliers, norms, values) are situated on different layers of
the environment and are different from the environmental dimensions (Tung 1979).
First,  I  look  at  the  elements  and  layers  of  the  environment,  and  then  I  discuss  the
environmental dimensions or characteristics.
1.2.1. Layers of the Environment
Organizations are different from the environment (Luhmann [1984] 1995: 17), which
is always more complex (Luhmann [1984] 1995: 182). The environment of
organizations consists of the totality of physical and social factors taken into
consideration in the process of decision-making (Duncan 1972: 314). The
environment of an organization is internal (comprised of all relevant physical and
social factors inside the organizational boundaries, such as organizational objectives
and goals, products and services) and external (comprised of all relevant physical and
social factors outside the organizational boundaries) (Duncan 1972; Tung 1979). The
focus in the current study is on the external environment of the organization, which
can be further regarded as macro, aggregated and task (Osborn and Hunt 1974), or in
the resource dependence tradition - as broader, enacted and interactive environment
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 63).
The macro (broader) environment of an organization is the general institutional
context of a specific geographic area and it consists of those factors (educational,
5 According to Scott (2003), organizational ecology, resource dependence and institutional theory
belong to the “open-natural system models.”
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legal-political, and socio-cultural) that have important influence on organizations
(Osborn and Hunt 1974: 231). The aggregated (enacted) environment consists of non-
organizational collections, such as associations, interest groups and other
constituencies that impact organizational behavior (Osborn and Hunt 1974). It
imposes the norms and values on the focal organization (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003
[1978]: 63). It is important to note that the macro and the aggregated environment
represent the larger and more general framework which constrains organizational
behavior (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 63). The boundaries of those layers of the
environment can be the nation-state, the region (or the state) or a certain geographic
area in which the organization evolves (Osborn and Hunt 1974).
The task (interactive) environment of an organization is part of the larger framework
(macro and aggregated) and is comprised of entities with which the focal system
interacts (through input-output transactions) in order to survive and grow (Osborn and
Hunt 1974: 232; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 63). The elements of the task
environment are regarded as other organizations (Osborn and Hunt 1974), such as the
customers (both distributors and final users), suppliers (of material, labor, equipment,
capital, and work space), and competitors (for both markets and resources) (Dill
1958).6
The environment impacts organizational behavior (Dill 1958) through exerting
selective pressure (Terrebarry 1968). Thus, organizations are contingent on the
environment in which they evolve (Luhmann [1984] 1995). According to some
researchers (Luhmann [1984] 1995: 184), organizational contingency on the
environment can be presented in two different ways depending on the way the
environment is viewed: (1) if the environment is perceived as a resource, then the
organization experience contingency as dependency (resource dependence
perspective) (Yuchtman and Seashore 1967), and (2) if the environment is perceived
as information, then the organization experiences contingency as uncertainty
(institutional theory) (Dill 1958; Duncan 1972). Luhmann [1984] 1995: 184) stated
that “these two ways to view the organizational contingency on the environment are
6 Dill (1958) considered the regulatory bodies (government agencies, unions, interfirm associations) as
being part of the task environment of an organization. Herein, I follow Osborn and Hunt (1974) who
considered these entities as being part of the aggregated environment.
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not mutually exclusive because information can also be treated as a resource and
because problems of information can arise in relation to resources, but the system’s
internal forms of managing contingency diverge, depending on which way is chosen.”
As it was mentioned earlier, the elements that compose the environment (clients,
suppliers, and competitors) are not the same as the environmental dimensions or
characteristics (Tung 1979). Many researchers tried to identify relevant environmental
dimensions (Duncan 1972; Terrebarry 1968; Thompson 1967; Tung 1972). Below,
the characteristics of the environment relevant to the current study are presented.
1.2.2. Dimensions (Characteristics) of Organizational Environment
The organizations under scrutiny evolve in transition environments characterized by
high level of complexity, instability and non-routiness due to the process of
institutional change. Therefore, I regard the following dimensions of organizational
environment – (1) complexity; (2) change rate, and (3) routiness (versus non-
routiness) of problem/opportunity states.
A) Complexity
Environmental complexity refers to the number and heterogeneity of the factors that a
focal organization has to take into account when making decisions (Emery and Trist
1965, Dess and Beard 1984; Duncan 1972; Terreberry 1968; Thompson 1967). As the
number and diversity of environmental components increases, organizations
experience difficulties to understand the relationships between them (Tung 1979).
Hence, the level of environmental uncertainty increases (Dess and Beard 1984).
B) Change Rate
The change rate of an environment refers to the “frequency and magnitude of
turbulence that prevails among environmental factors and components” (Tung 1979:
675). In addition, the change pattern can be predictable (stable) and/or not predictable
(unstable) (Dess and Beard 1984; Jurkovich 1974; Tung 1979). When the relevant
environmental components experience constant change and the pattern of change is
hard to predict, the organizations find it difficult to keep up (Tung 1979). This
situation increases the level of environmental uncertainty (Thompson 1967; Duncan
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1972; Tung 1979). Furthermore, the change rate has the single greatest effect on the
variation in the environmental uncertainty (Duncan 1972; Tung 1979).
C) Routiness of Problem/Opportunity State
The routiness of problem/opportunity states refers to the variability and analyzability
of the stimuli confronting the organization (Duncan 1972; Jurkovich 1974; Tung
1979).  Variability  is  related  to  the  number  of  stimuli  and  the  analyzability  –  to
whether existing solutions can be applied to new stimuli. It is said that when the
variability is high and the stimuli are not easily analyzable, the level of uncertainty is
higher (Tung 1979).
The current research focuses on organizational environments in transition. They are
extremely complex, experiencing high level of change and nonroutiness of
problem/opportunity states. The level of uncertainty for such environments is
extremely elevated. Thus, predictability of the future state of things becomes very
difficult (Terreberry 1968). Organizations evolving in such environments “live on the
brink of chaos” (Jurkovich 1974: 389). “Situations change rapidly and unpredictably.
No matter how exhaustive and reliable information is, it tends to increase the potential
for conflict” (Jurkovich 1974: 390). The process of transition and the transition
environments are examined in detail in Chapter 2.
In any environment, organizations can function on different layers. For many small
organizations, the enacted environment is geographically confined.
1.2.3. Local, National, and International/Global Layer of the Environment
As Gillespie and Perry (1975: 29) suggest, the organizational environment must be
further segmented in order to facilitate analysis and theory building “in a manner
which maximizes the variation between content areas and minimizes the variation
within content areas.” Following the neo-institutionalists, the environment can be
regarded as local, national, and international/global assuming that small organizations
decide a priori which layer is the most appropriate to import meaning from (Scott
2001).
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Local enacted environment is when the relevant constituencies (i.e. clients,
competitors) are located on a local level – a city and/or a particular region. National
environment is when the company addresses audiences located within the boundaries
of the nation-state.
International/global enacted environment is when the relevant constituencies are
located outside of the national borders of the focal organizations. In this research, the
organizations functioning on this layer do not physically cross the national borders but
address external or outside the national borders audiences through partnership
arrangements.
Herein, I do not distinguish between the evaluating audiences on the different
environmental layers (local, national, international/global) because all actors evolving
in the transition environment as well as the international organizations that have
originated in more stable environments but are looking for partners in the transition
environment experience elevated transaction costs (Meyer 2001).
So far, I presented the organizational environment, its elements and its
dimensions/characteristics. In order to better understand the organization-environment
relationship, in the next section I look at the concept of organizational legitimacy
existing on the borderline between the two.
1.3. Theoretical Approaches to Organizational Legitimacy
In the field of organizational studies, there are two main theoretical approaches
regarding organizational legitimacy (Suchman 1995): evaluative (also sometimes
called strategic) adopted by most strategists (Parsons 1960; Thompson [1967] 2003),
including population ecologists (Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991; Hannan and
Freeman 1977, 1984) and resource dependence theorists (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990;
Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003; Zimmerman and Zeitz
2002), and cognitive (or sometimes called institutional) adopted by neo-
institutionalists (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer
and Scott 1983; Scott 1991, 2001, 2003; Zucker 1977).
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The difference in the way the two schools interpret organizational legitimacy comes
from  the  different  way  they  view  the  organization,  the  environment  and  their
relationship (Kraatz and Zajac 1997). The strategists adopted a technical perspective
that regards organizations as rational actors functioning in a complex environment
(Thompson 1967) “within which a product or a service is exchanged in a market such
that organizations are rewarded for effective and efficient control of the work
process” (Scott and Meyer 1983: 140). Hence, they emphasize the exchange
interdependencies (Meyer and Rowan 1977) in place between the organization and its
task environment (Thompson [1967] 2003).
On another side, based on the sociological tradition, new institutionalists regard the
organization as being confined by its environment (Tolbert and Zucker 1983) since it
is a reflection of the prevailing societal myths (in the form of institutionalized
practices and procedures) rather than actors involved in exchanges with their
environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The organizational environments are
perceived as comprised of “cultural elements, that is taken-for-granted beliefs and
widely promulgated rules that serve as templates for organizing” (DiMaggio and
Powell 1991: 27-28). Thus, neo-institutionalists emphasize the institutional rather than
the technical aspect of the organizational environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In
general, institutional environments have a broader definition – it is the meaning
system in which an organization resides (Palmer and Biggart 2005) and it includes
norms, standards, and expectations held by relevant constituencies (Kraatz and Zajac
1996).
In addition, in terms of the way the two approaches regard the relationship
“organization-environment,” the technical environments exercise control on the
organizational output while the institutional environments reward organizations for
establishing correct structures and processes by conferring them with legitimacy
(Scott 1991: 167).
The concept of legitimacy is developed on the borderline between the organization
and the environment in which it exists (Baum and Rowley 2005: 6) (see Fig. 1).
“Legitimacy provides the linkage between organizational and societal level of
analysis” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975: 131) and helps researchers understand the
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relationship “organization-environment” by providing some insights on organizational
viability and survival (Scott 2001: 158).
Fig. 1: Interdependence between the Organization and the Environment
There are two main approaches to organizational legitimacy - evaluative and cognitive
– discussed in the next section.
1.3.1. Evaluative Approach to Organizational Legitimacy
Since organizations are collective actors claiming to accomplish some specific set of
ends, they need public support (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Legitimacy is perceived
as  an  appraisal  of  organizational  actions  by  the  outer  societal  systems  based  on  the
congruence between organizational actions and the value system of the larger super-
ordinate system (Parsons 1960: 175). Even though Parsons (1960: 176) states that the
process of legitimation does not legitimate the value system of an organization but its
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actions, the latter7 themselves reveal the value system of an organization (Dowling
and Pfeffer 1975).
Within the evaluative approach towards organizational legitimacy, I examine the
population ecology and resource dependence view on the concept.
A) Population Ecology
According to population ecologists, legitimacy is associated with public approval and
it is directly linked to organizational survival (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
Legitimacy is regarded as a valuable asset, which can increase the life chances of an
organization (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
Indeed, population ecologists associate organizational legitimacy with two
organizational characteristics – reliability and accountability (Hannan and Freeman
1984). Reliability is defined as the ability to “produce collective products of a given
quality repeatedly” (Hannan and Freeman 1984: 153). Accountability is related to the
ability of organizations to “account rationally for their actions” (Hannan and Freeman
1984: 153). In terms of accountability, organizations are not obliged to have certain
processes and procedures in place; they just have to make internally consistent
arguments  that  those  exist  to  ensure  the  repeated  rational  allocation  of  resources
(Hannan and Freeman 1984). As a result, the external approval favors inertial
organizational structures that can demonstrate reliability and accountability based on
reproduction of processes and routines within the organization (Hannan and Freeman
1984).
At the same time, population ecologists perceive legitimacy as a constraint on
organizational behavior in more general terms, and on organizational change and
adaptation, in particular (Hannan and Freeman 1977). Change undermines the already
acquired legitimacy based on the external requirements for reliability of performance
(Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991).
7 Organizational actions are role behavior, which is sanctioned by norms, justified in their turn by
values (Katz and Kahn 1966: 68). Thus, roles, norms, and values furnish three interrelated bases for the
integration of organizations (Katz and Kahn 1966: 68).
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B) Resource Dependence
In the resource dependence tradition, legitimacy is viewed as a valuable resource,
which organizations use in order to gain access to other resources required for their
activities (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003). This way they ensure their continuous
adaptation and survival (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003). In addition, some authors
claim a relationship between legitimacy and organizational performance since they
assume that the attracted resources are positively correlated with profitability (Mazza
1999: 42). Thus, the ultimate sign of legitimate organization is its profit making
ability (Mazza 1999: 42).
Since the resource-holders are the outside constituencies of an organization, the latter
are the ones that confer organizational legitimacy (Perrow 1970; Pfeffer and Salancik
[1978] 2003). It is said that legitimacy lies in the eye of the beholder (Ashforth and
Gibbs 1990; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). Indeed, “legitimation is the process
whereby an organization justifies to a peer or subordinate system its right to exist, that
is  to  continue  to  import,  transform,  and  export  energy,  material,  or  information”
(Maurer 1971: 361). Hence, legitimacy is always controlled by the outside of an
organization (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003: 194).
It is interesting to note that legitimacy is known more often when organizational
actions are perceived to be illegitimate rather than legitimate (Pfeffer and Salancik
[1978] 2003: 194)8.  This is due to the fact that when an actual or potential
discrepancy exists between the organizational value system and the value system of
the larger super-ordinate system, organizations are subject to sanctions (legal,
economic or social sanctions) (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). Hence, organizations take
steps to guarantee that their actions are legitimate (Parsons 1960).
A very important property of organizational legitimacy is the fact that it is socially-
constructed (Berger and Luckman 1967), which means that it does not lie in the
organization itself. Rather, legitimacy is a condition which the organization has
accomplished based on relating with the environment and accepting certain rules and
8 Organizational legitimacy is not identical with economic exchange as well as what is legal or illegal
according to the law system within a society (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). In addition, efficiency and
performance are not sufficient to proclaim an organization as legitimate (Ashford and Gibbs 1990).
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norms of the larger societal system (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003 [1978]: 194). This way
the environment exercises certain external control on the organization (Pfeffer and
Salancik [1978] 2003: 43).
At  the  same  time,  strategists  do  not  agree  with  the  passive  view  of  accepting  the
environmental control per se. They state that organizations can actively manage
environmental demands by adopting different strategies in order to alter the
environment so that it fits organizational capabilities (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978]
2003: 106).
Strategists regard organizational legitimacy as being ambiguous (Pfeffer and Salancik
[1978] 2003: 195) and problematic (Ahsforth and Gibbs 1990). It is ambiguous
because it is not clear how large the part of the social system that  supports the
activities of an organization should be (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003: 194). It is
also not known by which processes organizations evaluate the legitimacy of
organizational actions (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003: 194). In addition, the mere
standards of desirability of the external environment are varying from crystallized to
ambiguous (Thompson [1967] 2003: 85).
Legitimacy is problematic because of contradicting requirements of different
stakeholders’ groups, changing norms and values, and difficulty in operationalization
of social values (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Thus, organizational environments are
considered not to be dependable based on changing requirements imposed on the
organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003: 2). When environments change the
organizations  face  the  dilemma  whether  to  change  with  them  (Pfeffer  and  Salancik
[1978] 2003: 2). The changing environment creates hurdles for the focal organization
in terms of ensuring the needed resources for organization’s operations.
Furthermore, strategists view organizational legitimacy as being retrospective since
organizations review their past actions in the context of the current social values and
norms (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003: 195).
Organizational institutionalists offer a complementing view on organizational
legitimacy, which is called cognitive approach to organizational legitimacy.
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1.3.2. Cognitive Approach to Organizational Legitimacy
In order to understand the way the institutionalists view legitimacy, it is important to
look at the way they regard institutions. The latter are the building blocks of social
life. Institutions are comprised of three elements – regulative, normative and cultural-
cognitive – that “together with associated activities and resources, provide stability
and meaning to social life” (Scott 2001: 48). In general, institutions are resistant to
change (Giddens 1984: 24). They also tend to be reproduced and transmitted across
generations through certain “carriers” – symbols, relational systems, routines and
artifacts (Scott 2001: 48). Furthermore, institutions operate on multiple levels – from
the world system to the interpersonal relationships (Scott 2001: 48).
The importance of institutions for understanding the concept of legitimacy lies in the
fact that they control and limit social action (Scott 2001: 50). Scott (2001: 50) states
that institutions provide the guidelines for social behavior as well as the restrictions by
“defining legal, moral and cultural boundaries setting off legitimate from illegitimate
activities” (Scott 2001: 50).
Scott  (2001:  50)  stated  that  institutions  are  both  a  property  and  a  process.  They  are
property at any given time because they represent the state of the social order (Scott
2001: 50). At the same time, the process of institutionalization (and
deinstitutionalization) is the process when the institutions are formed (Scott 2001: 50).
Legitimacy can  also  be  both  perceived  as  a  property  and  a  process  –  the  process  of
legitimation.
New institutionalists view legitimacy emerging from the organizational compliance to
the expectations of the external socio-cultural environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977;
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Even though the institutionalists emphasize the cultural-
cognitive or taken-for-granted aspects of legitimacy (rather than normative and
regulative), the elements based on which an organization is proclaimed as legitimate
or illegitimate are again externally assessed (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The cultural-
cognitive meaning is more likely to be imported from the environment (Scott 1991:
170) since culture is viewed as a “tool kit” from which organizations choose their
ends (or purposes) and the strategies to accomplish them (Swidler 1986). This way,
organizational actions are understood in the larger socio-cultural environment
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(Dobbin 2004; Zucker 1977). Hence, Meyer and Scott (1983) and Scott (1991: 170)
defined legitimacy as “the degree of cultural support for an organization – the extent
to which the array of established cultural accounts provides explanation for its
existence.”
For the neo-institutional researchers, organizations are driven to adopt practices and
procedures defined by prevailing concepts of rationalization, called “myths9” (Meyer
and Rowan 1977) or “cultural understandings” (Zucker 1977). They may not have
anything to do with organizational efficiency or rationality (DiMaggio and Powell
1983) but they tend to persist as part of the objective reality (Zucker 1977) because
they are considered “proper, adequate, rational, and necessary” by external
constituents (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This is why organizations must integrate them
(in the form of structural elements) in order to gain legitimacy and increase their
survival chances (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Thus, neo-institutionalists envision a
relationship between legitimacy and stability since organizations that do not adopt
legitimate elements are more vulnerable to claims that they are “negligent, irrational,
or unnecessary” (Meyer and Scott 1977).
It is important to note that for neo-institutionalists, the process of legitimation is the
same as the process of institutionalization (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Suchman 1995)
since the organizational actions are perceived to be legitimate only when they reflect
the highly institutionalized and thus taken-for-granted elements of the societal
environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991). In fact,
institutionalization is perceived as both a process and a property (Zucker 1977). It is
the  process  of  transmission  of  the  socially-defined  reality  among  actors  (Zucker
1977), which corresponds to the process of legitimation. At the same time, at any
point of the process, “the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less a taken-
for-granted part of the social reality” (Zucker 1977: 728), which corresponds to the
legitimacy property of an organization.
9 For the purpose of the study, I utilize the term “myths.”
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1.3.3. Evaluative vs. Cognitive Approach to Organizational Legitimacy
The basic difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that while the
strategists adopt a managerial perspective and view organizations as being able to use
actions (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) in order to get (or maintain and repair) societal
support, the institutionalists regard the cultural pressures that sector-wide structuration
dynamics generate on organizational actions (Suchman 1995). In other words,
strategists view organizations as actively managing their legitimacy by deciding on
which strategies to adopt in order to satisfy the sometimes conflicting demands of
various stakeholder groups. And the institutionalists regard the manager’s decisions
being constructed by the same belief systems that determine audiences’ reactions.
Hence, the latter adopt a more passive view on organizations as merely accepting the
norms and expectations imposed by the outer super-ordinate system, which makes
organizations in fact choose from a pre-defined set of alternatives.
This is directly related to how the two groups view the process of legitimation. For the
strategists, the process of legitimation is when the organizations act in order to
increase their perceived legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975: 122). For the
institutionalists, the process of legitimation and the process of institutionalization (the
collective structuration of fields) are the same (Suchman 1995).
The evaluative approach views legitimacy as a resource that an organization can
manage (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). The institutionalists, on the other side, do not
view legitimacy as a commodity that can be exchanged but as “a condition reflecting
perceived consonance with relevant rules and laws, normative support or alignment
with cultural-cognitive frameworks” (Scott 2001: 59). In addition,  legitimacy cannot
be perceived as an input to the production process like the rest of the resources an
organization utilizes in its activities (Scott 2001: 59). It has a rather symbolic value,
which has to be displayed or signaled to the interested constituencies (Scott 2001: 59).
1.3.4. An Integrative Approach to Organizational Legitimacy
Even if the above-mentioned differences between the evaluative and cognitive
approach to organizational legitimacy do persist, the line between them is not a clear-
cut since a rapprochement is observed between institutional theory on one side and
population ecology and resource dependency on the other side (DiMaggio and Powell
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1991: 32). A very good example is the shift in studies reflecting the institutional
tradition – while the early works viewed the environment as imposing structures on
individual organizations, the latter ones emphasize differences among organizations in
the way they respond to the institutional pressures (Scott 2001: 151). Indeed, all the
theories regarding legitimacy are converging on the ideas that “organizations actively
participate in the social construction of the environment” but their ability to exercise
strategic choice is constrained by the socio-cultural environment, in which they exist
(Lawrence 1999: 161).
In accordance to the converging theoretical approaches, Suchman (1995) adopted an
integrative approach to organizational legitimacy, integrating both the evaluative and
cognitive  dimensions  of  legitimacy.  He  also  explicitly  acknowledged  the  role  of  the
different social constituencies in the legitimation dynamics by stating that “legitimacy
is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
and definitions” (Suchman 1995: 574).
Even though there is a trend towards bridging the gap between the evaluative and the
cognitive approach, for the purpose of this study, I adopt a strategic approach to
organizational legitimacy. There are several reasons for this. The organizations under
scrutiny evolve in transition environments characterized by institutional vacuum and
the lack of institutional framework that can guide organizational behavior. Hence, the
norms and values that an organization has to adhere to in order to be granted
legitimacy have not been completely established yet. In some industries, norms and
values may get imported from more stable environments or organizations may turn to
the taken-for-granted signals existing on a cognitive level. In these environments, it is
the managers to decide which characteristics to acquire or use in order to
communicate in a meaningful way their conformity to the evaluating audiences’
expectations.
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, organizational legitimacy is defined as a
perception that an organization adheres to the evaluating audiences’ requirements
and expectations. It is achieved based on the use of valid signals of legitimacy.
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As it was mentioned earlier, legitimacy is a complex and multidimensional concept
existing on the borderline between the organization and its environment (Baum and
Rowley 2005: 6). To reflect the multi-faceted character of legitimacy, different
typologies have been developed. The next section examines the existing typologies of
legitimacy.
2. Types of Legitimacy
In the management literature, several legitimacy typologies exist depending on the
context examined and the particular research problem addressed (Dacin, Oliver and
Roy 2007; Higgins and Gulati 2006; Scott 2001; Suchman 1995, among others). In
fact, institutions as sources of legitimacy determine the types of legitimacy conferred.
As mentioned earlier, institutions are “composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and
regulative elements that together with associated activities and resources, provide
stability and meaning to social life” (Scott 2001: 48). Thus, Scott (2001: 61) based on
the three pillars of institutions, proposed three main types of legitimacy: regulatory10,
normative and cognitive11, which became the commonly-accepted legitimacy
typology. Later, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) added a forth type – legitimacy coming
from the industry.
2.1. Commonly-Accepted Legitimacy Typology
2.1.1. Regulatory Legitimacy
Max Weber ([1964] 1997) was one of the first sociologists to focus on the importance
of legitimacy for the organization (Ruef and Scott 1998). When he regarded social
action, Weber ([1964] 1997: 124) stated that it may be oriented according to some
“legitimate order.” This system of order is perceived by actors as “determined maxims
or rules” (Weber [1964] 1997: 127). Not behaving according to the order leads to
10 In his seminal work, Suchman (1995) discussed three main types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and
cognitive. Among these three types, only pragmatic legitimacy does not correspond to the widely-
accepted typology presented by Scott (1995). According to Suchman (1995), pragmatic legitimacy is
granted by the most immediate constituencies of the organization or its task environment. In
comparison to pragmatic legitimacy, regulatory legitimacy has a different meaning and it is perceived
as being more relevant for the purpose of this study.
11 Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) call the regulative legitimacy – sociopolitical regulatory legitimacy,
the normative legitimacy – sociopolitical normative legitimacy and the cognitive legitimacy – cognitive
legitimacy.
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disadvantageous consequences (in the form of reaction of disapproval) and will not fit
actor’s perception of duty (Weber [1964] 1997: 124).
Regulative legitimacy is conformity to regulatory standards, rules and laws (Scott
2003: 136; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). In general, regulatory bodies (governments,
trade associations, professional organizations) set “explicit regulative processes”
(Scott 1995: 35), which include rules, monitoring and sanctions in case of non
conformity (Scott 1995: 35). The mechanisms through which the regulative processes
function (or the sources of regulative legitimacy) can be informal (i.e. shaming and
shunning activities) or highly formalized and assigned to specialized actors (Scott
2001:  52).  Examples  of  the  latter  are  government  bodies,  such  as  state  agencies
(Baum and Oliver 1991; Ruef and Scott 1998) on different levels – local, regional,
national, international.
Previous studies (Delmar and Shane 2004) show that regulatory legitimacy is the first
type that organizations try to acquire in order to gain legitimacy. Scott (2001) sees the
legitimacy as continuum and regulatory legitimacy being at the beginning of it.
2.1.2. Normative Legitimacy12
Weber ([1964] 1997) had distinguished between regulatory and normative legitimacy
emphasizing the binding character of the two. Normative legitimacy though is
associated with rules, which are not enforced by a specialized agency and have a
voluntary character. Normative legitimacy is derived from the congruence between
organizational goals and the broadly-accepted values and norms (Parsons 1960; Scott
2003: 136). Scott (2001: 54-55) defines values as  “conceptions  of  the  desirable”
associated with “standards to each existing structures or behaviors can be compared
with.” Norms contain the notions of “how things should be done” (Scott 2001: 54-55).
Moreover, the normative component places emphasis on “normative rules that
introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social life” (Scott
1995: 37). In other words, organizational actions are evaluated whether they are “the
12 Suchman (1995) calls this type of legitimacy ‘moral.” He states that the term “normative” refers to
all cultural regulatory processes, not just those involving a conscious assessment of right and wrong
while the term moral legitimacy avoids the ambiguity. The author has also distinguishes between
different types of moral legitimacy, which will not be regarded in this study.
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right thing to do” (Suchman 1995: 579). It is important to note though that
organizations have to apply not only generalized societal norms but also a variety of
standards that have originated in different professional fields (Ruef and Scott 1998;
DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Often, a source of normative legitimacy are the public
opinion (expert and non-expert) (Deephouse and Carter 2005), and professional
associations (Ruef and Scott 1998).
2.1.3. Cultural-Cognitive Legitimacy13
Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is based on the cultural-cognitive pillar (or elements) of
institutions (Scott 2001: 57). Cultural-cognitive elements are “the rules that specify
what types of actors are allowed to exist, what structural features they exhibit, what
procedures they can follow, and what meanings are associated with these actions”
(Ruef and Scott 1998: 879). In general, they are deeply embedded in the socio-cultural
environment and provide frameworks on which normative and regulative systems are
constructed (Ruef and Scott 1998). In other words, cultural-cognitive legitimacy
determines  the  rules  of  the  game  and  thus  constructs  the  social  reality  of  actors
(Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002). If an actor gains cultural-cognitive legitimacy, it is
accepted as “necessary or inevitable” (Suchman 1995). In this sense, the sources for
cultural-cognitive legitimacy are the widely-held cultural beliefs and taken-for-
granted assumptions or practices (Scott 2001; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Westphal,
Gulati and Shortell 1997).
According to Suchman (1995), the cultural-cognitive legitimacy is “the most subtle
and the most powerful” as well as the most difficult to obtain and manipulate. If
“things being otherwise” is unthinkable, changes become very difficult or even
impossible (Suchman 1995).
Even though theoretically one can establish a difference between the normative and
cultural-cognitive legitimacy, in practice, very often it is difficult to distinguish
between them (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).
13 Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is emphasized by neo-institutionalists, such as Meyer and Rowan
(1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Zucker (1977), etc.
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2.1.4. Legitimacy Derived from the Industry
Industry legitimacy is conformity to practices derived from the industry (Zimmerman
and Zeitz 2002). In most of the cases, an overlap exists between the broader societal
and the industry dimensions of legitimacy. However, legitimacy derived from the
industry is theoretically justified when different sources of legitimacy are in conflict
when assessing the congruence of an organization with its environment. For example,
for organizations evolving in global industries, there might be a misalignment
between local standards and standards set on a global level. Furthermore, industries
vary on their legitimacy level – for example, a new industry provides its member
companies with little legitimacy due to lack of history, no established standards, and
novel practices (Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002).
The regulative (rules), normative (norms) and cultural-cognitive (beliefs) elements are
the building blocks of institutions (Scott 2001: 49). In fact, for Scott (2001) the three
systems are related and they move from the regulative through the normative to the
cultural-cognitive or they represent a continuum moving from the conscious to the
unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken-for-granted.
Besides the commonly-accepted typology of organizational legitimacy, below, I
present some additional typologies discussed in the extant literature.
2.1.5. Other Typologies
A) Legitimacy of Upper Echelon
Higgins and Gulati (2006) examined the context of young IPOs and the signaling
value  of  their  upper  echelon  (comprised  of  board  members  and  top  managers).  The
main premise of the article is that the composition of a young IPO’s top management
team signals legitimacy that in turn can impact the way investors evaluate the firm
(Higgins and Gulati 2006). In this context, they developed the following typology of
legitimacy: resource, role and endorsement legitimacy (Higgins and Gulati 2006). In
general terms, resource legitimacy is a dimension of legitimacy that is associated with
access to resources that can improve the firm’s technology, competitive stance and/or
marketing capabilities (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Role legitimacy is related to the
ability of the top managers to effectively fulfill certain key leadership positions
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(Higgins and Gulati 2006). And, the third type - endorsement legitimacy - is
associated with its ability to attract key endorsers from the investment community
(Higgins and Gulati 2006).
B) Legitimacy of Strategic Alliances
By applying institutional approach to strategic alliances, Dacin, Oliver and Roy
(2007) distinguished among five types of legitimacy: market, relational, social,
investment, and alliance legitimacy. Relational legitimacy14 is  associated  with  the
perceived worthiness of an organization as an attractive alliance partner (Dacin,
Oliver and Roy 2007). In general, organizations are capable of communicating their
worthiness as a partner to external parties via signals (Spence 1974).
The typology developed by Dacin, Oliver and Roy (2007) comes close to the typology
utilized in this research. In comparison, while Dacin, Oliver and Roy (2007) deal with
strategic alliances, I regard strategic outsourcing partnerships from the point of view
of the outsourcing service supplier. These outsourcee organizations evolve in
transition environments characterized by high level of environmental uncertainty.
Hence, they experience liability of origin and as a result, they are even more prone to
signal their adherence with the requirements of the stakeholders.
Since legitimacy is a very complex construct, I distinguish between two types in order
to better capture the aspects that need to be communicated to the external audiences
by the outsourcee organizations. The two legitimacy types were derived based on the
main risks identified by Quélin and Duhamel (2003: 656) faced by the outsourcer
when choosing an outsourcee: (1) risk linked to the services provider’s deficient
capabilities, and (2) risk of dependence on the service provider. Indeed, functional
legitimacy is comprised of all these elements, which help an organization to meet the
outsourcer’s concerns regarding deficient capabilities. And relational legitimacy is
comprised of dimensions that address the second risk – the risk of dependence on the
service provider.
.
14 The concept of ‘relational legitimacy’ is closely related to another concept - ‘relational quality.’ The
later was introduced by Arino, de la Torre and Ring (2001: 111) and it means “the extent to which the
partners  feel  comfortable  and  are  willing  to  rely  on  trust  in  dealing  with  one  another.”  In  fact,  I
consider relational quality as being part of relational legitimacy.
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In the next section, I present the two types of legitimacy - functional and relational –
and their respective elements.
2.2. Functional and Relational Legitimacy
Organizational legitimacy is a complex multidimensional construct (Deephouse and
Carter 2005). The functional and relational aspects of legitimacy are also
multidimensional constructs, each of them being comprised of several dimensions
regarded in the section below.
2.2.1. Functional Legitimacy – Elements
Functional  legitimacy signals  the  worthiness  of  a  partner  based  on  its  access  and/or
control of important and valuable resources and capabilities. Organizational resources
are firm-specific assets that are difficult to imitate by other organizations (Teece,
Pisano and Shuen 1997). Organizational capabilities are the activities and processes
through which an organization exploits and combines its resources in order to achieve
the desired ends (Amit and Schoemaker 1993).
2.2.2. Relational Legitimacy – Elements
Relational legitimacy is associated with the perceived worthiness of an organization
as an attractive partner (Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007). Herein, I regard one particular
aspect of relational legitimacy (according to Dacin et al. 2007 definition) – whether
an organization is reliable as a partner (i.e. whether it can comply with the
specifications of a contract). Relational legitimacy includes valid signals of the
worthiness of a partner based on communicating two sets of elements: partnership-
related (trustworthiness and reliability) and organization-specific (accountability,
stability and visibility).
The elements of functional and relational legitimacy cannot be directly experienced
by the exchange party unless the latter enters into a partnership with the organization
under scrutiny. Thus, the organization can utilize other observable organizational
characteristics to imply the access to relevant resources and capabilities as well as its
worthiness as a partner.
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I consider functional and relational legitimacy being independent from one another.
This means that organizational resources and capabilities are independent from the
perception of firm’s reliability as a partner. A firm may possess the relevant resources
and  capabilities  but  this  does  not  imply  that  it  will  fulfill  the  requirements  of  a
contract in a proper way. At the same time, a company may be a reliable partner but it
may not have the needed resources and competencies to accomplish the project.
Thus far, I defined and discussed the functional and relational types of organizational
legitimacy.  Now,  it  is  important  to  make  the  distinction  between  the  dimensions  of
functional and relational legitimacy and their sources. In the next section, I define
what it is understood under “source” of organizational legitimacy by distinguishing it
from legitimacy determinants.
3. Determinants and Antecedents (Sources) of Organizational Legitimacy
The determinants and the antecedents of organizational legitimacy are not the same.
Determinants of organizational legitimacy are those environmental conditions that
trigger the process of legitimation. The antecedents of organizational legitimacy are
the characteristics of the organization that precede the legitimacy as a condition15
which can be achieved at one particular point in time. Another way of calling the
antecedents is sources of organizational legitimacy and this is the term adopted for the
purpose of this study.
Both the process and the condition have a dynamic aspect to them. I look at those two
aspects of organizational legitimacy in depth in order to better understand what leads
to organizational legitimacy.
3.1. Determinants of Organizational Legitimacy
The process of legitimation implies that “organizations act to increase their perceived
legitimacy” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975: 122).
15 Herein, instead of the term “property” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) regarding legitimacy as a
characteristic of the organization, I use the term “condition” as it implies certain dynamism associated
with the state of being legitimate.
43
Since any process has its determinants, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) have identified
what determines the process of legitimation or the process of synchronization between
organizational structures and actions on one side and the rules, norms and beliefs of
the broader societal environment on the other side. Those determinants create
discomfort  in  the  organization  and  this  way  they  exercise  pressure  on  it  to  change
according to the rules adopted on a higher societal level. In fact, an organization has
to experience misfit with the environment in order to undertake the process of
legitimation.
According to Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), the determinants of organizational
legitimation include: changing societal norms and values (institutional change),
competitive dynamics between the focal organization and other actors functioning in
the same field (selection pressures), organization’s methods of operation and
organization’s output (input-output mechanism and its fit with the organizational
environment). Below, the above-mentioned determinants of organizational legitimacy
are examined.
3.1.1. Institutional Change
Institutions change over time, which implies that societal rules, norms and beliefs
based on institutions go through a process of transformation as well. This creates
sources of pressure on organizations and ultimately motivates them to change
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).
From a theoretical perspective, the sources that can trigger the process of institutional
change can be exogenous and endogenous to the organizational field. According to
Leblebici et al. (1991), “exogenous elements can penetrate the institutionalized
context and produce change in organizational practices.” In example, change of
political regime, economic and social processes (Galvin 2002). The source of change
can also be endogenous to the organizational field, such as the emergence and decline
of powerful actors or activities (Galvin 2002). Moreover, the change processes can be
both incremental and discontinuous (Scott 2001: 48), which can create either
temporary or sudden discomfort for the organizations. I look at institutional change
again in Chapter 2 when the legitimacy challenges of organizations evolving in
transition environments are addressed.
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3.1.2. Selection Pressures
The competitive dynamics in a population of organizations can also create pressures
on organizations to adopt a form that has been proven to be successful and thus has
been widely-accepted by other organizations. This process is known as isomorphism
based on competitive pressures (which are different from institutional isomorphism).
Thus, intensive competition creates discomfort by elevating the level of uncertainty
regarding the survival chances. In this case, organizations will adopt a form, which
has been proven to work. This creates certain inertial pressures on organizations
within a population, which later may be detrimental when another change process
starts evolving (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003).
3.1.3. The Input-Output Process
The resource dependence perspective views the organization and its environment as
being interdependent (Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003). Indeed, the input-output
mechanism links the organization and its environment. When either the processes or
products of these processes do not fit the environmental requirements, the
organization will experience discomfort. According to the resource dependence view,
change  does  not  come  from  changing  societal  rules,  norms  and  beliefs  but  rather  it
originates internally and affects the way things have been done within the
organization.
As it was mentioned earlier, the determinants are different from the
antecedents/sources of organizational legitimacy. In the next section, I examine the
antecedents or sources of organizational legitimacy.
3.2. Sources of Organizational Legitimacy
A source of organizational legitimacy is an organizational characteristic based on
which an organization can be evaluated by external audiences. At any particular point
in time, these characteristics can be viewed as results of certain processes. The
characteristics can be internal to the organization (i.e. age) or it can be granted to the
organization by association with other actors in the field (i.e. a certificate by a
reputable industry actor). In the latter case, the source of legitimacy lies in the
relationship  with  the  external  entity,  which  at  the  same  time  can  be  an  evaluating
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stakeholder  group.  Depending  on  the  result  of  the  assessment  process  of  the
organizational characteristics, an organization can be granted legitimacy.
The process of external assessment is subjective - each stakeholder grants legitimacy
depending on the weight of importance it gives to a certain source and the particular
needs it experiences at the moment of evaluation. The latter reflects how the
organization granting legitimacy fits with its own environment. These two conditions
are interrelated – in example, if an organization experiences pressing needs for certain
input, it may give a higher weight to the organization that can provide it and grant
legitimacy in an easier manner. Since organizational legitimacy lies in the eye of the
beholder (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990), the weight allocated to each characteristic is
subjective as long as the evaluation process is individually accomplished by the
interested stakeholder and the latter did not reply on somebody else’s previously-done
evaluation.
Not all organizational characteristics can be used as sources of legitimacy. Only
characteristics with signaling value attached are considered sources of legitimacy. For
this reason, they have to be observable, costly to imitate and share common meaning
between the legitimacy-claiming and legitimacy-granting entities. Since the
congruence  of  the  rules,  norms  and  beliefs  of  an  organization  with  those  of  the
environment has to be communicated from the sending to the receiving party and
understood by the two parties the same way, the signals have to “make sense”
(institutional perspective). Since legitimacy is a complex construct, each source will
signal certain aspects (or dimensions) of legitimacy.
This study focuses on communicating meaning between the legitimacy-claiming and
legitimacy-granting entities based on portfolio of signals. Any organization can
choose among many alternatives in building its portfolio. The challenge is to pick the
most appropriate signals, which implies very good knowledge on the evaluating
audiences’ requirements and expectations.
It is important to note that I do not look at how the receiving party interprets the
signals (or performs the assessment process internally) but rather how this affects the
support the focal organization receives from interested stakeholders. It is assumed that
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if  the  receiving  party  interpreted  the  signals  the  same or  similar  way as  the  sending
party, the focal organization will receive more support since it is more likely that the
latter will be granted legitimacy, everything else being equal.
Acquiring legitimacy has certain consequences for the organization. They are
examined in the section below.
4. Consequences of Organizational Legitimacy
Suchman (1995) poses the important question “legitimacy for what?” and tries to
establish the difference between what is legitimacy and the consequences of
legitimacy. Even though Suchman (1995) states that organizations seek legitimacy for
many reasons,  he distinguishes between two sets of reasons – continuity versus
credibility and passive versus active support (Suchman 1995).
4.1. Being Worthy vs. Being Understood
The first set of reasons is associated with an increased “stability and
comprehensibility of organizational activities” (Suchman 1995: 574). An organization
may want to acquire legitimacy in order to be perceived as more worthy (Suchman
1995). For example, this may happen when the organization faces high level of
environmental uncertainty or when the organization is young (liability of newness)
and small (liability of smallness). As it is a valuable resource, legitimacy increases the
chances that an organization will be granted other resources from interested
stakeholders and thus, it influences in a positive way its survival chances. This way,
organizational stability goes up. The increased stability later will act against the
organization as it will be transformed into inertia. But from the moment of granting
legitimacy, organizational worth increases.
Another consequence of granting legitimacy is the fact that an organization is
understood by its external evaluators. The organization wants to be evaluated by the
audiences not only as more worthy (for resource granting purposes) but also as “more
meaningful, more predictable and more trustworthy” (Suchman 1995). This is an
important condition, which ensures that an organization is comprehensible and thus
there is a need of it in the larger societal framework. If the organization does not fit
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the meaning framework, it will be considered as not needed and then its survival will
be threatened.
4.2. Passive Support vs. Active Support
The second set of reasons why an organization seeks legitimacy is associated with
whether it looks for passive or active support (Suchman 1995). These two terms
“active support” versus “passive support” are associated with the level of legitimacy
threshold that an organization needs to reach in order to be proclaimed as legitimate.
This level depends on how involved is the audience. Thus, an organization which
wants passive support has to reach a minimum threshold level of legitimacy. As
Suchman (1995) puts it an organization may need just to be “left alone” by some
group of stakeholders. This may be related to employing some impression
management techniques by organizations, such as writing mission statements
containing certain words and phrases.
An organization requires an active support from audiences that are not only passively
interested in the way the organization is doing business but also actively involved in
the process of elevating expectations towards the organization as well as the process
of assessment. In this case, an organization will need to reach a higher threshold level
of legitimacy.
As Suchman (1995) states the two sets of reasons basically show the same thing –
when an organization wants a passive support, this can be associated with the
condition in which the organization is merely willing to “make sense” or gain
comprehensibility. And when an organization wants an active support, it wants to be
perceived as being worthy and/or valuable (Suchman 1995). As an important
resource, legitimacy makes organizations in general and their structures and processes
in particular understood and perceived as worthy (Scott 2001). This eventually
increases their life chances.
This study focuses on the attempts of small organizations evolving in transition
environments to be perceived as worthy and gain the active support of the evaluating
audiences. For this purpose, SMEs engage in building portfolio of signals which is
used to demonstrate their adherence to the requirements and expectations of relevant
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stakeholder groups. The ultimate goal is to translate the active support of various
constituencies into a better profit-making ability for the focal organization.
Whether and how an organization seeks legitimacy and its effect on profit-making
ability  of  an  organization  depends  on  the  strategies  employed.  In  the  next  section,  I
examine the strategies for gaining legitimacy. It is important to note that I do not
study the process of legitimation itself but the result of it by comparing the legitimacy
stocks of organizations at a particular point in time.
5. Strategies for Gaining Organizational Legitimacy
Following the strategists (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Oliver 1991), Suchman (1995)
sees the process of legitimation imposing considerable challenges on organizations.
The challenges come from conflicting audiences’ requirements as well as the
institutional “iron cage” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This means that an
organization cannot take a decision, which is outside the set of possible decisions
(Meyer and Rowan 1977). The process of legitimation can have three distinct forms –
gaining, maintaining and repairing legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Herein, I examine
only the process of building/gaining legitimacy.
Building legitimacy is typical for organizations which operate in new sectors with
problematic technologies or are still poorly institutionalized (Aldrich and Fiol 1994),
new entrants into old sectors (Suchman 1995) or simply when an organization is
getting established (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Legitimacy is a valuable but at the
same time a problematic resource (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Gaining legitimacy is a
challenging endeavor for most organizations since when the latter are in situation of
not having legitimacy, they normally face conditions known as liabilities – liability of
newness (Stinchcombe 1965), liability of market newness (first defined by Certo
2003) including liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995), liability of smallness
(Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983), and liability of origin (Bartlett and Ghoshal
2000).
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Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) and later Suchman (1995) identified three possible
strategies that can help organizations gain legitimacy: (1) Conform to the prevailing
rules, norms and cultural-cognitive beliefs; (2) Select audiences which will grant
organizational legitimacy and (3) Manipulate the broadly-defined rules, norms and
cultural-cognitive beliefs.
These three strategies fall into a continuum – from relatively passive conformity to
relatively active manipulation (Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995). Since changing the
social rules, norms and beliefs is a gradual and a difficult process, organizations will
concentrate generally either on conforming to the prevailing rules, norms and beliefs
or on trying to identify with legitimate actors (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and
Pfeffer 1975). That is to say that manipulation of the environment is “less
controllable, less common and consequently far less understood” in comparison to the
other two strategies (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990).
Herein, the strategy “selection of environment” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) is
considered as the first step to building a successful portfolio of valid signals. In other
words,  an  organization  has  to  be  clear  who the  evaluating  audiences  are  in  order  to
develop  its  portfolio  of  signals  as  a  first  step  in  the  legitimation  process.  After  the
selection is done, which is indeed an active process implying strategic rather than
institutional view on organizational legitimacy, the organization can build its
portfolio. For this, it has to select from a set of possible signals that can be used since
the characteristics utilized by an organization as signals have to make sense to the
relevant stakeholder groups.
To conclude, the current study examines the actions undertaken by SMEs evolving in
transition environments in order to gain organizational legitimacy. Indeed, I do not
look at the process of accumulation of organizational characteristics (signals) but
rather compare the legitimacy stocks of similar organizations at one particular point in
time (cross-sectional study). The perspective on organizational legitimacy adopted
herein is the strategic perspective since an organization can actively decide on the
sources of legitimacy it employs. According to the institutional perspective, the set of
sources/signals used is always constraint by the environment in which an organization
evolves. In transition environments though due to the institutional vacuum, the
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commonly-accepted rules, norms and beliefs are not clearly established. Hence, it is
difficult for organizations to identify a common set of sources/signals based on which
they can gain the support of the evaluating audiences.
Organizations in transition environments try to gain legitimacy in order to be
perceived as worthy and receive the active support of the evaluating audiences. The
organizations seek their support of different stakeholder groups in terms of making
and executing a decision to buy/distribute their products and/or services (clients and
distributors), or work for the organization (employees).
As it was mentioned earlier, in order to gain the active support of evaluating
audiences, organizations employ valid signals of legitimacy. In highly turbulent
environments,  it  is  difficult  for  organizations  to  know  what  the  valid  signals  of
legitimacy are since the institutions against which legitimacy is matched have not
been established yet. In the next Chapter 2, I examine the legitimacy issues in
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CHAPTER 2: LEGITIMACY ISSUES IN TRANSITION
ENVIRONMENTS
Transition environments (such as transition economies) are settings that shift from one
coordination mechanism to another one. They are characterized by high level of
vulnerability and instability (Meyer 2001). To a certain extent, today’s environment of
any  organization  is  perceived  to  be  turbulent,  that  is  to  say  it  changes  more  rapidly
than ever before (Terrebarry 1968). But herein, I particularly look at environments
where “processes arise from the field itself and not merely from the interactions of
component organizations” (Terrebarry 1968).
Any organization evolves in an environment with which it is inevitably intertwined. If
the environment experiences turbulence and instability, this impacts the state of the
organization as well. Therefore, in this study, I examine the influence of the transition
environment on organizational actions. For this purpose, I employ the concept of
organizational legitimacy, which exists on the borderline between the environment
and the organization. More particularly, I study the legitimacy challenges of small
organizations in transition environments. Small organizations are important for the
success of any transition because they spur economic growth and employment (Danis
et al. 2010).
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I examine the specificities of the transition
environment. I look at the institutional transition as a stage in the process of
institutional change. Second, I examine the legitimacy needs of organizations
(including small firms) evolving in transition contexts. Third, I look at the transition
economies as an example of the transition environments. The phases of development
of the transition economies are discussed. Lastly, I examine the challenges that small




From a general perspective, the transition represents a specific period of time
characterized by a change from one identified stage to another. The concept comes
close to the concept of institutional change but it is indeed an integral part of it.
Below, in order to better understand the transition stage of the institutional change
process, I first look at the institutions and the institutional change.
1.1. Institutions and Institutional Change
Institutions are representation of social order (Jepperson 1991). As such, they
constrain and shape interactions and provide a structure to everyday life (North 1990:
3). By setting limitations, institutions facilitate and reduce the cost of the exchange
interactions (North 1990: 36). Therefore, they convey stability and continuity (Scott
2001).
Even though institutions defining the institutional environment of organizations
imply some level of stability and persistence, they are also subject to change (Scott
2001: 48; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). The process of change can be both incremental
and discontinuous (Scott 2001: 48) as well as caused by exogenous sources (i.e.
change in political regime, economic and social processes) or endogenous sources
(i.e. emergence and decline of powerful actors or activities) (Galvin 2002).
Institutional change creates sources of pressure on organizations and ultimately
motivates organizations themselves to change (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott 2002;
Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).
In terms of their rate of change, institutions differ depending on their type - while
formal rules and regulations can be changed overnight, informal institutions, by being
deeply embedded in the culture of society, show greater resistance to change (North
1992: 477). In addition, enforcing formal institutions without considering informal
institutions brings risk to the success of the whole process of institutional change
(Ovin 2001).
More precisely, institutional change is the process that “witnesses the
deinstitutionalization of existing forms and their replacement by new arrangements,
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which, in time, undergo institutionalization” (Scott 2001). The process of institutional
change is comprised of the following stages (see Fig. 2): (1) institution formation
(institutionalization); (2) disappearance or fading away of institutions
(deinstitutionalization), and (3) the adoption of new practices (reinstitutionalization)





Fig. 2: The Process of Institutional Change
The first stage of the institutional change is the process of institutionalization.
Selznick (1996) defined institutionalization as the process through which
organizations adapt to environmental pressures or the process when institutions are
formed (Scott 2001). Institutionalization is “the infusion with value beyond the
technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1996). Besides
institutionalization, the opposite process of fading away of institutions is also possible
(Oliver 1992; Scott 2001).
Deinsitutionalization is the process by which “institutions weaken and disappear”
(Scott 2001), “the legitimacy of an established or institutionalized practice erodes or
discontinues” (Oliver 1992), even though institutionalized practices do not disappear
completely (Dacin and Dacin 2008). Thus, an important question during the process
of deinstitutionalization is the question “what is kept and what is left?”
Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) analyzed reinstitutionalization as the final
stage of their model of institutional change. They associate reinsitutionalization with
new practices being widely adopted and surviving across generations.
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The processes of institutionalization, deinstitutionalization and reinstitutionalization
belong to the same continuum of the process of institutional change (Rao, Monin and
Durand, 2003) (see Fig. 2). In its essence, institutional transition is a process which is
very similar to the process of institutional change but in fact, it is an essential part of
it.  It  encompasses the deinstitutionalization of certain practices,  rules and norms and
the reinstitutionalization of the new ones. In the next section, I regard the specificities
of institutional transitions.
1.2. Institutional Transitions
Institutional transitions are “fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to
the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players” (Peng
2003: 275).  The transition represents the period in which former institutions fade
away but still exist, and the process of new institution formation has started but has
not been completed yet. Therefore, it is characterized by the co-existence of two
institutional frameworks and/or the lack of any.
When the two frameworks overlap and none is valid or when there is no institutional
framework to guide organizational behavior, there is a situation called institutional
vacuum. The vacuum is characterized by a sense of chaos due to either lack of
institutional framework or, on the opposite, an overlap of conflicting institutions
functioning simultaneously.
Hence studying the transition concept lies in studying the interaction between the
‘old’ institutional framework and the ‘new’ one. When studying transition, several
situations can arise in terms of predictability of change and conflict between the
models. During the transition stage, organizations will either keep or abandon the
‘old’ institutions and will create/adopt the ‘new’ institutions (see Fig. 3).
56
Transition










Fig. 3: Institutional Transition as a Stage in the Process of Institutional Change
Since most interactions are based on and create habitualization, typification (Berger
and Luckmann 1967) and expectations (Parsons 1960) within a specific institutional
context, all actors evolving in a transition environment are impacted by the chaos
inherent to the transition stage.  The specificities of the transition environments are
regarded in the section below.
1.3. Transition Environments
In general, transition environments are settings which go through an institutional
transition. Therefore, the institutional vacuum is inherent to all transition
environments. It makes all actors within a system experience elevated transaction
costs (Meyer 2001) resulting from the unclear regulatory frameworks and the
abundance of opportunistic behavior exercised by many actors due to the lack of
formal sanctions (Tsui-Auch and Möllering 2010), unreliable market information, and
underdeveloped institutions (i.e. the court systems) (Meyer 2001). The environmental
instability produces ambiguity and uncertainty in the rules of exchange among
economic actors (Hitt et al. 2000). Economic actors that have originated in more
stable environments (such as developed economies) and that are looking for partners
in transition environments also experience the above-mentioned transaction costs
(Meyer 2001).
Therefore,  the  transition  environment  is  immensely  different  from  that  of  a  typical
Western organization (McIntyre 2003; Peng and Heath 1996). Even though
uncertainty exists in exchange processes even in market-based economies, in
transition contexts, the underdeveloped market-supporting institutions for regulating
economic exchanges, weak laws and poor enforcement capacity of the formal legal
57
institutions (Acquaah 2007) are additional sources of uncertainty which make the
environment more complex and difficult to operate in.
Characterized by uncertainty (Terreberry 1968; Duncan 1972), the transition
environment is turbulent and dynamic (Dess and Beard 1984; Duncan 1972). It is also
unstable (Dess  and  Beard  1984).  Thus,  within  such  a  context,  change  is  difficult  to
predict (Lawless and Finch 1989). Additionally, a transition environment is not
“organized” (Dess and Beard 1984), meaning that it lacks regulations and maturity
(Dess and Beard 1984).
When studying transition, several situations can arise in terms of predictability of
change and conflict between the co-existing institutional frameworks. If the transition
is planned (Stone and Brush 1996), for example through a change in the law, then
organizations can prepare and plan for the change. Furthermore, organizations are
provided  with  a  ‘clear  picture’  of  the  new rules  of  the  game.  However,  most  of  the
changes  are  not  planned.  Hence,  some ‘old’  rules  of  the  game do  not  work,  but  the
‘new’ game has not been created yet. In itself, this leads to difficulties in predicting
the future state of things and in adopting adequate organizational behavior. This
condition is called organizational shortsightedness (myopia).
1.3.1. Organizational Shortsightedness (Myopia)
Based on the high level of the environmental uncertainty during transitions,
organizations experience shortsightedness. This implies that they can hardly plan for
the long-term future and their span of activities can be predicted for maximum of
several months (sometimes weeks). The organizational myopia can be explained with
the overall institutional upheaval (Peng and Heath 1996) and the resulting efforts to
constantly adapt to the insecure environment. As a result, organizations in transition
environments lose sight for the long-run merely because their survival in the short run
requires their constant attention and effort exertion. Two factors lead to organizational
shortsightedness in transition environments – operational embeddedness and unclear
vision for the future.
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A) Operational Embeddedness
As a  result  of  the  risks  associated  with  daily  operations,  which  in  more  mature  and
stable environments are routines, organizations become focused on ensuring the
continuous process of operation. Herein, the embeddedness in day-to-day activities is
called operational embeddedness16 – the operational limits on long-term planning. In
example, lacking of basic infrastructure (water, electricity, roads), insecurity in the
banking sector, inter-firm indebtedness and other factors lead to interruptions of
firms’ operations on a daily basis. This embeddedness in the day-to-day activities
leads to lack of sight for the future.
B) Unclear Vision for the Future
In addition, when the environment changes in a profound way, the organizations do
not know what the desired future state of things is simply because they have not
experienced it and have not established a benchmark for comparison. Thus, if left on
their own, with no imported models of behavior (Newman 2000), they do not know
which behavior is correct to reach the desired future state and what the latter is, as a
matter of fact.
Organizational shortsightedness (myopia) is a result of the instability of the transition
environment and it is one of the reasons an evaluating audience may place a discount
on an organization which evolves in a transition environment. Other reasons (related
to organizational myopia) may be unreliable performance, lack of trustworthiness,
low quality of products/services offered, etc. The discount that the evaluating
audiences (both domestic and foreign) can place on an organization due to its context
of origin is called liability of origin – a term coined by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000).
Liability of origin affects all organizations evolving in transition contexts since it is
based on the specificity of the environment itself. But organizational size moderates
the effect of the liability of origin because the smaller the organization, the more
vulnerable it is to the impact of the environment in which it evolves.
16 Based on Zukin and DiMaggio (1990), Uzzi (1997) regards four types of embeddedness: (1)
structural – related to structure of ties among actors; (2) cognitive – refers to the mental processes that
direct economic behavior of actors; (3) cultural – shared beliefs, norms and values shape economic
goals; and (4) political – institutional limits on economic incentives. Herein, I use a fifth type of
embeddedness – operational embeddedness (as described above).
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The  severity  of  liability  of  origin  depends  on  the  phase  of  development  of  the
transition environment (early or late) and this issue is discussed below.
1.3.2. Phases in the Development of the Transition Environment
Based on the examination of transition economies, some authors (Peng 2003; Danis et
al. 2010) conceptualize the transition process as being comprised of two stages – an
early and a late phase. The early stage of the transition marks the process of
deinstitutionalization of the rules, norms and values pertinent to the old institutional
framework and the beginning of the new institutions creation (reinstitutionalization of
the new framework). In the late stage of the transition process,  the new rules of the
game are more firmly established as the institutions mature (Danis et al. 2010) while
the old ones slowly fade away.
In general, the liability of origin is more severe for organizations in the initial phase of
the transition process since the lack of legitimacy of the new ways of organization of
the economic activity is ubiquitous. In addition, the process of new institution creation
has started but has not been completed yet. This creates many difficulties and costs for
all economic actors. As the institutions mature, in the late phase of the transition
process, the liability of origin experienced by the organizations evolving in the
transition environment starts to diminish. An explanation to the diminishing liability
of origin is the accumulation of legitimacy stock by organizations.
Liability of origin, like any liability, determines the need of an organization to
demonstrate its legitimacy or the adherence to the requirements and expectations of
evaluating audiences. Since many theories are challenged when applied to transition
environments (Peng et al. 2008), herein, I look at organizational legitimacy and try to
identify the specificities pertinent to the concept when it is applied to organizations
evolving in transition contexts.
2. Legitimacy Needs of Organizations in Transition Environments
Organizational legitimacy in transition environment will exhibit certain specificities
mainly due to the dynamic nature of the relationship environment-organization.
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2.1. The Dynamic Nature of Organizational Legitimacy
Organizational legitimacy exists in the borderline between the organization and its
environment (Baum and Rowey 2003: 6). In less vulnerable environments (such as
developed economies), the relationship environment-organization is stable and it is
more clear what the requirements of the legitimacy-granting entities are. Hence, in
stable environments, organizational legitimacy is perceived to be dichotomous – an
organization  is  either  legitimate  (that  is  to  say  it  meets  the  requirements)  or  not  (it
deviates from them).
In vulnerable contexts (such as transition environments), the relationship between the
organization and its environments, reflected in organizational legitimacy, is
influenced by the instability of the environment. The change rate is elevated and the
rules, norms and beliefs change even over short periods of time. In such contexts,
organizational legitimacy can be regarded as a continuous variable – organizations
can accumulate legitimacy stocks (characteristics) that eventually place them on a
continuum from less legitimate to more legitimate. At any given point in time,
organizations can be compared based on their legitimacy stock.
From signaling theory of legitimacy perspective, the process of building the
legitimacy stock is difficult due to the following two reasons: First, the meaning of
signals in transition environments is not clearly-defined or has not been established
yet. In example, signals that are imported (i.e. ISO management standards) are not
completely understood by the organizations that decided to adopt them as well as their
evaluating audiences. It takes time for shared meaning to be developed. Second, in
transition environments, there are many noisy signals (i.e. quality awards). This
means that they are not granted on merit but based on certain corruptive practices. As
a result, they do not carry the informational value they are supposed to convey.
Therefore, the communication based on signals between organizations is impeded.
The organizations themselves are confused in how to claim their organizational
legitimacy. Often, they act upon sporadic opportunities and scarce information.
In addition, if the environment changes in a dynamic way, organizations have to adapt
to these changes and also change. This dynamic relationship environment-
organization is reflected in organizational legitimacy. The nature of organizational
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legitimacy becomes also dynamic. Legitimacy is hard-to-establish in such
environments due to the newness and instability of the regulative, normative and
cognitive institutions. In general, the sources of legitimacy become either signals that
are imported from more stable environments (i.e. management and process standards)
and/or some taken-for-granted assumptions (i.e. organizational size and age).
Moreover, in unstable environments, by conforming to the requirements and
expectations of relevant stakeholder groups, a legitimate player tries to convey the
message “I am here to stay.” Hence, organizational legitimacy is the antidote of
organizational opportunism prevalent in transition environments. Organizations are
prone to get into opportunistic actions in transition environments due to lack of formal
sanctions and their shortsightedness. Building legitimacy stocks indeed demonstrates
that an organization has long-term intentions to evolve in a certain sector.
By looking at organizational legitimacy as a continuous variable, one can pose the
question of the appropriateness of the use of organizational reputation for the purpose
of this analysis keeping in mind that reputation has been always considered a
continuous variable. In the section below, I compare organizational legitimacy and
reputation.
2.2. Organizational Legitimacy vs. Organizational Reputation
An organizational reputation is a collective representation of the company’s past
actions and future prospects that describe how key resource providers interpret
company’s initiatives and assess its ability to deliver valued outcomes (Fombrun
2001). A positive reputation is a valuable organizational asset because it can provide
information to firm’s stakeholders (i.e., consumers, investors, suppliers) (Fombrun
1996) and influence their expectations towards the future actions of the organization
(Weigelt and Camerer 1988). Since the content of firm’s reputation is information
(Dollinger, Golden and Saxton 1997), it becomes especially important in incomplete
information settings (Dollinger, Golden and Saxton 1997), such as transition
environments.
On the contrary to the widely accepted view (Rao 1994), I consider reputation as an
antecedent of organizational legitimacy. This is due to the fact that the organizations
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under scrutiny are small enterprises functioning in transition environments
characterized by chaos and a high level of instability (Peng 2003). Building good
reputation comes before establishing legitimacy simply because the legitimacy-
granting institutions have not been created yet or even if they were, they may not
perform their functions as expected. An organization can have a good reputation and
not be legitimate but reputation can help an organization build its legitimacy.
Herein, the organizations under scrutiny are SMEs evolving in transition
environments. Based on the high level of environmental instability and vulnerability,
all organizations evolving in transitional contexts experience liability of origin. The
liability of origin determines the need of organization to demonstrate their legitimacy.
The question then is: what are the legitimacy needs of small organizations (vs. large
ones) evolving in transition environments? In the section below, I try to specify the
legitimacy challenges of SMEs evolving in transitional contexts.
2.3. Legitimacy Needs of SMEs Organizations in Transition Environments
Today,  small  organizations  are  the  most  common  type  of  enterprises  (Soriano  and
Dobon 2009). Thus far, in the literature there is no commonly agreed upon definition
of  what  constitutes  an  SME.  Moreover,  across  countries  different  criteria  (i.e.
employment, sales turnover or investment) are adopted (Ayyagari, Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt 2007). Even when the same criterion is used, the definition of an
SME still differs from country to country (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2007;
Soriano and Dobon 2009). For the purpose of this article, I follow McIntyre (2003:
10) and adopt the standard European Union definition of SMEs: SMEs are
organizations with fewer than 250 employees. This definition includes micro- (from 1
to 9 employees), small- (from 10 to 49 employees) and medium- (from 50 to 249
employees) enterprises (McIntyre 2003: 10). For the purpose of this study, the terms
SME and small organizations are used interchangeably.
Herein, I focus on the legitimacy needs of SMEs evolving in transition environments.
There are several reasons why legitimacy needs of small and large organizations
differ. First, small organizations have lower visibility. Second, they face different
institutional pressures in comparison to large organizations, most of which are
privatized formerly state-owned enterprises (SOEs). And third, small organizations
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face liability of smallness. All of the above-mentioned challenges of SMEs operating
in transition environments determine the specificities of their legitimacy needs. In the
section below, I regard these challenges in detail.
2.3.1. SMEs and Organizational Visibility
In general, organizational visibility is perceived to be a function of size (Boje and
Whetten 1981; Brammer and Millington 2006; Goodstein 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). That is to say larger organizations have higher visibility. There are several
reasons for this. Large organizations have more interpersonal (Boje and Whetten
1981) and interorganizational ties (Gulati 1999), greater number of clients (Bowen
2000), offer wider range of products and services (Boje and Whetten 1981) and are
connected to more employees, investors, government agencies, etc. (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Visibility is important because it influences how others perceive and
evaluate the organizations (Boje and Whetten 1981).
In stable environments, as organizations increase in size, they become involved in
more complex and intensive ties with various stakeholder groups (Goodstein 1994).
The later impose their requirements, to which large organizations have to conform in
order to be granted legitimacy (Goodstein 1994; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Indeed,
larger organizations are more prone to engage in strategic actions in order to
demonstrate their conformity to the requirements and needs of various stakeholder
groups (Goodstein 1994).
Based on the communist legacy, large organization traditionally have been more
visible and legitimate (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010). In transitional contexts, higher
visibility directly relates to higher level of organizational legitimacy.
2.3.2. SMEs and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)
In many sectors, most of the large organizations are privatized formerly state-owned
enterprises  (or  incumbents).  The  institutional  pressures  are  different  for  new
entrepreneurial firms (most of which are SMEs) and the incumbents (Peng 2003). In
the early phase of the transition, the formerly state-owned enterprises can more easily
extract protection and resources from the government and this way leverage their
deeply embedded relationships with regulative authorities (Peng 2003). Hence, they
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operate in a safety net, which minimizes the pressures coming from the transition
environment.
In the late phase of the transition, (former) SOEs are pressurized to enhance their
competitiveness and consequently their profitability as the government decreases its
ownership (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi 2007). Hence, as the transition progresses, the
legitimacy challenges for former SOEs increase.
In comparison, small entrepreneurial ventures are subject to different institutional
pressures (Peng 2003). At the beginning of the transition process, the mere private
form of economic organization has to gain legitimacy. In many former socialist
countries, productive assets were owned by the government which was significantly
involved in all economic activities (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010). Due to the lack of
legitimacy, small firms face numerous barriers to growth – difficult access to
financing, discriminative regulations by government based on the lack of well-
established property rights, rent-seeking and corruption by government officials (Zhu,
Hitt and Tihanyi 2007). Therefore, SMEs are encouraged to build relationships with
the government, SOEs and business groups17 in order to get resource allocations (Zhu,
Hitt and Tihanyi 2007).
In the late phase of the transition process, small organizations engage in the process of
gaining organizational legitimacy based on signaling their own resources and
capabilities. Growth is encouraged by the fact that financing becomes more easily
available from banks and newly-created capital markets (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi 2007).
Organizational legitimacy based on signaling resources and capabilities becomes
meaningful when certain (market-based) institutions were established - either built or
imported from more stable environments. At the same time, developing relationships
with government officials earns less and less legitimacy for the small firms.
2.3.3. SMEs and Liability of Smallness
Small organizations are subject to liability of smallness. In general, they have higher
chances of failure (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983) due to the fact that they have
17 Business groups are sets of firms bound together by formal and informal ties and are accustomed to
taking coordinated actions (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi 2007).
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fewer resources, less well-trained managers, and less developed relationships with
creditors (Bruderl and Schussler 1990) and other external stakeholders (Singh, Tucker
and  House  1986).  This  is  a  condition  known  as  ‘liability  of  smallness18’ (Freeman,
Carroll and Hannan 1983). In transition environments, small organizations are even
more vulnerable since they can more easily import instability from the environment
(Smallbone et al. 1999) due to lack of organizational slack.
As it was mentioned earlier, firm growth is challenged in transitional contexts.
Hence, an organization that was able to grow in size demonstrates that it can manage
in a successful way the insufficiency of resources as well as the environmental
instability. Based on the communist historical norms, large organizations are
perceived as more legitimate (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010). Hence, in transitional
contexts, size alone is a powerful signal of legitimacy.
To conclude, size is an important attribute which impacts the legitimacy needs of
organizations. In general, SMEs are not scrutinized by as many stakeholders as large
organizations. At the same time, it is more difficult for them to demonstrate their
adherence to the expectations of relevant constituencies. Based on the signaling
theory of legitimacy, organizations can demonstrate their legitimacy by using valid
signals. Since valid signals are costly, small organizations are less likely to obtain
them due to lack of sufficient resources. As a result, gaining organizational legitimacy
is more challenging for small rather than for large organizations evolving in transition
environments.
For the purpose of this study, I  look at  the attempts of SMEs to gain organizational
legitimacy in the late phase of the transition process. Since the market-supporting
institutions have matured, small organizations can use valid signals of legitimacy in
order to demonstrate their adherence to the stakeholder’s expectations. In most cases,
the legitimacy-claiming efforts of small organizations in transition environments are
related to the fact that they offer high quality products/services (Peng 2003), and in
long-term arrangements that they are reliable partners.
18 At the same time, small organizations have certain advantages related to their size – i.e., smaller
firms can often react faster to the changing market needs due to their flexible organizational structure
which promotes and encourages innovation, communication, and decision making (Soriano and Dobon
2009).
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Examples of settings going through the transition stage of the institutional change
process (or transition environments) are the transition economies. In the section
below, I examine the specificities of transition economies.
3. Transition Economies
Transition economies are the countries going through institutional transitions (Danis
et al. 2010; Peng 2003), or institutional upheaval (Peng and Heath 1996). More
particularly, the transition economies move from one primary mode of exchange
(central economic planning) to another mode (market orientation underpinned by
private ownership) (Hoskisson et al. 2000; Peng 2003). This process is associated
with fundamental change of the formal and informal rules of the game (institutions)
that affect all economic actors, including organizations (Danis et al. 2010; Peng
2003).
Historically, planned economies were characterized with strong central economic
planning and bureaucratic controls on all business decisions, property rights held by
the state, little need for formal laws to define the relationships between exchange
parties (Hoskisson et al. 2000). The business planning in centrally-planned economy
was focused on product supply and flow rather than product demand (Martin and
Grbac 2003). Industries were monopolistic in nature and the competition for
customers was eliminated (Martin and Grbac 2003).
The fall of communism in 1989 put an end to the central planning and the beginning
of  the  process  of  transition  to  market-based  economy.  This  process  introduced  a
significant change in a wide array of business factors (Martin and Grbac 2003). In
general, transition strategies are based on liberalization, institution building, and
macroeconomic stabilization (Blejer and Skreb 2001). Even though progress had been
made  across  the  whole  Central  and  Eastern  European  region,  the  degree  of  success
across countries varies and has been largely determined by country-specific
conditions and political configurations (Blejer and Skreb 2001; Wright et al. 2005).
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Several structural reforms took place during the transition period, such as price and
foreign trade liberalization, opening to capital markets, and freedom to enterprise (de
Larosiere 2001: 477). The latter element of the structural reforms is directly related to
the processes of privatization of the large state-owned enterprises (de Larosiere 2001:
478). It also implies that new enterprises are free to establish themselves but are also
free to close down in case of difficulties (de Larosiere 2001: 479).
In addition, macroeconomic stabilization was on the agenda of all governments in all
transition economies. Related to the implementation of tight monetary and fiscal
policy, macroeconomic stabilization was the precondition for external financial
assistance (Hoskisson et al. 2000). The process had its difficulties resulting from the
rapid price and trade liberalization and led to high inflation (de Larosiere 2001: 478).
Even though transition economies tried to combine and manage the structural reforms
and macroeconomic stabilization, often economic and political shocks have greatly
augmented the uncertainty for both domestic and foreign firms (Hoskisson et al.
2000).
After the first step of structural reforms and macroeconomic stabilization, the so-
called “second wave” is associated with the building of a coherent legal environment
and market-based institutions which have to guarantee the ongoing success of the
transition process (de Larosiere 2001:477). As de Larosiere (2001: 478) mentioned “a
well-functioning  market  economy  requires  the  clear  definition  of  rights  and
obligations” regarding property laws, corporate laws, bankruptcy laws, tax legislature,
etc. Building an adequate market-based legal framework is a very gradual process
based on new laws, new organizations and new behaviors of the economic actors
(Kolodko 2001). The lack of them has allowed a large increase in opportunism, rent
seeking, insider privileges, bribery and corruption in many transition economies
(Hoskisson et al. 2000). This created a greater degree of uncertainty and risks for the
domestic firms and foreign investors which resulted in deterring  the inward foreign
direct investments (Hoskisson et al. 2000).
Even though the formal rules can be changed overnight, the informal rules of behavior
“embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are more persistent and can
change  only  progressively”  (North  1990).  During  the  process  of  transition,  there
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might be institutional vacuum associated with the lack of framework that guides
organizational behavior. In their attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty,
economic actors extensively rely on personalized networks that existed during the
socialist regime and continued to proliferate during the transition period (Peng and
Heath 1996). To a certain extent these networks of personal relationships substitute
for the lack of adequate managerial skills. The skills of managers in small
organizations in transition environments are far behind the capabilities of managers in
advanced economies (Kolodko 2003).
As a profound institutional change, the transition process is a lengthy one. Even
though formal rules of behavior may change overnight, the informal rules embodied
in customs, traditions and codes of conduct take much more time to change (North
1990: 6). Thus, some authors (Peng 2003) have distinguished between phases in the
process of institutional change. In the next section, I examine the specificities of the
two phases of the transition process.
4. Phases in the Development of the Transition Economies
As it was mentioned earlier, the transition environment goes through two phases of
development – early and late.
4.1. Early Phase of the Transition Process
In the early phase, even if they exist, the new institutions are still not mature and not
consistent with the needs of the market-driven system (Danis et al. 2010). The lack of
institutions to guide behavior creates an immense level of uncertainty for all actors
evolving in the transitional context (Peng 2003).
For firms, the greater the uncertainty in their environment, the more likely they rely
on managerial networking relationships when entering into economic exchanges
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Peng and Heath 1996). In highly unstable environments,
economic actors are more likely to mobilize their social network resources and/or
personal contacts (Batjargal 2003) to facilitate business activity and achieve their
organizational goals (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi 2007).
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Moreover, in such environments, managers adopt a survival mentality (Danis et al.
2010). Their strategic efforts are more related to improvisation rather than to planning
and implementation (Danis et al. 2010).
4.2. Late Phase of the Transition Process
In the late phase of the transition process, the business environment stabilizes since
exchange relationships start being governed by the market-supporting institutions
(Danis et al. 2010). As transaction costs go down, the return on intensive personal
networking may diminish (North 1990; Peng 2003). As the market develops,
competition among the domestic start-ups as well as with foreign entrants intensifies
(Acquaah 2007). As a result, in the late stage managers may be more prone to devote
their time and energy to develop market-based competitive strategies (Peng 2003).
The legitimacy needs of organizations in general, and the entrepreneurial new
ventures in particular, are different during the early and late stage of the transition
process. In the early stage, the small entrepreneurial ventures try to establish the
legitimacy of the private form of organization of the economic activity. In many
countries, private ownership was not allowed during the Communist era. Hence, the
mere private form of ownership has to gain legitimacy in the early stage of transition.
During the late stage of the transition, market-supporting institutions have matured
and new norms centered on market competition have emerged (Peng 2003). Even
though many institutions do not fulfill their role completely, claiming and granting
legitimacy on organizational level becomes possible. Moreover, organizations differ
in terms of their legitimacy stock – some will be perceived more legitimate then
others. Small entrepreneurial ventures can claim (and consequently be granted)
organizational legitimacy mainly by demonstrating high quality of their products and
services (Peng 2003).
The stage of the transition process influences the way organizations are perceived by
the  evaluating  audiences.  In  the  early  phase,  liability  of  origin  is  higher  and
constituencies (domestic and/or foreign) tend to question small organizations evolving
in transition environments in a more severe way. The lack of legitimacy is ubiquitous.
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In the late phase, as the market-based institutions mature, small firms from transition
environments extract higher legitimacy from the evaluating audiences based on their
legitimacy stock.
Even though acquiring organizational legitimacy is challenging, some SMEs from
transition environments try to even access the international/global markets. Indeed,
there is a growing interest among international business (IB) scholars regarding the
competitive strategies of small firms from transition environments trying to access the
international/global market scene in general (Danis et al. 2010), or enter the markets
of the developed economies, in particular (Yamakawa et al. 2008). In the section
below, I regard the challenges that SMEs face when they access the
international/global markets.
5. The Internationalization of SMEs from Transition Environments
Firms from transition economies are accelerating their attempts to integrate the global
economy (Hoskisson et al. 2000). Even though recent studies show that SMEs
increasingly internationalize their activities in order to capture opportunities in
international/global markets (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi 2007), there is little research done
on the internationalization attempts of SMEs from transition environments
(Yamakawa et al. 2008).
Small firms achieve foreign market presence through exporting and/or foreign direct
investments (FDI) (Dimitratos et al. 2003). They can be also involved in international
activities from alternative perspectives. In many industries, SMEs rely on
technological development (i.e. the Internet, facilitated transportation) in order to
internationalize their activities (Todd and Javalgi 2007). Examples include the IT and
textile manufacturing in India and Eastern Europe. Therefore, small local firms might
find opportunities to go global and/or deal with foreign partners without crossing their
national borders.
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5.1. Reasons for Internationalization of SMEs from Transition Environments
SMEs that originated in transition environments can be motivated by different reasons
to enter the international/global markets. These firms are believed to go international
only after a period of domestic maturation and home market saturation (Oviatt and
McDougall 2005). Home-based SMEs would want to access the international markets
after the local market would saturate due to intensive domestic (Yamakawa et al.
2008) and/or foreign competition (Todd and Javalgi 2007). This is especially the case
when the domestic markets are small - i.e. most Eastern European countries -  as well
as  when  the  purchasing  power  of  the  domestic  consumers  is  low  (Smallbone et al.
1999), and/or when there is a threat by MNEs entering their home base (Wu and
Pangarkar, 2006).
In addition, internationalization of activities allows a higher return on investment for
technologically-intensive industries (Yamakawa et al. 2008). In some sectors
characterized by technological intensity (i.e. IT), internationalization is a way to
spread the development costs over larger markets (Bruton and Rubanik 2002).
Moreover, an SME can internationalize in order to access capabilities that are not
existent or under-developed in its home-base (Yamakawa et al. 2008).
Moreover, the regulative environment within a country may push small organizations
to internationalize, especially when the government allocates more support to the
previously SOEs. SMEs may also find the institutional environment in the host
country  more friendly, that is to say with better protection of property and intellectual
rights, better functioning capital markets, and less corruption (Yamakawa et al. 2008).
Another reason for the international expansion of small firms from transition
environments is the quest for legitimacy. Any association with a client or an
investment in a more stable environment (i.e. developed economy) enhances the
organizational legitimacy of the small firm (Yamakawa et al. 2008). The SMEs are
perceived more credible and producing/providing high quality products/services once
they establish foothold in a more stable environmental context (Yamakawa et al.
2008). This way, small firms get additional resources in their home base by attracting
governmental help, investors, consumers and other relevant stakeholders (Yamakawa
et al. 2008).
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Even if there are many motivating factors that make SMEs from transition
environments internationalize, the latter face numerous challenges.
5.2. Challenges for SMEs from Transition Environments Going International
Those challenges can be explained by the numerous liabilities they experience –
liability  of  smallness,  foreignness  and  origin.  It  is  interesting  to  study  how  these
liabilities interact as well as the legitimacy strain they pose on small firms in
transition environments.
The already-mentioned liability of smallness is directly related to the lack of sufficient
resources (i.e. financial, managerial, human and informational) and capabilities (Zhu,
Hitt and Tihanyi 2007). While large MNEs have the necessary resources and
capabilities to cope with the challenges inherent to internationalization/globalization,
SMEs going global are less resource-endowed and less competitive (Zhu, Hitt and
Tihanyi 2007).  Limited resources may hinder the ability of small firms to identify and
act upon entrepreneurial opportunities in foreign markets (Zhu, Hitt and Tihanyi
2007). In fact, the lack of efficient information and know-how related to the foreign
markets  is  one  of  the  most  important  problems  SMEs  face  when  they  expand
internationally (Liesch and Knight 1999).
The international business literature has long recognized that firms going global face
the ‘liability of foreignness’ because they are not yet familiar with the local practices
specific to each and every market (Zaheer 1995). Liability of foreignness is part of the
broader term “liability of market newness,” which is discussed in Chapter 3.
Liability of origin (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000) is linked to the environment in which
SMEs have originated – transition environments. As it was mentioned, transitional
contexts experience a lack of appropriate institutional framework to govern the
behavior of economic actors. Liability of origin is experienced by organizations
evolving in the domestic as well as foreign markets even though the evaluating
audiences may be different. The domestic and foreign constituencies may discount
organizations originating in transition environments based on different reasons – i.e.
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foreign clients/partners may place a discount on a potential transition partner based on
insufficient resources/capabilities while domestic ones on their trustworthiness.
Besides  their  disadvantages,  SMEs  face  certain  advantages  when  they  decide  to
expand internationally. Small firms have less bureaucratic structures, higher flexibility
in implementing new technologies or meeting changing consumers’ tastes, higher
level of innovativeness (Soriano and Dobon 2009).
Some research shows that small firms in transition environments can mobilize their
networks of relationships (with the government and various business groups) in order
to identify and act upon entrepreneurial opportunities in foreign markets (Oviatt and
McDougall 1995; Zhou, Wu and Luo 2007). Despite their small size and all the
disadvantages coming from originating in transition environments, many SMEs
successfully identify opportunities in foreign markets and manage to achieve
competitiveness at least in the short run (Smallbone et al. 1999; Todd and Javalgi
2007).
To conclude, transition environments are settings going through institutional
transitions. The process encompasses two simultaneous processes –
deinstitutionalization of the old rules, norms and beliefs and the reinstitutionalization
of the new ones. The overlap of two institutional frameworks or the lack of any leads
to institutional vacuum when there is no one institutional framework to guide
organizational behavior. Institutional vacuum is inherent to the transition
environments and leads to an elevated level of uncertainty and vulnerability.
Consequently, this impacts the relationship environment-organization and it gets
reflected in the concept of organizational legitimacy.
The legitimacy needs of organizations (including SMEs) evolving in the transition
contexts have their specificities. Influenced by the dynamic nature of the relationship
environment-organization, legitimacy (existing on the borderline between the two) is
perceived to be a continuous rather than a dichotomous variable. In addition,
reputation seems to be more easily established in transition settings and hence, it is
one of the antecedents of organizational legitimacy.
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Moreover, establishing organizational legitimacy is more difficult for small firms in
comparison to large firms due to their lower visibility, less support from the
government, and liability of smallness.
In order to better address the legitimacy needs of small firms in transition contexts, in
the  next  Chapter  3,  a  signaling  theory  of  legitimacy  is  proposed.  It  is  based  on
communication via signals between the legitimacy-claiming and legitimacy-granting
entities. Its theoretical foundations lie in the strategic perspective of organizational
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CHAPTER 3: SIGNALING THEORY OF LEGITIMACY
The signaling theory of legitimacy is an extension of the understanding of the concept
of organizational legitimacy. It is based on the signaling theory in economics (Spence
1973; 1974) and the strategic perspective on organizational legitimacy (Ashforth and
Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1991). The basic premises of the
signaling theory of legitimacy state that when the evaluating audiences discount a
particular organization based on certain characteristics (which can be internal and/or
external), the latter can use valid signals of legitimacy in order to communicate its
adherence to the requirements of the relevant stakeholders’ groups.
Valid signals of legitimacy have to be observable, costly to imitate (Spence 1974) and
carry the same (or similar) meaning between the sending (legitimacy-claiming) and
the receiving (legitimacy-granting) party. Usually contexts characterized by high level
of information asymmetry between the exchange parties and the resulting adverse
selection and moral hazard are the settings in which the use of signals is very
important.
Transition environments (discussed in Chapter 2) are an example of settings where
organizations (especially SMEs) are prone to use signals in order to communicate
their conformity to the evaluating audiences’ expectations. In order to better address
the legitimacy needs of SMEs evolving in transition environments and trying to obtain
long-term arrangements, two new types of legitimacy (comprised of functional and
relational legitimacy) are examined. Indeed, signals of functional and relational
legitimacy are used by small firms to demonstrate their adherence to the requirements
of relevant stakeholders’ groups.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I look at the signaling theory in economics,
types of signals and the context when signaling certain organizational characteristics
is  crucial.  Second,  based  on  the  signaling  theory  in  economics  and  the  strategic
perspective of legitimacy, I present the theoretical basis of the signaling theory of
legitimacy. And finally, I present the new legitimacy typology comprised of
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functional  and  relational  legitimacy  –  in  order  to  address  the  needs  of  small
organizations in transition environments.
1. Signaling Theory in Economics
The signaling theory of legitimacy extends the strategic perspective on organizational
legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1991)
proposing that when an organization faces any type of liability (newness, smallness,
market newness and/or origin), it can build (and communicate to its evaluating
audiences) a portfolio of legitimacy signals. Any liability threatens the survival of the
organization. Hence, by employing valid signals of legitimacy, an organization can
increase its survival chances.
In order to develop a signaling theory of legitimacy, I first look at the postulates of the
signaling theory, which was initially developed in economics and applied to labor
markets (Spence 1973).
1.1. Signaling Theory – Basic Assumptions
In economics, signaling theory relates quality and uncertainty when economic actors
with different grades of quality exist at the market (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1973,
1974).19 In general, the sellers possess more knowledge about the quality of what
(s)he offers than the buyers - a situation known as information asymmetry (Akerlof
1970). In environments, characterized with information asymmetries between the
exchange parties, one party can use available signals to reduce the uncertainty about
(in more general terms) a course of action (Spence 1973, 1974).
The signals are observable characteristics, actions and/or activities that are costly and
difficult  to  imitate  as  well  as  subject  to  manipulation  by  the  sending  party  (Spence
1973, 1974). Signaling creates a win-win situation. It benefits the high-quality actor
who sends the signals (Lee 2001) as well as the receiving party since it facilitates
decision-making. By examining the insurance market, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
19 Akerlof (1970) studied the market for cars in the United States. He distinguished between two grades
in quality – good and bad cars. The latter arecalled ‘lemons.’
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noted  “if  individuals  were  willing  or  able  to  reveal  their  information,  everybody [at
the market] can be made better off.” On the contrary, the absence of signals causes
market inefficiency (Eliasberg and Robertson 1988).
Organizations use valid signals in order to communicate certain characteristics or
qualities to the evaluating audiences. Below, I look at the definition of ‘valid signals’
in the economics literature. Afterwards, I examine the types of signals and the
contexts when using signals is very important.
1.2. Valid Signals
1.2.1. Definition
A valid signal is a signal that reduces the level of uncertainty between the economic
actors (Pollock and Gulati 2007). In order to serve as uncertainty-reducing signals, the
latter should fulfill three important criteria – they have to be:
? Observable – a signal can effectively distinguish one economic actor from
another one only if the respective party can view the characteristic and/or the
activity possessed by the other party in the exchange process. For example, in
the labor market context, an employer can verify the educational degree of the
potential employees based on his/her diploma (Spence 1973).
? Costly20 (implying difficult) to imitate (Spence 1973; Milgrom and Roberts
1986) – a signal will effectively distinguish one economic actor from another
one only when the signaling costs are positively correlated with actor’s
productive capability (Spence 1973). If this assumption does not hold,
everyone will invest in the signal. If the signal becomes ubiquitous, the actors
will not be distinguishable based on it (Spence 1973). For example, in the
labor market context, candidates of inferior quality do not possess the skills or
abilities needed to earn certain educational degree. Signaling costs can include
not only financial outlays but also psychic and other costs (i.e. time) (Spence
1973).
20 Some researchers state that this is not a necessary requirement for a valid signal (Bhattacharya and
Ditmar 2001).
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? Shared meaning – this is a condition added to the two above-mentioned
characteristics of valid signals in economics. A valid signal has to carry the
same (or similar) meaning for the sending (legitimacy-claiming) and the
receiving (legitimacy-granting) party. If this condition does not hold, the
informational value of the signal is very little, if any.
Besides the labor markets where it originated, signaling theory is applied to many
other contexts. Moreover, different attributes are examined as valid signals carrying
important informational content which decreases the information asymmetry between
the exchange parties. Based on the evaluative criteria used, signals can be two types:
(1)  based  on  whether  they  can  be  controlled  or  not  by  the  focal  organization  (fully-
controlled and partially-controlled), and (2) based on their informational content
(signals of product/service quality and signals of firm’s quality).
1.2.2. Typology of Signals
A) Fully-Controlled and Partially-Controlled Signals
The fully-controlled signals (also  called indices) are organizational characteristics
which  are  in  the  direct  control  of  organizations  (Spence  1973;  Downes  and  Heinkel
1982). In the management literature, some examples of fully-controlled signals
include board structures (Certo 2003) and managerial background (D’Aveni 1989,
1990; Higgins and Gulati 2003, 2006). The partially-controlled signals (also called
signals) are observable organizational characteristics that are largely outside the
control of the focal company (Spence 1973; Downes and Heinkel 1982).
Even though the partially-controlled signals may result from actions initiated by the
focal actor, these signals are provided by third parties who make their own decisions
(Pollock and Gulati 2007). Partially-controlled signals are as frequently used as the
fully-controlled signals (Pollock and Gulati 2007). Some examples of partially-
controlled signals include: third-party endorsements (Carter and Manaster 1990;
Gulati and Higgins 2003; Higgins and Gulati 2003, 2006; Stuart et al. (1999); and
certification contests (Rao 1994; Rindova et al. 2005; Wade et al. 2006).
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B) Signals of Product/Services Quality and Signals of Firm’s Quality
Based on their informational content, signals can be divided into two main groups: (1)
signals of product/service quality, and (2) signals of firm’s quality and future
prospects. I look at these two categories below. There are several institutions that
function as valid signals of product quality – product guarantee/warranty (Grossman
1981), brand name, licensing practices indicating levels of proficiency (i.e. licensing
of doctors, lawyers, and barbers) (Akerlof 1970: 499-500) and minimum quality
standards (Leland 1979), seller liability (Heinkel 1981), etc. Signals are not only
confined to (output) product quality issues (Lee 2001). They can also communicate
the firm’s quality and future prospects. In example, firm’s reputation is  used  as  a
signal that provides information about the working conditions in the organization
(Turban and Cable 2003).
The table below presents signals identified by different researchers:
FIELD AUTHORS VALID SIGNALS
Westphal and Zajac (1994, 1998) Long-term incentives plans
Zajac and Westphal (2001, 2004) Stock repurchase plansCorporateGovernance
Wade et al. (2006) Certification contest
Corporate Identity Lee (2001) Corporate name change
Corporate Reputation Rindova et al. (2005) Media ranking
Nelson (2003) Founder-led companiesEntrepreneurship
Hsu and Ziedonis (2007) Owning a patent
Ross (1977) Debt
Bhattacharrya (1979) Dividends
Leland and Pyle (1977) Entrepreneurial willingness to
invest in his/her own project
Finance
Hughes (1986)
Direct statement about the firm
value
Certo (2003) CEO stock options
Titman and Trueman (1986); Carter
and Manaster (1990); Michaely and
Shaw (1994); Carter, Dark and Singh
(1998); Stuart, Hoang and Hybels
(1999); Gulati and Higgins (200321,
2006), Pollock, Porac and Wade
(2004)
Reputation of investment banker (or
underwriter)
Titman and Trueman (1986), Balvers,
McDonald and Miller (1988)
Reputation of an auditor company
IPO Literature
Gulati and Higgins (2003),
Megginson and Weiss (1990), Lerner
Reputation of venture capitalists
21 Higgins and Gulati (2003) recognized the role of prestigious underwriters on the IPO valuation and
examined the antecedents of having a prestigious underwriter. They discovered that past prominent
employment affiliation of the top management team is linked to the underwriter prestige.
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(1994), Brav and Gompers (1997)
Gulati and Higgins (2003), Stuart,
Hoang and Hybels (1999)
Strategic alliance partners
Stuart, Hoang and Hybels (1999) Reputation of organizations with
ownership stake
Certo (2003) Board  prestige
Gulati and Higgins (2006), Higgins
and Gulati (2003), Lester et al. (2006)
TMT background
Downes and Heinkel (1982), Ritter
(1984), Hughes (1986)
Proportion of equity ownership of
original shareholder
Labor Market
Literature Turban and Cable (2003) Firm's reputation
Nelson (1974), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) Price
Nelson (1974), Milgrom and Roberts
(1986) Advertising volume
Dean and Biswas (2001) Third-party endorsement
Marketing
Eliashberg and Robertson (1988) Pre-announcing behavior
Rao (1994) Placement in certification contests
Baum and Oliver (1991)
Certification from credential
agenciesStrategicManagement
Baum and Oliver (1991), Haunschild
(1994) Relationship with high-status actors
Upper Echelon
Literature D'Aveni (1989, 199022) Managerial prestige
Table 1: Valid Signals in Different Organizational Contexts
After I looked at the various types of signals studied in different fields, I specifically
regard the contexts when signaling is important.
1.3. Contexts when Signals are Crucial
The informational difference between buyers and sellers exist in many markets
(Leland and Pyle 1977). Such markets, for example, are the financial markets between
the borrower and the lender, between the IPO and the potential investors, between the
entrepreneur and the business angels and/or venture capitalists providing financing
(Leland and Pyle 1977). The intermediate markets for outsourcing services
characterized by information asymmetry between the counterparts in the exchange
process are also an example of markets where signals are important. Economists have
discovered that the competition on the markets with imperfect information (or
22 D’Aveni (1990) operationalized the multidimensional construct ‘prestige’ by measuring:
membership in the political elite, membership in the military elite, membership in elite educational
circles, membership in webs of board directorates, and previous acceptance into the ranks of high
ranking corporate officers.
82
asymmetrical information) between the exchanged actors is very complex (Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1976). As a result, many institutions arise in order to decrease the
difficulty related to the existing information asymmetry (Rothschild and Stiglitz
1976).
In mature and stable sectors, there is data (collected over many years) on
organizations and their actions. In such sectors, when faced with uncertainty, market
players can base their decisions on past experience and on potential partner’s status
and/or reputation (Podolny 1994).
Additionally, professional education and training of institutional investors (i.e. mutual
and pension fund managers) and investment bankers serve to diffuse knowledge and
skills in standard valuation practices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Markets typically
rely on this codified knowledge and detailed analysis of financial, economic, and
market data to reduce information asymmetry regarding inherent quality and to value
firms because such information reduces uncertainty (Alchian and Woodward 1988).
However, during the emergence of new industries, investors and analysts lack a
codified body of knowledge and industry-specific experience. In these contexts, firms
often operate with new and unproven business models and compete against many
rival start-ups, all jockeying for early market dominance. Information asymmetry is
particularly problematic in new economic sectors because managers have great
discretion over scarce financial capital and investors are inexperienced in these
domains (Alchian and Woodward 1988).
The situation of information asymmetry means that one party in the economic
transaction has superior information than the other party (Akerlof 1970; Rothschild
and Stiglitz 1976). There are two forms of opportunistic behavior that can arise from
information asymmetry – adverse selection and moral hazard.
A) Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is a type of opportunistic behavior based on hidden and/or
erroneous information that benefits the seller (Durand and Vargas 2003). The basis for
the adverse selection is the qualitative difference in the initial conditions (Sanders and
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Boivie 2004). The basic idea of the adverse selection principle (or also called “lemon
principle”) is that the ‘bad’ products are more likely to be selected than the ‘good’
products (Akerlof 1970). This leads to pushing the good product sellers out of the
market. As a result, if there is no mechanism or institution, which can overcome the
information asymmetry (Hughes 1985) the market will fail (Akerlof 1970). In this
case, sellers of high-quality products have incentives to develop mechanisms and/or
use institutions that will help them sell their products or services at an appropriate
price (Hughes 1986). Some suggested solutions are licensing (Leland 1979), imperfect
quality testing (Heinkel 1981), product warranties (Grossman 1981) among others.
B) Moral Hazard
Moral hazard is  a  risk  of  non-compliance  of  an  action  by  an  economic  actor  or  an
agent (in agent-principal relationship) (Durand and Vargas 2003). Moral hazard is
related to the unobserved or hidden actions that can be undertaken by the economic
actors driven by their utility (or profit) maximization (Arrow 1963; Sanders and
Boivie 2004). In addition, moral hazard hampers the direct information transfer
between economic actors (Leland and Pyle 1977).
Adverse selection and moral hazard are compounded by the uncertainty of new
economic sectors. Consequently, when valuing new firms in emerging industries,
interested audiences are likely to use secondary sources of information to help
identify qualitative differences across firms and their future prospects (Pollock and
Gulati 2007; Sanders and Boivie 2004).
Besides new economic sectors in established economies, the problems of adverse
selection and moral hazard are typical for markets characterized with greater quality
variation (Akerlof 1970). According to Akerlof (1970), these are the markets in
underdeveloped countries, including transition economies. These environments are
characterized by more dishonesty (Akerlof 1970) due to the overall chaos or lack of
institutional framework to guide organizational behavior. When goods are sold in
dishonest way on the market, the sellers misrepresent their quality. Thus, the problem
for the buyer is to be able to identify the quality (Akerlof 1970). The cost of
dishonesty lies not only in the amount by which the purchaser is cheated but also the
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cost includes the loss from driving legitimate business out of existence (Akerlof
1970).
Organizations are dependent on the various groups of stakeholders for resources
(Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003), which ensure their long-term survival ((Pfeffer
and Salancik [1978] 2003; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Hence, organizations are
interested in using signals to decrease information asymmetry between them and their
evaluating audiences. This is a way to be granted organizational legitimacy. In the
section below, the basic premises of the signaling theory of legitimacy are presented.
2. Signaling Theory of Legitimacy
The signaling theory of legitimacy is based on the signaling theory in economics
(Spence 1973, 1974) and the strategic perspective of organizational legitimacy
(Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975; Oliver 1991).
The signaling theory of legitimacy states that when facing liabilities, organizations
can use valid signals of legitimacy in order to demonstrate and/or communicate their
conformity to evaluating audiences’ expectations. Based on the evaluation of the
signals, legitimacy can be granted or not, which consequently increases or decreases
the survival chances of organizations, respectively (see Fig. 4).



























In developing the signaling theory of legitimacy, I first define the concept of
organizational liability. Then, different types of liabilities are presented. It is followed
by a discussion on a new legitimacy typology (functional and relational legitimacy)
which addresses in a better way the legitimacy needs of small organizations in
transition environments trying to obtain long-term contracts.
2.1. Organizational Liabilities
2.1.1. Definition of Organizational Liability
In general, a liability is the state of being liable or likely to experience something
undesirable (Oxford Dictionaries Online). Arend (2004) defined strategic liability as
“those resources that damage and destroy a firm’s ability to generate rents.” When an
organization faces a liability, it experiences a certain type of disadvantage in
comparison to its potential competitors. In this study, organizational liability is
defined as “the discount the evaluating audiences place on a particular organization in
comparison to potential competitors.” The source of the liability can be inherent to the
organization (internally-defined liabilities) or external to the organization (externally-
defined liabilities).
I use evaluating audiences as a general term to address all groups of stakeholders that
are interested in the organization under scrutiny. Depending on the concrete industry
and position of the organization in the value chain, the importance of the different
stakeholder groups varies.
The  basic  premises  of  the  signaling  theory  of  legitimacy  are  that  by  signaling  their
conformity to stakeholders’ expectations, organizations can overcome the liabilities
they face and increase their survival chances. The signaling theory of legitimacy
contributes to the strategic perspective of organizational legitimacy since any
organization (no matter the type of liability it faces) can create a portfolio of signals in
order to communicate its fit with the requirements of the evaluating audiences.
Organizations are not passive actors accepting their condition (i.e. new and small
ventures) – they can indeed improve their fit with the stakeholders’ expectations by
utilizing valid signals of legitimacy.
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2.1.2. Types of Liabilities
Going back to Fig. 4, organizational liabilities can be internally- and externally-
defined. The internally-defined liabilities are based on certain characteristics inherent
to the organization, such as age (liability of newness) and size (liability of smallness).
The externally-defined liabilities are derived from the environment in which the
organization evolves, such as liability of market newness based on the fact that the
organization is new to the market and liability of origin based on the instability of the
environment in which an organization evolves.
The liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe 1965), smallness (Freeman, Carroll and
Hannan 1983) and foreignness (Zaheer 1995) are well-discussed in the literature.
Certo (2003) added a new type of legitimacy – liability of market newness – which he
used regarding organizations that undergo an IPO. Herein, it is suggested that liability
of foreignness is a sub-type of the liability of market newness since it reflects only an
organization that moves two specific layers of the environment – i.e. from national to
international. Liability of market newness is a broader term referring to organizations
that move not only from one environmental layer to another one but also the ones that
enter new markets in general (i.e. due to a diversification strategy).
As it was mentioned earlier, the liability of origin (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000) is
related to the discount that evaluating audiences (both domestic and foreign) place on
an organization due to its context of origin. Liability of origin is a complex
phenomenon that is associated with the importation of instability from the
environment in which an organization functions. The discount can be placed not only
by organizations that have originated outside the transition environment but also by
organizations that evolve in the transition environment itself. The reason for this is
that all actors that interact with organizations evolving in transition environments
experience elevated transaction costs (Meyer 2001).
All  organizations  in  transition  contexts  are  subject  to  liability  of  origin.  But  small
firms are even more vulnerable since they do not have slack that help large structures
absorb the environmental uncertainty.
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The type of organizational liability and the type of evaluating audiences directly
reflect on the type of legitimacy sought. The latter determines the types of signals it is
appropriate  to  use  in  order  to  efficiently  communicate  the  conformity  to  the
stakeholders’ expectations.
It is important to note that the widely-accepted typology of legitimacy relates to a
specific environment characterized by relative stability. The typology of regulative,
normative and cognitive legitimacy is based on the pillars of institutions (Scott 2001).
Institutions imply stability. When the environment experiences institutional vacuum –
a shift between two institutional frameworks associated with a very high level of
instability, the above-mentioned typology is difficult to apply.
Regulatory legitimacy can be hardly established and even if it is (in example,
accreditation from government body), in many cases it is meaningless due to the high
level of opportunistic behavior experienced and exercised by the economic actors.
The high level of corruption implies that an accreditation may be granted not based on
merit. Hence, an accreditation can be a noisy signal which does not contain the
informational value expected.
The other legitimacy types – normative and cognitive legitimacy - are also difficult to
obtain since the new norms have not been created yet but the old ones are not valid
anymore. A valid question in transition environments is: where do new norms and
beliefs come from? One way is to import them from more stable environments – i.e.
certificates that are globally-recognized (i.e. ISO). Another way is to go back to some
cognitive sources of legitimacy that existed in the pre-transition stage of development
– i.e. some traditional practices of production, etc.
For the purpose of this study, the above-mentioned typology of legitimacy does not
apply  due  to  the  specificities  of  the  transition  environment.  Hence,  I  propose  a  new
legitimacy typology comprised of two types – functional and relational legitimacy.
The new typology addresses in a better way the legitimacy needs of small
organizations in transition environments trying to obtain long-term contracts. In the
next section, the functional and relational legitimacy are defined and their dimensions
– identified.
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3. Functional and Relational Legitimacy
Organizational legitimacy is a multi-dimensional construct (Deephouse and Carter
2005). In the literature, different legitimacy typologies have been developed (Scott
2001; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Higgins and Gulati 2006 among others). Each
typology reflects the particular context in which the organizations studied evolve and
the respective dimensions of the legitimacy concept. The present study focuses on
small organizations evolving in transition environments, trying to demonstrate their
worthiness  as  partners  (in  long-term  arrangements).  I  examine  two  aspects  of  the
legitimacy concept – the functional and the relational legitimacy – assuming that the
proposed typology reflects in the best possible way the signaling needs of the
organizations under scrutiny. I perceive the two constructs of functional and relational
legitimacy as building blocks of the organizational legitimacy concept.
The most important evaluating audiences in transition contexts are mainly the ones
that transact directly with the focal organization, such as clients, distributors,
employees. Some of the stakeholders’ groups (i.e. government agencies) are not
relevant in transition environments since even if they exist, it is very likely that they
do not perform their functions in the expected manner. For example, they do not
sanction the organizations that engage in illegitimate behavior.
The above-mentioned audiences that transact directly with the focal organizations
experience  two  main  type  of  risks  (uncertainties)  based  on  the  existing  information
asymmetry: (1) risk linked to the partner’s deficient resources and capabilities, and (2)
risk of over-dependence on the partner (Quélin and Duhamel 2003: 656) . The
proposed new typology, namely functional and relational legitimacy, addresses
successfully the above-mentioned risks.
Functional legitimacy signals  the  worthiness  of  a  partner  based  on  its  access  and/or
control of important and valuable organizational resources and capabilities. It
demonstrates an organization meets the requirements in terms of resources and
capabilities and addresses the potential partner’s concern regarding deficient
competencies.
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Relational legitimacy is  associated  with  whether  an  organization  is  reliable  as  a
partner and will comply with the specifications of a contract (i.e. in terms of
respecting the quality requirements and deadlines). Relational legitimacy reflects the
concern of the legitimacy-granting audiences regarding the dependence on the focal
organization.
It is considered that functional and relational legitimacy are independent from one
another. This means that organizational resources and competencies are independent
from  the  perception  of a firm’s trustworthiness (and other relational aspects) as a
partner. A firm may have certain resources and competencies but this does not imply
that it will fulfill the requirements of a contract in a proper way. At the same time, a
company may be a reliable partner, which does not have the necessary resources and
capabilities to accomplish the project.
In this study, I adopt a strategic perspective of organizational legitimacy (Ashforth
and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) and assume that any organization can
handle the above-mentioned concerns or perceived risks by employing concrete
signals of functional and/or relational legitimacy. Signaling certain organizational
characteristics helps the focal company bridge the information asymmetry that exists
between the exchange parties and communicate its adherence to the evaluating party’s
requirements and expectations.
Before I identify concrete observable organizational characteristics that enhance the
legitimacy of the organizations under scrutiny, I explore the dimensions of functional
and relational legitimacy as latent (not directly observable) variable constructs. Based
on the review of the literature on organizational legitimacy and other related concepts,
I try to specify the content of the two concepts, which is indeed the first stage of the
process of building a latent variable construct. In the second part of the thesis, I
continue with the latent variable construction by identifying relevant indicators per
dimension (second stage), checking for multicollinearity (third stage) and checking
for external validity (forth stage) (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). I first look
at the dimensions of the functional legitimacy construct followed by the dimensions
of relational legitimacy construct.
90
3.1. Dimensions of Functional Legitimacy
As it was discussed above, functional legitimacy signals the worthiness of a partner
based on its access and/or control of important and valuable organizational resources
and capabilities.23 In early research, the distinction between firm’s resources and
capabilities was not made (Spanos and Lioukas 2001). Herein though, following Amit
and Schoemaker (1993), I perceive resources as  assets  that  are  either  owned  or
controlled by the firm. In general, they are divided in two main groups - tangible and
intangible (Spanos and Lioukas 2001). And the capabilities are the ability to exploit
and combine resources through routine processes in order to accomplish
organizational goals (Spanos and Lioukas 2001). Herein, I call resources and
capabilities with the term organizational competencies.
According to the resource-based view, the distinct resources and capabilities of an
organization can be the basis for creating and sustaining competitive advantage if they
are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable (Barney 1991). Firms
are heterogeneous in terms of their resources and capabilities (Peteraf 1993). Hence,
signaling the access or control of the above-mentioned resources and capabilities can
help an organization increase its attractiveness as a partner to potential exchange
parties and thus enhance the functional aspect of its legitimacy. I look at the types of
competencies that if possessed and demonstrated can enhance the functional
legitimacy of an organization. More specifically, I name them task-related
competencies in order to emphasize the direct link between the competencies and the
task in question.
Task-related competencies have been defined in the joint venture partner selection
literature (Geringer 1991, Gleister and Buckley 1997) and the definition provided is
similar to the definition adopted for the purpose of this research. Hence, I first look at
the definitions of task-related competencies in the joint venture literature followed by
the definition adopted in this study.
23 As  Peteraf  (1993)  mentioned  there  is  subtle  variation  in  terminology  across  papers.  According  to
Barney (1991): “Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm.” Herein, a clear distinction between firm’s
resources and capabilities is made.
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Geringer (1991) introduced the term “task-related” selection criteria referring to the
criteria companies use to choose a joint venture partner.24 Following Geringer
(1991:45), the task-related competencies are “the operational skills and resources
which a venture requires for its competitive success.” The task-related competencies
are associated with the “viability of a proposed venture’s operations” (Geringer 1991:
45). These competencies include resources and capabilities and can be tangible,
intangible, human or non-human in nature (Geringer 1991). Some examples of task-
related competencies are patents or technical know-how, financial resources,
experienced managerial personnel, and access to marketing and distribution systems
(Geringer 1991). Based on Geringer’s typology, Gleister and Buckley (1997) tried to
rank the relative importance of a set of selection criteria, including task-related and
partner-related variables (p. 207). In example, criteria, such as knowledge of local
market, distribution channels, links with major buyers, and knowledge of local culture
are identified as being very important in choosing a joint venture partner (Gleister and
Buckley 1997).
While in the literature on joint venture partner selection, the task-related competencies
are variables used by an organization in order to make a decision on its joint venture
partner,  for  the  purpose  of  this  study,  I  adopt  a  different  perspective  –  I  look  at  the
signals that a small organization in transition environment can send to its potential
partners in order to demonstrate that it has the necessary task-related skills and
resources.
Similarly, the definition of task-related competencies adopted is: resources and
capabilities that demonstrate the company can perform the task in question. Signaling
task-related competencies (resources and capabilities) can help small organizations in
transition environments gain the support of the evaluating audiences.
The resource-based view (Penrose 1959; Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt 1984) places a lot
of attention on firm’s distinctive competencies as the basis for creating and sustaining
24 Indeed, Geringer (1991) introduced a typology of joint venture partner selection criteria that was
comprised of two groups of criteria – task-related and partner-related criteria. The author distinguished
between the two groups based on whether the investment mode involves the presence of multiple
partners. Some examples of partner-related criteria include partner’s national or corporate culture, the
degree of favorable past association, compatibility and trust between partners’ top management teams,
and a partner’s organizational size or structure (Geringer 1991: 46).
92
competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-
substitutable (Barney 1991). Some authors (Leonard-Barton 1992) perceive the
distinctive (Hitt and Ireland 1985) and core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990)
as being two different names of the same concept, which is defined as the
competencies that differentiate a company strategically.
By adopting knowledge-based view of the firm, Leonard-Barton (1992) identified
several dimensions of the firm’s core competency – (1) employee knowledge and
skills, including firm-specific techniques and scientific understanding; (2) the
knowledge embedded in technical systems, including information and procedures; (3)
managerial systems representing formal and informal ways of knowledge creation and
control; (4) the values and norms associated with the various types of embodied and
embedded knowledge.
When evaluating the task-related competencies of small technology-based
organizations evolving in transition environments, I identify several distinctive
competencies signaling the possession of which can enhance the functional legitimacy
of organizations – informational, managerial, organizational, innovative and symbolic
reputational. In their totality, they represent different dimensions and hence build the
formative latent construct of functional legitimacy. All of these dimensions of
functional legitimacy are regarded in detail in Chapter 4.
3.2. Dimensions of Relational Legitimacy
Relational legitimacy is associated with the perceived worthiness of an organization
as an attractive partner (Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007). Herein, I regard one particular
aspect of relational legitimacy (according to Dacin et al. 2007 definition) – whether
an  organization  is  reliable  as  a  partner  and  will  comply  with  the  specifications  of  a
contract (i.e. in terms of respecting the quality requirements and deadlines). In the
context of transition environments, small organizations trying to receive long-term
contracts have to signal not only their ability to perform the task in question
(functional legitimacy) but also to perform it by respecting the initially set deadlines
and quality specifications (relational legitimacy).
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Relational  legitimacy includes  valid  signals  of  the  worthiness  of  a  partner  based  on
the communicating two sets of elements: partnership-related (considering the
relationships of the focal organization with other entities) and organization-related
(considering characteristics specific to the focal organization). The elements of
relational legitimacy cannot be directly experienced by the exchange party because
this would mean being engaged in a contractual arrangement with the focal
organization. Thus, the organization can utilize other observable organizational
characteristics  (signals)  to  imply  its  worthiness  as  a  partner  in  a  potential  long-term
arrangement.
The evaluating audiences in transition environments are mainly concerned with
whether a potential partner is trustworthy and/or reliable, which can be demonstrated
based on past performance (Zott and Huy 2007). In addition, they are concerned with
whether their potential partner can successfully manage the processes inside
(accountability) and outside the organization (stability). Another dimension of
relational legitimacy, which may be typical only for small organizations evolving in
transition environments, is organizational visibility. The latter is comprised of the
physical  footprint  (in  terms  of  the  offices  as  a  physical  access  point  for  the
stakeholders) and virtual footprint (website) of an organization. In transitional
contexts characterized by a sense of chaos and experiencing a high degree of
opportunistic behavior, the physical and virtual footprint of the organizations under
scrutiny becomes very important. The dimensions of relational legitimacy are
regarded in detail in Chapter 4.
3.3. Organizational Legitimacy
The enhanced organizational legitimacy leads to more stakeholders’ support for the
focal organization’s actions (Scott 2001), and consequently improves the survival
chances of organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1984). Organizational legitimacy is
conferred by different groups of external constituencies (Singh et al. 1986) but not all
of them have equal weight in providing an assessment of the focal organization (Ruef
and Scott 1998). The actions that an organization needs to take in order to be granted
legitimacy differ by stakeholder group (Shepherd and Zacharakis 2003).
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In the transition context, the most important legitimacy-granting groups are the ones
that have high bargaining power in direct exchanges towards the legitimacy-claiming
organizations. Since these entities are directly involved with the organization under
scrutiny, they affect its short-term survival.25 Based on the criteria discussed above,
some examples of legitimacy-granting audiences include: clients, employees and
distributors.
The stakeholders’ support increases the survival chances of an organization. .
Furthermore, the ultimate sign of a legitimate organization is its profit-making ability
(Mazza 1999: 42). Therefore, in this study, I go a step further and try to establish a
positive relationship between organizational legitimacy expressed in terms of
stakeholder support and its profit-making ability.
To conclude, a signaling theory of legitimacy is proposed in order to address the link
between the liability experienced by an organization and the need to signal its
legitimacy or the adherence to the evaluating audiences’ expectations. In addition,
since the particular group of firms we regard in this study is comprised of SMEs
evolving in transition environment, I propose a new legitimacy typology – functional
and relational legitimacy –  in order to better address their needs.
The next part (Chapters 4 and 5) looks at the theoretical and empirical setting for this
research. The theoretical setting examines the outsourcing arrangements between the
outsourcer and the outsourcee. The suppliers of services (outsourcees) are small
organizations evolving in transition environments. In many global industries, there are
many companies that compete for outsourcing arrangements on an
international/global, national and/or local level. Thus, keeping in mind that the
environment  in  which  they  originate  and  operate  poses  certain  constraints  on  the
ability to meet the expectations of the outsourcing party, these organizations have to
demonstrate/communicate their legitimacy. According to Pollock and Gulati (2007)
25 I did not consider the government agencies and the community because of low level of
institutionalization of the sector. I also disregarded the suppliers and the alliances since the suppliers
are very fragemented and the alliances are opportunistic and exist via non-formalized arrangements
between the organizations. Since most of the companies are SMEs, they are not publically traded.
Hence, I did not consider the shareholders as an important legitimacy-granting stakeholder group.
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there was not enough attention paid to how companies get included in the so-called
“consideration set” (Roberts and Lattin 1997, Zuckerman 1999) of the decision
maker.  In  this  study,  I  look  at  the  attempts  of  small  organizations  in  transition
environment to gain long-term outsourcing contracts by using signals of functional
and relational legitimacy.
96










The Bulgarian IT Sector
PART I: THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND POSITIONING OF THE RESEARCH
PART II: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL SETTING






PART IV: DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
CHAPTER 8:
Discussion, Contributions,







Outsourcing is “one of the greatest organizational and industry structure shifts of the
century.” James Brian Quinn26
At the end of the 20th century, the organizational form is experiencing a great change
(Corbett 2004). The large, hierarchical organizations have been replaced by loosely
coupled, leaner and more flexible firms focused on core activities (Achrol 1997;
Schilling and Steensma 2001). There are several reasons why companies switched to
this modular form (Schilling 2000), which allows them to easily change between
different providers of loosely-coupled organizational components (Schilling and
Steensma 2001). Flexibility or the organizational ability to do new things quickly is
an important gain based on modularity of organizational forms (Schilling and
Steensma 2001). The hyper-competitive, performance-driven environment, which
pressurizes organizations to constantly reduce the costs and improve the quality (Apte
and Mason 1995; Corbett 2004: 10) as well as the increased number of information-
based operations made flexibility an important organizational characteristic in order to
respond to the changing requirements (Apte and Mason 1995).
In addition, organizations started thinking in a different way about their competitive
advantage – the rise of the resource-based view of the firm where the emphasis is
placed on the core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1994) (see Fig. 5) and not on
the favorable organizational positioning in the environment and the resulting higher
bargaining power (Porter 1980). Managers started leveraging the inter-organizational
relations based on the understanding that an organization can derive equal if not
higher value from partnerships for complementary activities (Mol 2007: 12) (see Fig.
5).
26 James B. Quinn (1992) cited by Corbett (2004).
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Fig. 5: Outsourcing – at the Center of a Fundamental Business Restructuring (Corbett
2004)
Outsourcing has become a key restructuring tool for organizations in the late
twentieth century (Mol 2007) and there are many industries that are undergoing the
process of vertical disintegration (Jacobides 2005). Some examples include
automotive companies outsourced the production of their parts (Jacobides 2005), PC
manufacturers transferred the final assembly to their distributors, banks outsourced
back-office operations, and retailer and hospitals – their inventory operations (Cachon
and Harker 2002). The entire industries dealing with providing professional services,
such as accounting, legal services, marketing, advertising, consulting today are based
on outsourcing (Corbett 2004).
In this study, the focus is not on the outsourcer’s decision to externalize some of its
value-chain activities but on the organizations that compete for outsourcing contracts.
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The chapter is organized as follows. First, I define outsourcing followed by a
discussion on the different types of outsourcing. Then, I examine the outsourcing
process from the point of view of the company initiating the outsourcing - the
outsourcer (Tiwana 2008) - as well as the point of view of the company receiving the
outsourcing contract - the outsourcee (Tiwana 2008). The chapter finishes with a
discussion on the specificities of the intermediate markets for outsourcing services.
1. What is Outsourcing?
Initially, the term “outsourcing” was coined in relation to the subcontracting of
information systems in the late 80s (Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina 2006).
Today, the term is applied broadly to any type of value-chain activity (marketing,
manufacturing, human resources, etc.), which is not performed in-house. Other terms
that have been used to label the outsourcing are “externalization,” “external sourcing,”
(Murray, Kotabe, and Wildt 1995; Murray and Kotabe 1999), “offshoring” (Kotabe
1989), “vertical deintegration” (Walker and Weber 1984), “vertical disintegration”
(Jacobides 2005) and “hollowing-out” (Kotabe 1989).
There are different definitions of outsourcing but as Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-
Robaina (2006) state all of them agree on the fact that through outsourcing a company
decides not to make certain product/service internally (Gilley and Rasheed 2000;
Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; de Fontenay and Gans 2008) but to rely on resources
and competencies of external parties (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993; Lei and Hitt
1995)27 on ongoing basis (Linder 2004). Holcomb and Hitt (2007: 466) define
[strategic] outsourcing as “the organizing arrangement that emerges when firms rely
on intermediate markets to provide specialized capabilities that supplement existing
capabilities deployed along a firm’s value chain.” Since outsourcing alters the
boundaries of the firm (McCarthy and Anagnostou 2004; Rothaermel et al. 2006) it is
considered to be an integral part of the overall strategy of an organization (Quélin and
27 Kotabe (1989) regarded outsourcing as being done in two ways: (1) independent foreign suppliers on
a “contractual” basis; (2) from foreign affiliates of the focal company on an “intrafirm” basis. Herein, I
adopt the first view of outsourcing.
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Duhamel 2003) and as such it aims to achieve (sustainable) competitive advantage
(Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina 2006).
1.1. Outsourcing as a State and a Process
Mol (2007: 5) distinguishes between outsourcing as a state and  as a process. As a
state, outsourcing is defined as “the procurement of goods and services from external
suppliers” (Mol 2007: 5). The counterpart of outsourcing as a state is vertical
integration (Harrigan 1985) – internally produced goods and services or procured
from units that are part of the corporate system (Mol 2007: 5). Any type of activity
within a firm can be outsourced or internally performed (integrated) (Mol 2007: 5). In
addition, for many value-chain activities, organizations can integrate backward or
forward and at the same time rely on external parties for a portion of its supplies and
distribution, an organizing approach labeled as taper integration (Rothaermel et al.
2006),
As a process,  outsourcing  is  defined  as  “a  range  of  actions  within  a  clearly
identifiable timeframe that lead to the transfer of outside suppliers of activities,
possibly involving the transfer of assets (including people) that were previously
performed in-house or procured from other units within a corporate system” (Mol
2007: 5). The counterpart of outsourcing as a process is the insourcing -  when  the
organization decides to internally produce goods and services that have been
previously procured from outside providers (Apte and Mason 1995).
In  order  to  increase  our  understanding  of  the  concept  of  ‘outsourcing,’  I  look  at  its
relationship with other related concepts, such as alliances and try to distinguish
between them.
1.2. Strategy vs. Method of Strategic Development
Herein, following Holcomb and Hitt (2007), I distinguish between the two concepts –




There are only two types of inter-firm relationships that are excluded from the
category of alliance partnerships – market-based transactions and mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) (Inkpen 2001). Alliance partnerships are short- or long-term
voluntary  collaborative  arrangements  (Inkpen  2001)  between  at  least  two  sovereign
organizations concerning one or more areas of activity (Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007)
in contexts involving competitive markets and uncertainty over outcomes (Arino, de
la Torre and Ring 2001). In these arrangements, both parties regulate their future
conduct by means of “more or less formally specified contractual mechanisms”
(Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007).
Companies can enter into alliance partnerships in order to gain: improved competitive
positioning (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Kogut 1988; Hedgedoorn 1993),
access to new resources (Kotabe et al. 2000) and competencies (Hedgedoorn 1993),
new capabilities (Hamel 1991; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996), strategic
renewal (Borys and Jemison 1989), risk and investment sharing (Anderson 1990;
Ring and Van de Ven 1992), economies of scale and scope (Contractor and Lorange
1988), reduction in liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995; Mezias 2002), legitimacy
(Baum and Oliver 1991; Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007), and access to new markets28
(Hagedoorn 1993; García-Canal et al. 2002).
In general, companies are more prone to enter alliance partnerships when they occupy
vulnerable strategic positions, which means that they are either in difficult market
situations or are undertaking expensive and risky strategies (Anderson 1990;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996). More specifically, for many multi-national
enterprises (MNEs), entering into alliance partnerships is a way to reduce the
liabilities of foreignness (Mezias 2002) and gain access to emerging markets (García-
Canal et al. 2002).
1.2.2. Outsourcing
Outsourcing involves a focal company’s decision to deploy certain activities of its
value chain to a company at the intermediate market (Holcomb and Hitt 2007) and as
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such, it is an organizational strategy29. The focal company chooses one of the
outsourcing providers based on cost and/or quality consideration (as well as location
consideration when it comes to international outsourcing).
Hence, the biggest difference between these two concepts is that while outsourcing is
a type of organizational strategy, the alliance is a method of strategy development.
This means that an organization may take the strategic decision to deploy one or more
of its value chain activities to external parties and one of the ways to do it is through
an alliance partnership. As it will be mentioned later, another way may be simply
purchasing or contract manufacturing (Mol 2007: 7-8).
Thus, from the outsourcer’s point of view, part of the outsourcing arrangements (but
not all) are alliance-like arrangements since many of them are developed as long-term
partnerships and require higher level of involvement from the two (or more) parties
involved. They are associated with accessing valuable competencies, which the
company does not want to produce internally. Hence, the focal organization does not
want to internalize those competencies or overall it goes back to the make-or-buy
decision. This is the reason why Holcomb and Hitt (2007) stated while the alliances
are based on appropriation logic – the economic value created is most likely
appropriated by the company with larger bargaining power (Alvarez and Barney
2001), the outsourcing decisions are not based on appropriation logic per se. They are
rather based on economic terms defined by a focal firm after considering the different
cost/performance trade-offs (Holcomb and Hitt 2007).
On the other side though, for the ones that receive the outsourcing contracts (the
outsourcees), the distinction between alliance and outsourcing becomes very clear –
when the arrangement is an alliance the company participates, invests, and shares the
risks and the gains from the partnership. When the arrangement is an outsourcing one,
the  outsourcee  renders  a  service  to  the  outsourcer.  In  general,  the  outsourcee  has  a
limited role in setting the specifications regarding the outsourcing contract, such as
product design, cost, quantity requirements, etc. Those specifications are set in
29 Or at least it has to be. Bettis et al. (1992) stated that many companies fail in their outsourcing efforts
just because they did not view outsourcing strategically.
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advance and determine the conditions of the contract in order to decrease the
transaction costs for the outsourcing party (Schilling and Steensma 2001).
Based on the above-said, I do not look at the alliance literature. Instead, I examine the
outsourcing research since this research focuses on the specificities of the outsourcing
arrangement from the outsourcee’s point of view. I especially regard the benefits that
can arise for the suppliers of outsourcing services based on signaling certain
organizational characteristics.
The definition of outsourcing includes different forms of outsourcing. Thus, in the
next section, I try to shed light on the way the contract can be arranged between the
two parties, which determines the form of the outsourcing. It is important to note that
most of the literature thus far has regarded the outsourcing forms and types from the
point of view of the organization that has decided to externalize some of its activities
(the outsourcer). In this study, the emphasis is based on the other side of the coin – the
suppliers’ perspective. This means that even if for the supplier, the outsourcing
arrangement implies its basic/normal activity, the services rendered and its motivation
to enter into an arrangement will differ.
2. Forms of Outsourcing
In this section, I discuss the forms of outsourcing from the outsourcer’s and the
outsourcee’s point of view.
2.1. Forms of Outsourcing from Outsourcer’s Point of View
The outsourcing arrangements differ depending on the nature of the relationship
between the outsourcer and the outsourcee in terms of level of involvement and
interdependence, on whether the organization has been engaged in certain activity or
not, as well as the geographic scope of the relationship (Mol 2007).
Based  on  the nature of the relationship between the outsourcer and the outsourcee,
Mol (2007) distinguished between three different forms of outsourcing – purchasing,
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subcontracting and strategic outsourcing – all of which are part of the definition of
outsourcing from outsourcer’s point of view.
2.1.1. Purchasing, Subcontracting and Strategic Outsourcing
Purchasing is  considered  to  be  the  simplest  form  of  outsourcing  arrangement  –  the
supplier delivers a good/service according to certain specifications and no
communication is needed between the two parties while the production of the
good/service is taking place (Mol 2007: 7). The level of interdependence between the
two parties is at its lowest level (Mol 2007: 7).
Subcontracting is a process driven by the buyer and a lot of operational information is
exchanged between the two parties – i.e., a project with limited duration (Mol 2007:
7). The level of interdependence is higher in comparison with purchasing and this
determines the need of more intensive communication regarding operational matters
between the two parties (Mol 2007: 8).
Strategic outsourcing – the buyer and the supplier exchange higher level of
information in order to create competitive advantage (Mol 2007: 7). In this case, the
buyer and the supplier work more closely by continuously communicating between
each other and what the buyer does has serious consequences on the supplier and vice
versa (Mol 2007: 8). Thus, joint objectives may arise due to the tight interdependence
of the two parties in the process (Mol 2007: 8).
Another way of looking at the forms of outsourcing is whether the company decides
to discontinue certain value-chain activities and find external suppliers or decide not
to even invest in those but rather acquire them from the intermediate markets for
outsourcing services. Based on this criterion, there are two types of outsourcing –
substitution-based and abstention-based outsourcing (Gilley and Rasheed 2000).
2.1.2. Substitution-Based vs. Abstention-Based Outsourcing
The  substitution-based outsourcing (Gilley and Rasheed 2000) is the decision to
discontinue internal production of certain goods and/or services and replace those
activities with capabilities provided by external parties on the intermediate markets
(Holcomb and Hitt 2007). The second form abstention-based outsourcing is the
106
decision to acquire capabilities from the intermediate market rather than invest in
order to internalize production (Gilley and Rasheed 2000).
Another criterion, which is applied to distinguish between different types of
outsourcing arrangements, is the geographic location.  Based  on  it,  two  types  of
outsourcing arrangements can be identified – on-site and off-site (Power, Desouza and
Bonifazi 2006: 12).
2.1.3. On-site vs. Off-site Outsourcing
On-site outsourcing arrangement is when the supplier conducts the work according to
the specifications of the contract on the premises of the client and off-site is when the
supplier conducts the work on its own premises (Power, Desouza and Bonifazi 2006:
12).
The off-site outsourcing arrangement can be divided into the following three groups –
onshore, nearshore and offshore (Power, Desouza and Bonifazi 2006: 12). Onshore is
when the supplier conducts work within the same country, nearshore – when the work
is done in neighboring locations, and offshore – when the geographical distance
between the outsourcer’s location and the location where the outsourcing work is
done is considerable (Power, Desouza and Bonifazi 2006: 13).
2.1.4. Domestic, Foreign and Global Sourcing
Depending on the location of the outsourcer and the outsourcee(s), there are three
types of outsourcing – domestic, foreign and global. Domestic sourcing is  when the
customer and the supplier of outsourcing services are located in the same country
(Murray and Kotabe 1999). Foreign sourcing is when they are located in different
countries (Murray and Kotabe 1999).
Many organizations (especially, the multi-national enterprises) today follow global
sourcing strategy. Global sourcing is related to accessing resources and competencies
worldwide and using them as part of the value chain of the company – i.e., production
operations in different countries, buying and assembling components, parts or finished
products worldwide (Murray, Kotabe and Wildt 1995). Following global sourcing
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strategies,  the organizations are always on the run to find more cost  efficient and/or
higher quality destinations for their value-chain activities.
2.2. Forms of Outsourcing Arrangements from Supplier’s Point of View
From the outsourcee’s point of view, depending on the motivation of the latter to enter
into an outsourcing arrangement, there are two types – capability-enhancing and
performance-enhancing arrangements.
2.2.1. Capability-Enhancing Arrangements
The capability-enhancing arrangements are outsourcing deals that help the outsourcee
develop new resources and/or competencies. These new capabilities may increase the
firm competitiveness and in the long-run, it may turn to be very beneficial. Of course,
the capability-enhancing arrangements can improve the organizational performance
but the underlying value of these arrangements is mainly to help the organization
develop new capabilities.
2.2.2. Performance-Enhancing Arrangements
The performance-enhancing arrangements are arrangements that help the
organization improve its performance but they are not related to the process of new
capability development. Even though one can argue that any arrangement to deliver
outsourcing services is an opportunity for the outsourcee to learn and improve, not all
of them are related to developing new valuable capabilities. The impact of some
outsourcing deals on new capability acquisitions is marginal. The organization
engages in some outsourcing projects merely to maintain its performance objectives
(in terms of sales volume, net profit, etc.)
2.2.3. Local, National and International Arrangement
In addition, I use another criterion to distinguish among the types of outsourcing deals
from the outsourcee’s point of view – where the output goes. Based on this criterion, I
regard local, national (or domestic) and international (or foreign) arrangements.
From the outsourcee point of view, the arrangements can also be regarded as domestic
(when the customer and the provider are in the same country) and foreign (when the
customer and the provider are in different countries) (Murray and Kotabe 1999).
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In addition, based on the length of the outsourcing arrangement, the latter can be
short-, medium- and long-term arrangements.
2.2.4. Short-, Medium- and Long-Term Arrangements
Short-term outsourcing arrangements are considered to be up to one year, medium –
from one to five years, and long – more than five years. Determining the type of the
outsourcing arrangement based on the length of the contract is difficult because if the
arrangement is not related to huge investment (i.e., the GIS systems in the IT sector),
then usually the contract is signed for one year with an option to be extended. Some
studies though estimate the average contract duration being 6-7 years (Barthélemy
2001; Quélin and Duhamel 2003)
It is clear, that very often the benefits expected from the outsourcing arrangement
determine the type of arrangement. In the next two sections, I try to examine the
benefits for the outsourcer (section 3) and the outsourcee (section 4).
3. Outsourcing – the Outsourcer’s Perspective30
By adopting the outsourcer’s perspective, herein I present the reasons for outsourcing
based  on  different  theoretical  approaches  as  well  as  some  of  the  downsides  of
outsourcing for the supplier of the outsourcing services.
James Quinn (1999: 10) very well summarized the benefits for engaging in
outsourcing arrangement for the outsourcer: “…lowers costs, risks and fixed
investments while greatly expanding flexibility, innovative capabilities and
opportunities for creating higher value-added and shareholder returns (Quinn 1999:
10).
30 It is important to note that outsourcing is not an entry mode strategy. The entry modes are export,
licensing and foreign direct investments (FDI) (Zhang, Zhang and Liu 2007). Outsourcing is the
process of externalization of some of the value-chain activities of a company, which can be done in
many different countries (global sourcing). Thus, a company gets certain parts of the product or the
services done in another country through the outsourcing arrangement but this has nothing to do with
the selling of final goods/services. Thus, from the outsourcer’s point of view outsourcing is not a
foreign entry mode.
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There are several theoretical approaches31 that provide explanation to why companies
engage in outsourcing, which eventually goes back to the make-or-buy decision and
relates to the question of firm boundaries (Steensma and Corley 2001). The
transaction cost economics (Holcomb and Hitt 2007), resource-based view (Holcomb
and Hitt 2007), bargaining perspective on strategic decisions (de Fontenay and Gans
2008), and relational view (Dyer and Singh 199832) are among the theories trying to
answer the question of firm boundaries. And even though some authors present those
theoretical approaches as being a competitive views on organizational decision
whether to externalize certain value-chain activity, they are indeed complementary
(Steensma and Corley 2001). Below, the most popular approaches – the transaction
cost economics and resource-based view of the firm – are presented.
3.1. Transaction-Based Arguments for Strategic Outsourcing
Concerned with the boundaries of the firm, transaction-cost economics regard the
make-or-buy decision as being the hallmark of the theory itself (Coase 1937,
Williamson 1975). Thus, the transaction-cost theory is directly linked to the decision
to deploy one or more value-chain activities to an external party. Regarding
outsourcing, the transaction cost theory considers two types of costs – the production
and the transaction costs (Mol 2007: 35). The production costs are the costs
associated with the process of producing products/services (Mol 2007: 35). The
transaction costs are very broad in scope and include all the costs of using markets
rather than producing in-house (Jacobides 2005). Examples of transaction costs are:
searching, negotiation, contracting, monitoring progress, enforcement costs, costs
incurred when resolving disputes (Alexander and Young 1996;, Holcomb and Hitt
2007). In other words, the theory explains the company’s decision to outsource certain
activities by its drive to achieve cost efficiency (Holcomb and Hitt 2007). If the cost
of externalizing certain value-chain activities is lower than producing them in-house
31 Mol (2007) discussed several approaches that deal with the outsourcing decisions within a firm.
Besides the ones mentioned in the text, those approaches include: transaction cost economics, resource-
based view, core competence, micro-economics, industrial organization, agency theory, real options,
industrial voids, costly contracting, social networks and others. Since I take the stance of the companies
that receive outsourcing contracts, I assume it is not needed to go in depth in what drives organizations’
decisions to outsource or not.
32 Dyer and Singh (1998) proposed a relational view of competitive advantage. The authors state that
firm’s critical resources may extend beyond firm boundaries. Furthermore, they looked at the sources
of relational rents from a pair or network of firm relationships.
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or in other words if the transaction costs are lower, firms will rely on the market
(Jacobides 2005).
3.1.1 Where Do Cost Savings Come From?
A company that decides to outsource certain value-chain activities indeed reduces the
total level of assets and other related facilities and technologies (Bettis et al. 1992;
Gilley and Rasheed 2000). In some cases, the organization that has initiated the
outsourcing can transfer some assets to the supplier – i.e. machines, buildings,
products and other (Mol 2007: 23). All of this leads to lower fixed costs and break-
even point for the initiator (Gilley and Rasheed 2000). This way, the organization can
improve its financial indicators in the short run (such as return on assets) (Gilley and
Rasheed 2000; Mol 2007: 23).
Furthermore, cost savings can come from the specialization of the outsourcing
supplier and the related economies of scale, knowledge and capital investments in
proprietary technology, which help the latter perform the same business activity more
efficiently and effectively  (McCarthy and Anagnostou 2004; Kakabadse and
Kakabadse 2000). Even though a lot of research reports that the scale economies of
the  outsourcee  very  often  do  not  surpass  the  scale  economies  of  the  outsourcers
(Alexander and Young 1996), many decisions are still based on the expectations that a
specialist supplier will achieve economies of scale and thus reduce cost per unit.
Moreover, a company can save on bureaucratic costs associated with the production
of certain goods/services internally (Mol 2007: 25). The main issue is that very often
there are no price mechanisms and economic incentives for the employees within the
organization to increase efficiency (Mol 2007: 25). This can make the internal
production very expensive (Mol 2007: 25).
3.1.2. When do Markets Work?
Thus, the question is then under which conditions a company will decide to outsource
certain value chain activities rather than performing those internally? Since
Williamson (1995) looks at the market as the default mode of a transaction (Mol
2007: 36), the question then can be translated into: when do markets work (as opposed
to when do markets fail?)
111
According to the transaction cost theory, there are several conditions under which a
company will prefer to outsource rather than internalize certain value chain activities
– when the assets are not highly specific or they are of general use (Holcomb and Hitt
2007; Jacobides 2005), when there is certain level of certainty about the business
conditions surrounding a transaction (as opposed to the technological uncertainty as of
Holcomb and Hitt 2007, or uncertainty in general as of Coase 1937; Williamson
1975), and lower frequency with which a transaction occurs (Mol 2007: 37). There is
an additional condition discussed by Mol (2007: 37) - ease of measurement - which
means that the easier it is to monitor the behavior of the counterpart, the more likely it
is  that  the outsourcing will  occur.  All  of these are reasons that can make a company
decide to outsource certain value-chain activities and create demand on the
intermediate markets. Indeed, the intermediate markets for outsourcing services are
demand-driven markets – even when a provider of a certain service does not exist, one
can be expected to appear very quickly if demand for this outsourcing service is
created (Corbett 2004: 6).
3.1.3. Downsides of Outsourcing
The transaction-cost economics looks at the downsides of strategic outsourcing by
postulating that in certain situations, outsourcing can impose significant transaction
costs on the party that has undertaken the outsourcing initiative (Schilling and
Steensma 2001). Moreover, some companies rely on excessive outsourcing and
maintain a portfolio of suppliers, which implies higher coordination costs (such as
logistics, inventory, nationalism and cultural distance (Kotabe 1990). In addition,
some transaction costs may arise from the opportunistic behavior of the supplier
(Schilling and Steensma 2001), which can “provide the supplier with a greater rent
from the relationship than it would normally do” (Mol 2007: 27). An example of
opportunistic behavior exercised by the outsourcee is supplying goods/services with
lower than agreed quality (Steensma and Corley 2001).
Moreover, outsourcing decreases the scope economies based on the relatedness of
activities within an organization (Bettis et al. 1992).  When  one  or  more  of  these
related activities is externalized, the optimization that arises at the interface between
these activities will go down (Mol 2007: 26; Porter 1980).
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Besides the transaction-cost perspective, another theoretical approach that can be
applied to outsourcing is the resource-based view of the firm (Espino-Rodríguez and
Padrón-Robaina 2006).
3.2. Resource-Based Arguments for Outsourcing
According to the resource-based view, any organization is perceived as a bundle of
resources and capabilities (Grant 1991). The decision to outsource certain value-chain
activities makes the company access the intermediate markets for specialized
capabilities (Holcomb and Hitt 2007). Indeed, as Holcomb and Hitt (2007) mentioned
“the ability to access new and potentially more valuable capabilities is a critical driver
of strategic outsourcing because these actions can fundamentally alter a firm’s
capability endowments.”
From resource-based view perspective, a successful outsourcing strategy requires a
company to have a clear idea of its core versus non-core activities (Espino-Rodríguez
and Padrón-Robaina 2006), which is directly linked to its degree of outsourceability33
of an activity (Mol 2007: 52). In addition, outsourcing includes the concept of
business processes since resources by themselves cannot be sources of competitive
advantage but they can become one if they are exploited efficiently through certain
business processes (Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina 2006).
3.2.1. Core vs. Non-Core Activities
An organization can increase its strategic focus through outsourcing (Mol 2007: 23).
This can be accomplished when the company knows its unique resources and core
competencies or those resources and competencies that define the firm’s fundamental
business (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Their value lies in the difficulty to transfer
them  from  one  organization  to  another  due  to  their  high  transaction  costs  and  their
tacit nature (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). Thus, it is not feasible for any
organization to outsource its core activities (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) since the
strategic  risk  increases  as  outsourced  activities  come  close  to  the  core  (Bettis et al.
1992). It is feasible though to externalize the non-core or supporting activities along
the value-chain (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). This is perceived to increase the short-
33 Degree of outsorceability is to which extent it is beneficial to outsource that activity (Espino-
Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina 2006).
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term returns (Lei and Hitt 1995) by better controlling the short-term costs and the
reduced capital expenditures. In addition, by deploying tangential activities to external
parties, companies can concentrate their (financial and other) resources to build core
competencies34 (Bettis et al. 1992; Lei and Hitt 1995) and thus stimulate innovation
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse 2000).
Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina (2006) stated that organizations differ in terms
of  the  amount  and  attributes  of  their  resource  endowments.  The  attributes  of  the
resources are whether they are valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable
(Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina 2006). Thus, the authors established a
relationship between the outsourcing strategy and the gap of capabilities in order to
determine the decision to outsource:
Outsourcing = f (gaps in capabilities)
Gaps=f (resources attributes, resources allocations)
In the tradition of resource-based view of the firm, it is perceived that outsourcing of
non-core activities can significantly improve firm performance (Espino-Rodríguez
and Padrón-Robaina 2006).
Furthermore, outsourcing of peripheral activities increases organizational flexibility
(especially in industries where technology innovation is fast-paced) (Kotabe 1990).
Externalizing certain value-added activities can help an organization adjust its scale
and scope upward and downward more easily and at a lower cost in response to the
changing demand conditions (McCarthy and Anagnostou 2004).  Thus, it is said that
outsourcing reduces firm’s risk during economic downturns (Lei and Hitt 1995) since
an organization is more flexible in making its strategic decisions (Schilling and
Steensma 2001).
34 Prahalad and Hamel (1990: 85) define core competencies as “collective learning in the organization,
especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple teams of technologies.”
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3.2.2. Downsides of Outsourcing
Each firm has an optimal level of outsourcing35 - beyond this level, if an organization
outsourced an activity, it will be an activity that is better to be kept in-house (Mol
2007: 58). Thus, the excessive reliance on outsourcing can be very detrimental for the
long-term development of valuable capabilities (Bettis et al. 1992). When an
organization deploys those activities to outside parties, it affects its ability to learn and
acquire new competencies, knowledge and technologies (Lei and Hitt 1995) and
consequently innovate (Mol 2007: 28). In the long run, the deteriorated knowledge
base of an organization can affect company’s attempt to sustain competitive
advantage (Bettis et al. 1992; Lei and Hitt 1995). Thus, the decision on which
organizational competencies are core and non-core and can be outsourced is of great
importance to the management team of any organization (Bettis et al. 1992; Lei and
Hitt 1995). In addition, having certain activities being outsourced can deter the ability
of a firm to take advantage during economic upturns (Lei and Hitt 1995).
The above-discussed theoretical approaches explain when and why the outsourcers
deploy some of their value-chain activities to external parties rather than performing
them internally. Besides the importance of these two questions, the question of who
they will decide to outsource to is also crucial. De Fontanay and Gans (2008) shed
some light on this question by regarding the strategic decision on whether to
outsource to an established company or to an independent company, which eventually
may become a competitor.
With this research, I try to provide an insight on which criteria (organizational
characteristics/signals) might be important when outsourcers decide who to outsource
to. As an initial step, in the next section I examine the reasons why an outsourcee will
enter into outsourcing arrangement.
35 According to Mol (2007: 58), the optimal level of outsourcing is an intermediate level – it can never
be when all activities are integrated or when all activities are outsourced.
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4. Outsourcing – the Outsourcee’s Perspective
Outsourcing is not simply a purchasing decision for the outsourcer (Gilley and
Rasheed 2000:764) and not simply selling an output for the outsourcee since it
involves transfer of the responsibility of a business activity as well as the associated
knowledge from one party to another one (McCarthy and Anagnostou 2004). In
addition, outsourcing requires an ongoing relationship between the interacting parties
(Linder 2004). Indeed, the relationship between the outsourcer and the outsourcee is
characterized by: (1)  its ongoing character, which requires an interaction in the long-
run; (2) a transfer of a whole business activity from one party to another one and the
associated knowledge with it, and (3) a dependency (to a certain extent) between the
two parties.
Looking at the outsourcing process from outsourcee’s perspective is very important
because as Corbett (2004: 6) mentioned in the outsourcing process “a number of
inherent  factors  work  together  to  shift  the  balance  of  the  value  equation  toward  the
“buy” side more and more every day.” According to the author, there are several
factors for this: (1) the increased number and enhanced capabilities of the suppliers,
(2) technology development related to an increased number of outsourcing
destinations – physical barriers are not considered barriers anymore as well as the fact
that internal technology investment is becoming riskier, which makes more and more
companies outsource it to outside parties and (3) hyper-competitive markets for
outsourcing services, which has increased the standard of performance (Corbett 2004:
7).
In the outsourcing arrangement, the outsourcer presents its specification. By meeting
those specifications, the outsourcee develops capabilities, which can help it gain
future contracts. Thus, it is very important to make the first “break” or get the first
contract. After that, the process of new capability development is unlocked. Not all
outsourcing arrangements will lead to the development of capabilities though. As it
was mentioned earlier, some of them are performance-enhancing arrangements.
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4.1. Benefits for the Outsourcees
Even though Holcomb and Hitt (2007) stated that the outsourcing arrangement serves
the interests of the organization that has initiated it, the outsourcing deal can be
beneficial even for the suppliers of outsourcing services. Cachon and Harker (2002)
found out that with outsourcing all firms are better off. For the service providers,
outsourcing is a way for future growth and expansion. The resource-based view of the
firm36 can be used to explain the benefits for the suppliers of outsourcing services.
In the long run, the benefits for the supplying organization can arise based on their
engagement with the outsourcing contracts. The latter implies working and interacting
with  an  external  (sometimes  foreign)  counterpart.  Thus,  the  outsourcee  will  develop
new resources and competencies (Bettis et al. 1992). Sometimes, the outsourcees use
the capabilities they developed based on the outsourcing contracts in order to start
competing on their own in the same market (for examples, see Bettis et al. 1992 and
de Fontaney and Gans 2008).  I distinguish between the two types of capabilities that
the supplier can develop in the process of completing the outsourcing contract: (1)
related to the outsourced activity (i.e. IT, manufacturing and not only regarding
economies of scale and scope (Bettis et al. (1992), which is indeed the fundamental
business activity (or core) of the supplier and (2) managerial capabilities related to
managing the project itself.
The new resources and competencies can be the basis for the development of dynamic
capabilities defined as “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal
and external competences to address rapidly changing environments” (Teece, Pisano
and Shuen 1997: 516). The dynamic capabilities are the key to achieve sustainable
competitive advantage and this way outperform the rest of the providers of
outsourcing services on the intermediate market.
Unfortunately, to the extent of our knowledge, in the academic literature there are still
no empirical studies done on partner selection issues in outsourcing arrangements
(except de Fontenay and Gans (2008), who looked at the dichotomous choice between
36 The TCE is not applicable here because the companies that receive the outsourcing contracts do not
face the choice whether to go on the intermediate market for outsourcing services. The market for
outsourcing services is basically the market where they offer their main product/service.
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outsourcing to an established company or an independent company). Thus, even
though the supply chain literature presents models (based on linear programming,
mixed integer programming, goal programming, multi-objective programming, and
non-linear programming, etc.) that can be applied in order to make the best choice in
terms of suppliers (for a review, look at Ting and Cho 2008), it is still not known how
exactly outsourcers choose their outsourcing counterparts when deciding to farm out
certain value-chain activities.
In the practitioners’ literature though, Power, Desouza and Bonifazi (2006) looked at
the process of supplier assessment (pp. 100-111). Based on their practical experience,
the authors identified several stages of the process of vendor assessment. It is assumed
that knowing what the important attributes the outsourcers use to assess their potential
partners at each stage of the process will be important to develop the framework of
valid signal that the latter can use to communicate their legitimacy.
4.2. Supplier Evaluation at the Market for Outsourcing Services
In the practitioners’ literature, many authors try to convince managers that
outsourcing should not be done for cost reduction purposes only (Doig et al. 2001;
Power, Desouza and Bonifazi 2006: 108; Quélin and Duhamel 2003; Quinn 1999). If
done only on cost considerations, outsourcing may turn to be a bitter game, as many
consulting companies report – i.e. Diamond Cluster International stated that 78% of
the organizations that outsourced their IT activity stopped the contract prematurely
(Quélin and Duhamel 2003); offshore outsourcing initiatives have 50% failure rate
according to Gartner survey (Rottman 2008), almost half (46%) of the companies that
outsourced their software development viewed the work of their suppliers as being
low-quality (Rottman 2008). In addition, Hirshheim (1998) noted a trend to
“backsourcing” – organizations that outsourced certain value-chain activities take
them back in-house due to their dissatisfaction with the performance of the outsourcer
(Quélin and Duhamel 2003).
As a result, today many academicians and practitioners promote the idea that
outsourcing should be a well-thought process undertaken only after in-depth analysis
of the strategic value of key activities followed by an examination of the match
between the strategic needs of the focal company and the efficiency and capabilities
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offered by the suppliers (Doig et al. 2001). Assuming that the company has taken the
strategic decision to externalize some of its value-chain activities, they go through the
following stages of assessment of the potential suppliers (Power, Desouza and













Fig. 6: The Vendor Assessment Process (adapted from Power et al. 2006).
Below, the specificities of each stage are presented.
Preparation –  the  outsourcer  has  to  compile  a  cross-functional  team  of  firm
representatives, which following a well-defined process (standardized, fair and
documented) conduct vendor evaluation.
Assembling a manageable list of candidates – herein, based on the needs of the
outsourcer, the team applies broad criteria in order to reduce the number of potential
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partners to a more manageable list of candidates. In example, here the team can
eliminate vendors by geographical location, etc.
Evaluating the vendors – herein, the team evaluates the capabilities of each vendor
from  the  pre-selected  group  according  to  a  list  of  desired  attributes.  This  list  of
attributes includes: past dealings with the supplier, trust, brand name, references from
current  clients,  area  of  specialization.  One  way  to  do  this  is  getting  in  contact  with
supplier’s current customers. Additional criteria for evaluation are the business
strategy, management practices and procedures, years of experience, types of
certification and the award and reward mechanisms they use.
The major information an organization needs to gather when evaluating potential
suppliers can be divided into two groups: (1) the outsourcee should have certain
technical capabilities (i.e., quality methodologies); (2) the outsourcee should be able
to meet schedules and budget commitments (can be gathered from current or past
customers).
Evaluating the vendor’s proposal – at this stage, the most important decision criteria
is pricing. Besides pricing, additional criteria are completeness, clarity, detail and
rigor. When the outsourcer evaluates the completeness of the supplier’s proposal, it
assesses whether all the outsourcer’s needs are taken into consideration. Clarity
demonstrates how easily the vendor is able to communicate with the outsourcer on the
areas of the proposal. With the detail and rigor, the outsourcee indeed demonstrates
the mastery of the process.
In-depth look at the vendors – risk assessment of each vendor is mandatory in order
to  secure  a  good  choice.  The  risk  assessment  will  include  whether  the  vendor  is
focused on one client, the political environment in the home country of the supplier,
adequate financial portfolio, and the adoption of industry innovations.
Power, Desouza and Bonifazi’s book (2007) provides some advices for the
practitioners on how to choose their supplier of outsourcing services. As it was stated
before, it is not clear whether outsourcers in fact go through these stages of evaluation
since  there  is  no  empirical  study  on  the  outsourcing  partner  selection.  Even  though
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this is an area that deserves researchers’ attention, herein, I look at the opposite side of
the same process – how the suppliers increase their chances to be picked. According
to the proposed signaling theory of legitimacy, a supplier can increase its
attractiveness by signaling its adherence to the stakeholders’ requirements in terms of
resources and capabilities as well as its reliability as a partner.
From Fig. 6, one can see that signaling the possession of certain capabilities and
signaling attributes of being a reliable partner is crucial at the stage of evaluating the
vendors. Other stages though, such as being part of the list of vendors considered (the
stage  before)  as  well  as  the  stage  when the  proposal  of  the  vendor  is  evaluated  (the
stage after) are also important.
The outsourcer and the outsourcee meet at the intermediate market for outsourcing
services, which in some industries has global scale (i.e. the high-tech industries). In
the next section, the specificities of these markets are presented.
5. Intermediate Markets for Outsourcing Services
The intermediate markets for outsourcing services (also called supplier markets) are
indeed the markets where the outsourcer and the outsourcee meet. They are demand-
driven markets - once the outsourcer creates demand at the market, the providers of
the demanded outsourcing services will appear (Corbett 2004). The intermediate
markets for outsourcing services emerge when the previously integrated production
processes between two sets of specialized firms in the same industry have been
divided and are considered as separate entities (Jacobides 2005). This process is called
vertical disintegration and it is associated with rather invisible but radical industry
transformation (Jacobides 2005).
Since lately the intermediate markets for outsourcing services shifted from the
developed countries to emerging economies (including transition economies), I
specifically focus on the latter. This clarification is necessary because those markets
have their specificities, which are important in order to understand the behavior of
organizations getting outsourcing contracts.
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5.1. Characteristics of the Intermediate Markets for Outsourcing Services
Herein, I specifically examine markets that are comprised of many small-and-medium
enterprises (SMEs)37 (i.e. customized software development), which compete among
each other for clients. When competition among outsourcees is high and the buyer can
easily switch to an alternative supplier, the transaction costs for the outsourcers are
low since they do not have to spend additional costs on monitoring and contract
specification (Walker and Weber 1987). At the same time, the competition among
outsourcees constantly drives the production costs down.
On the other side, I consider suppliers located in transition environments. The
uncertainty based on the underdeveloped market-supporting institutions, lack of well-
defined property rights and others (Peng 2003) induces market players to exercise
opportunistic behavior.  Thus, as it was already mentioned, these small organizations
supplying products/services at the intermediate outsourcing markets face a liability of
origin. Therefore, from one side the presence of numerous suppliers in many low-cost
destinations decreases the transaction costs for the outsourcer (and increases its
bargaining power) and on the other side, the fact that they come from transition
environments increases the transaction costs.
This made some researchers state that the markets for outsourcing services are not
totally predictable and reliable both for the buyer and the supplier (Quinn and Hilmer
1994). The challenges in those markets lie in the risk that can arise regarding price,
quality, time, or other terms (Quinn and Hilmer 1994).
5.1.1. Outsourcing Markets are Uncertain Markets
Uncertainty is defined as the inability of decision-makers to specify a complete
decision tree (Walker and Weber 1984 following Williamson 1975). The uncertainty
in the outsourcer-outsourcee relationship is related to environmental complexity and
the bounded rationality of the decision maker (Walker and Weber 1984 following
Williamson 1975). Thus, an information asymmetry exists between the outsourcer and
the outsourcee, which is related to the lack of information available on the
marketplace or from individual supplier regarding their performance (Quinn and
37 In this study, I use the terms ‘small- and medium-size enterprise’ and ‘small organization
interchangeably.
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Hilmer 1994). In other words, the supplier has superior information about its own
qualities. Hence, in case they have superior resources and capabilities, as well as
reliability as potential partners, they need to find a way to communicate this to clients
through signaling.
According to the transaction cost economics, when the outsourcer is faced with high
level of market uncertainty, they prefer to internalize the value-chain activity (Coase
1937; Williamson 1975). More recent research started questioning this fundamental
premises of the transaction cost economics based on some studies showing that when
the market instability and unpredictability increases, individual companies tend to
interact more, rather than less with other organizations, therefore increasing the
overall volume of their market transactions (Podolny 1994). Thus, some researchers
proved that in uncertain environments, organizations try to reduce costs, transfer the
uncertainty in performing certain value-chain activities to the outside parties and
access to specialized skills and outputs (Abraham and Taylor 1993; McCarthy and
Anagnostou 2004).
5.1.2. Outsourcing Markets are Reputational Markets
Even though many markets for outsourcing services are global markets characterized
by a large number of suppliers (many of which are small organizations with low
bargaining power), reputation plays a role. The role of reputation (based on past
performance) is augmented due to several reasons: (1) the high level of uncertainty at
the market for outsourcing services associated with the country-specific
characteristics; (2) information asymmetry between the buyer and the supplier related
to the lack of market information about the supplier of outsourcing services.
Herein, organizational reputation is considered as one of the building blocks of the
legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition environments. In transitional contexts,
gaining organizational reputation based on past performance is easier than acquiring
legitimacy since the rules, norms and values (against which legitimacy is matched)
have not been completely established yet.
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5.1.3. Outsourcing Markets are Relational Markets
The outsourcing markets are relational markets which implies that outsourcers rarely
go through the process of vendor evaluation once they have found a supplier that
satisfies their basic needs. This means that once a satisfactory relation is established
between the outsourcer and the outsourcee, the former rarely undertakes the process
of assessing additional suppliers of outsourcing services even if better suppliers may
exist at the market.
5.1.4. Outsourcing Markets are not Commodity Markets
Some authors (Davenport 2005) state that in many outsourcing markets, there are
process standards (activity, performance and management standards) that will
eventually lead to commoditization of the outsourcing services. The effect of the
commoditization will be a dramatic increase in the number of organizations willing to
externalize some of their value-chain activities as well as an increase in the number of
suppliers of those services (Davenport 2005). The expected overall impact will be a
decrease in the prices of the outsourcing services (Davenport 2005).
Herein, I adopt the view that the commoditization of outsourcing services has not
happened yet due to the low adoption rate of the above-mentioned process standards
by SMEs in emerging and transition environments. Hence, the providers of
outsourcing services do differentiate themselves not only on the basis of price but also
on the basis of quality (in the broadest sense) of the products/services offered. And in
evaluating the outsourcing providers, organizations consider a set of organizational
characteristics besides the price of their products/services.
Therefore, the analysis lies on an important assumption – the decision on which
organizations choose their outsourcing providers is not based solely on cost
considerations (Quélin and Duhamel 2003; Quinn 1999) but on a combination of
quantitative and qualitative criteria, such as price, quality, on-time delivery, supplier
location, after-sales services, etc. (Ting and Cho 2008).
In this study, I particularly look at SMEs in transition environments trying to obtain
long-term outsourcing contracts. Signaling certain organizational characteristics helps
the focal company bridge the information asymmetry that exists between the
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exchange parties and communicate its adherence to the evaluating party’s
requirements and expectations.  As it was mentioned earlier, the outsourcers (clients)
consider two main aspects of the organization they evaluate in outsourcing
arrangements (Quélin and Duhamel 2003) – whether the latter has the needed
resources and competencies (captured by the concept of functional legitimacy) and
whether it is a trustworthy player (captured by the concept of relational legitimacy)
By operating in the markets for outsourcing services, outsourcees can rely on signals
of functional and relational legitimacy in order to communicate their adherence to the
requirements and expectations of the evaluating audiences. The conformity to
stakeholder’s expectations is a condition signifying organizational legitimacy.
Hence, it is hypothesized:
H 1: The higher the functional legitimacy of an organization, the higher its
organizational legitimacy.
H 2: The higher the relational legitimacy of an organization, the higher its
organizational legitimacy.
Legitimacy helps organizations secure additional resources necessary for their
survival (Hannan and Freeman 1984). The legitimacy stock of an organization
comprised  of  different  signals  or  characteristics  is  costly  and  lengthy  to  obtain.  In  a
transition environment, an organization with higher legitimacy stock based on signals
should be able to demonstrate a better profit-making ability. In example, a company
with higher legitimacy stock (or organizational legitimacy) should be able to charge
more its clients due to the better prospects of providing reliable services in the long-
run. The relationship legitimacy ? performance has already been discussed in the
literature  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  additional  resources  an  organization  can
attract are positively correlated with its profitability (Mazza 1999: 42). The ultimate
sign of legitimate organization is its profit-making ability (Mazza 1999: 42).
Hence, I hypothesize:
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H 3: The higher the organizational legitimacy, the higher its profit-making ability.
The dimensions of the functional and the relational legitimacy constructs were already
identified  in  chapter  3.  In  the  next  section,  I  look  at  each  dimension  of  the  two
constructs keeping in mind the organizations under scrutiny – small firms evolving in
transition environments trying to obtain long-term outsourcing arrangements.
6. Dimensions of Functional Legitimacy
As it was discussed earlier, functional legitimacy signals the worthiness of a partner
based on its access and/or control of important and valuable task-related resources and
capabilities. When evaluating the task-related competencies of small technology-
based organizations evolving in transition environments, several distinctive
competencies were identified – informational, managerial, organizational, innovative
and symbolic reputational. In their totality, they represent different facets which build
the construct of functional legitimacy.
As a next step, I look at the dimensions of functional legitimacy starting by
information competencies.
6.1. Information Competencies
The resource-based view looks at the effective deployment and exploitation of
information as an important asset (Peppard, Lambert and Edwards 2000). Usually, the
information competencies relate to the ability of organizations to derive value from its
information systems’ (IS) output (Peppard, Lambert and Edwards 2000). Tippins and
Sohi (2003) even defined the IT competency as “the extent to which a firm is
knowledgeable about and effectively utilizes IT to manage information within the
firm” (p. 748). Therefore, information competencies, the way they have been defined
so far, are associated with the information processing within the firm and the
consequent value creation.
For the purpose of this study, informational competencies are defined as being related
to the ability of an organization to ensure access to relevant industry information. This
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implies an external focus on information gathering rather than information processing.
Small organizations evolving in transition environments need to rather access
information regarding the latest developments in the sector on global and national
level than to try to derive value of their information systems (if in place at all).
Tippins and Sohi (2003) mentioned three ways for information acquisition – (1) based
on direct experience, (2) based on the experience of others (i.e. customers and
suppliers), and 3) based on the company’s own memory. This point of view is
extended by the observation that a small organization in transition environment can
directly acquire information via its clients and/or suppliers, via the social network of
the founding team members and/or membership in industry associations. In this study,
I examine the external representation (an observable signal) of the possessed
information competencies. The evaluating audiences may consider the ability to
ensure access to up-to-date industry information as an important organizational
feature, especially in fast-paced industries/sectors. Hence, I hypothesize:
H 4: Organizational characteristics signaling superior informational competencies
will affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition
environments.
The second dimension of the functional legitimacy construct is the managerial
competencies of the founding team members.
6.2. Managerial Competencies of Founding Team
The firm’s founding team is the group of entrepreneurs that initiated and consequently
manages the venture. In general, managers are perceived as a unique organizational
resource (Hitt et al. 2001). There are several observable managers’ characteristics –
age, tenure in the organization, functional background, education, socioeconomic
roots, and financial position – that affect the management style and the strategies
adopted by the organization (Hambrick and Mason 1984).
In transition environments, managerial weaknesses are recognized as one of the most
important factors that can inhibit the firm’s ability to grow (Child and Pleister 2003).
Founding managers may experience deficiencies in terms of their managerial and
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decision-making capabilities (Hitt et al. 2004). They may also lack the appropriate
mindsets in order to successfully compete in an environment which shifts from
planned to open market economy (Filatotchev et al. 1996). The instability of the
transition environments makes managers very short-term oriented (Hitt et al. 2004).
Therefore, managers show less commitment to long-term arrangements (Hitt et al.
2004).
If the founding team members had Western or Western-like education and/or work
experience, this leads to transfer of some knowledge and skills from the institution
where the education and/or experience was acquired to the newly-created venture.
Hence, managers will demonstrate a better ability to manage long-term arrangements
in a market-based context. The Western education and/or work experience influences
the way the managers communicate and negotiate as well as their commitment to the
success of the arrangement.
In addition, if the founding managers had business education, this affects their
approach to managing the company. The prior education and training influences
directly the quality of enterprise management (Child and Pleister 2003). Moreover,
business education in transition environments could be acquired after the beginning of
the process of institutional change. During the socialist era, education in business was
non-existent. Thus, even if acquired domestically, the business education is very
likely to reflect the principles promoted by the Western educational systems.
Hence, superior managerial competencies (i.e., business education and/or Western
education and work experience) influence positively the ability of founding managers
to manage and exert commitment in the long-term arrangements of their
organizations. Hence, I hypothesize:
H 5: Organizational characteristics signaling superior managerial competencies of
founding team members will affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs
evolving in transition environments.
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Besides the managerial competencies residing in the founding team members, there
are some competencies on organizational level, or the so-called organizational
competencies. They are examined in the section below.
6.3. Organizational Competencies
One can argue that any competency of a firm is “organizational” and this is correct.
For the purpose of this study though, organizational competencies are the
competencies that cannot be associated with a smaller unit of the organization – i.e. an
asset or a resource. For example, the employees’ or managerial competencies are
inherent to the stuff employed or the founding team members, respectively.
Organizational competencies pertain to the organization as a whole and cannot be
related to its employees, managers, information processing or any other resource. I
particularly examine the organizational competencies derived from affiliation with
prestigious industry players and the organizational form (specialist versus generalist).
Prestigious Affiliates’ Certification
The certificates granted by prestigious affiliates can be the external representation of
some organizational competencies. In general, the association with prestigious
affiliates decreases the uncertainty associated with the future prospects of the firm and
consequently affects stakeholders’ evaluation of the company in a positive way
(Titman and Trueman 1986; Carter and Manaster 1990; Gulati and Higgins 2003;
Stuart et al. 1999). In order to be granted certificates by prestigious industry groups,
organizations have to demonstrate the possession of certain competencies. Hence, it is
hypothesized that certified partnerships enhance the functional aspect of
organizational legitimacy since it is a demonstration of organizational competencies.
Specialist/Generalist
Specialist organizational structure is characterized by lean exploitation of a narrow
niche (Usher 1999) and lower requirements for excess capacity (Hannan and Freeman
1977). On the contrary, generalist structures rely upon wide variety of resources
simultaneously and maintain large excess capacities (Hannan and Freeman 1977).
While in stable environments specialism is always favored (Hannan and Freeman
1977), in unstable environments (such as transition environments) generalism is not
always the successful organizational form (Hannan and Freeman 1977). As Hannan
and Freeman (1977) mentioned when “the environment shifts uncertainty among
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states that  place very different demands on the organization, and the duration of the
environmental states is short relative to the life of the organization, populations that
specialize will be favored.”  Hence, generalist structures are “not optimal to any
environmental configuration” (Hannan and Freeman 1977: 946).
Small organizations in transition environments competing for long-term partnerships
will benefit from signaling their specialist form since this form communicates having
lower levels of slack and better efficiency in performing the task in question. Hence, I
hypothesize that superior organizational competencies in the form of prestigious
affiliates certification and specialist organizational form will enhance the functional
aspect of organizational legitimacy.
H 6: Organizational characteristics signaling superior organizational competencies
will affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition
environments.
Another dimension of the functional latent construct is the ability of the focal
organization to innovate, or its innovative competencies. In the section below, I look
at the specificities of the innovative competencies of SMEs evolving in transition
environments.
6.4. Innovative Competencies
In general terms, innovation is the application of knowledge in order to produce new
knowledge (Drucker 1993: 190). Organizational innovativeness contains new
products or services, new processes and new organizational structures that firms use
to compete with one another and meet customer demands, and also the adoption of a
new idea, process, product, or service developed internally or acquired from the
external environment (Pouder and St. John 1996).
There are two main research streams in the literature on innovation: (1) innovation
diffusions (or adoption) across nations, industries and organizations and (2)
development and marketing of new products (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001). For the
purpose of this study, I concentrate on product innovations, associated with “firm’s
commitment to the development and marketing products that are new to the firm
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and/or the market” (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001). New products can take different
forms: upgrades, modifications, and extensions of existing products as well as
completely new for the market (Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001).
I examine the link between innovativeness and functional legitimacy of an
organization based on the assumption that organizational innovativeness “manifests
its capability to explore new possibilities” (Cho and Pucik 2005: 557) and it requires
systematic effort and a high degree of organization (Drucker 1993: 190).
Due to the high level of environmental uncertainty, small organizations in transition
environments are occupied to ensure their survival in the short run (which I previously
called organizational shortsightedness) rather than to engage in systematic innovative
efforts. In addition, due to their small size, they experience lack of managerial and
financial resources to spend on the development of new product technologies (Hitt et
al. 2000, Li and Atuahene-Gima 2001). Nevertheless, there are still some companies
(namely technology ventures) that engage in innovative efforts and manage to develop
and market new products/services.  Furthermore, some extant research has proved that
in volatile environments, engaging in product innovation leads to better organizational
performance (Covin and Slevin 1989).
If an SME in transition environment has some innovative capacity and it demonstrates
it to the external constituencies, this affects positively its functional legitimacy since it
shows not only that it has sufficient resources but also that it had developed the
competencies to re-organize or re-group them in order to create new knowledge (Li
and Atuahene-Gima 2001). Hence, I hypothesize that:
H 7: Organizational characteristics signaling firm’s innovative competencies will
affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition
environments.
The last dimension of the functional legitimacy latent construct is the symbolic
reputational competencies. In the section below, I regard the specificities of the
symbolic reputational competencies of SMEs in transition environments.
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6.5. Symbolic Reputational Competencies
First, it is important to distinguish between symbolic reputational competencies and
organizational reputation based on past performance. I use the latter as a building
block of the relational legitimacy latent construct, which is discussed in the next
section. The symbolic reputational competencies are related to receiving some kind of
a distinctive award.
Similar  to  certification  contests  (Rao  1994),  awards  are  associated  with  ranking  of
organizations (Wade et al. 2006).  The  difference  comes  from  the  fact  that
organizations agree voluntarily to participate or not in the evaluation process. Hence,
it is not clear whether the organization that has received the prize is indeed the best in
the category of evaluation. At the same time, the award is an external representation
of certain organizational competencies. This is the reason why awards are considered
as being part of the functional legitimacy latent variable construct.
Second, I distinguish between quality awards and certificates, which can be perceived
as quality awards as well (Hendricks and Singhal 1997). Some examples of
certificates include ISO 9000, Capability Maturity Model I (CMMI), etc. The
difference is that the quality awards are given to organizations as one-time recognition
for superior performance in a certain field. They are usually based on rankings of
organizations publicized in the media (Wade et al. 2006). The certificates are based
on the evaluation of internal processes and practices in the organization and have to
be renewed every year. To maintain a certificate, a company is expected to show a
continuous improvement of its internal processes and practices. Hence, the two have
an important but different signaling value. The signaling value of quality awards
demonstrates superior competencies in a certain field in comparison to the
competition (rankings). The signaling value of the certificates demonstrates
organizational accountability (discussed in the next section).
Quality awards can be a valid signal of superior competencies of small organizations
evolving  in  transition  environment  since  they  are  costly  (in  terms  of  effort)  and
observable (based on media coverage). They are particularly important in uncertain
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environments where judgments on quality should be made (Wade et al. 2006). Hence,
I hypothesize:
H 8: Organizational characteristics signaling symbolic reputational competencies
will enhance the functional legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition environments.
After the dimensions of the functional legitimacy were presented, in the next section, I
look at the dimensions of the other type of legitimacy – relational legitimacy.
7. Dimensions of Relational Legitimacy
Relational legitimacy is associated with whether an organization is reliable as a
partner and will comply with the specifications of a contract (i.e. in terms of
respecting the quality requirements and deadlines). In the context of transition
environments, small organizations trying to receive long-term contracts have to signal
not only their ability to perform the task in question (functional legitimacy) but also to
perform it by respecting the initially set deadlines and quality specifications
(relational legitimacy).
Relational  legitimacy includes  valid  signals  of  the  worthiness  of  a  partner  based  on
communicating two sets of elements: partnership-related (trustworthiness and
reliability) and organization-specific (accountability, stability and visibility).
Below, I specify the content of each dimension of the relational legitimacy latent
construct, as follows: I start with organizational trustworthiness (including reliability)
as the only partnership-related characteristic examined in this study. Then, I continue
with accountability, stability and visibility as organization-specific characteristics.
7.1. Organizational Trustworthiness
As a precondition for trade and production, trust is important in any business
transaction (Akerlof 1970). There is a difference between trust and trustworthiness of
an organization as a partner. Trust is the confidence in other’s goodwill (Ring and
Van de Ven 1992) or that “no party to an exchange will exploit another’s
vulnerabilities” (Sabel 1993: 1133). A company is trustworthy when it will not exploit
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the vulnerabilities of others (Barney and Hansen 1994). While trust is an attribute of
the relationship between the exchange parties, trustworthiness is a characteristic of
individual exchange partner (Barney and Hansen 1994). Relationships between
trustworthy partners are more stable to external pressures and show greater
adaptability (Mohr and Spekman 1994).
Reliability is an organizational characteristic associated with the ability to reproduce
collective products of a given minimum quality repeatedly (Hannan and Freeman
1984, Ingram and Baum 1997). In uncertain environments, interested stakeholders
may value reliability more than efficiency (Hannan and Freeman 1984). This means
that  rational  actors  may  be  willing  to  pay  high  price  for  the  certainty  that  a  given
product or service will have relatively small variance in quality (Hannan and Freeman
1984). Some researchers consider reliability as being part of trust (Nahapiet and
Ghoshal 1998). For the purpose of this study, I adopt this point of view and perceive
reliability as being part of organizational trustworthiness.
The need to signal trustworthiness is even higher for small organizations in transition
environments due to their shortsightedness and the fact that they are often prone to
behave in an opportunistic way. In addition, the organizations under scrutiny are
trying to obtain long-term contracts. Hence, it is important to demonstrate that the
organizations under scrutiny will not take advantage of the vulnerabilities of potential
partners in the long run and will be able to perform the outcome repeatedly. Usually,
the assessment is based on the past performance of the organization under scrutiny.
Hence, I hypothesize:
H 9: Organizational characteristics signaling organizational trustworthiness will
enhance the relational legitimacy of SMEs in transition environments.
The second dimension of the relational legitimacy latent construct is organizational
accountability. The specificities of organizational accountability of SMEs in transition
environments are presented below.
7.2. Organizational Accountability
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Accountability is an organizational characteristic related to the ability of an
organization to account rationally for their actions (Hannan and Freeman 1984). This
means both that they must be able to document how resources have been used and to
reconstruct the sequences of organizational decisions, rules, and actions that produced
particular outcomes (Hannan and Freeman 1984). It does not mean that the
organization  has  to  tell  the  truth  to  their  members  and  to  the  public  about  how
resources were used. It is enough to be able to make internally consistent arguments
that appropriate rules and procedures existed to reproduce rational allocation of
resources and appropriate organizational actions (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
Researchers found out that organizations have to accomplish their technical work
internally and demonstrate that they follow ordered, rational procedures to evaluating
audiences by utilizing symbolic displays (Basu, Dirsmith and Gupta 1999).
Furthermore, corporate actors favor other corporate actors that can signal reliable
performance and account rationally for their actions (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
Having in mind the instability of the transition environment (which affects all
organizational actions), small organizations trying to receive long-term contracts will
be even more interested to demonstrate their internal processes follow certain
procedures that have been widely accepted within a sector or in general (in the
economy). This will assure the evaluating audiences that the organization under
scrutiny follows certain guidelines in order to perform the task in question. This is the
reason why the signals of accountability are building blocks of the relational
legitimacy construct. Hence, I hypothesize:
H 10: Organizational characteristics signaling organizational accountability will
enhance the relational legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition environments.
Besides organizational trustworthiness and organizational accountability, another
dimension of the relational legitimacy construct is stability. Below, I look at the
specificities of organizational stability of SMEs in transition environments.
7.3. Organizational Stability
Generally speaking, organizational stability is based on routines. An organizational
routine is “a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent actions, involving
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multiple actors” (Feldman and Pentland 2003). Routines are perceived as sources of
organizational stability (Feldman and Pentland 2003) but also inertia (Hannan and
Freeman 1983) and inflexibility (Weiss and Ilgen 1985). At the same time, a new
view on routines emerges where they are perceived as sources of both flexibility
(Pentland and Rueter 1994) and change (Feldman 2000). Routines become sources of
change in early stages of organizational development, in times of crisis but also in old,
established organizations in stable environments due to the agency factor (Feldman
and  Pentland  2003).  The  latter  is  related  to  the  fact  that  eventually  routines  are
performed by people which adds an element of subjectivity to the repetitive process of
routine performance (Feldman and Pentland 2003). As a result, Feldman and Pentland
(2003) draw the attention to the dual character of routines – they inhibit but at the
same time cause change.
Both population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1977) and neo-institutionalists
(Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2001) look at routines as being the basis for
organizational stability associated with reliable performance. When evaluating
potential partners, interested audiences want to be assured that an organization is
stable to perform the task in question. Or in other words, decision-makers look for
signals which carry the legitimacy-enhancing information that the routines ensuring
reliable performance exist within the organization.
When I talk about routines that underlie organizational stability of small organizations
in transition environments, I disregard the endogenous change they may cause due to
the agency factor (Feldman and Pentland 2003). I rather focus on the way routines
bring stability to organizations exposed to exogenous shocks (Feldman 2003). I look
at routines as internal structures, processes, roles that incorporate or reflect the
instability and volatility inherent to transition environments. The presence of the
above-mentioned routines is an important aspect of the day-to-day operations because
they allow the organization to successfully manage the environmental volatility and
reproduce the expected output. The lack of institutional framework that guides
organizational behavior makes the transition environment more complex and unstable.
Hence, external representation (signals) of the existence of routines (which due to
their nature are hardly observable) will provide valuable information to the evaluating
audiences.
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H 11: Organizational characteristics signaling organizational stability will enhance
the relational legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition environments.
The last dimension of the relational legitimacy latent construct is organizational
visibility. The specificities of organizational visibility of SMEs in transition
environment are presented in the section below.
7.4. Organizational Visibility
In general, visibility is defined as “the extent to which phenomena can be seen or
noticed” (Bowen 2000: 93). Organizational visibility “is based upon characteristics
that are likely to result in the organization having a publicly recognized name” (Fuller
et al. 2006). It is “an important attribute of organizations” (Brammer and Millington
2006) and a symbol of organizational success (March and Simon 1958; Fuller et al.
2006).
Visibility has an important role in reducing the information asymmetry existing
between an organization (and more precisely the management team) and its
stakeholders (Brammer and Millington 2006). More visible organizations are under an
increased level of stakeholders’ regulation (Brammer and Millington 2006). On the
other side, when stakeholders are more informed about company’s actions, they are
more likely to take actions themselves towards this company (Brammer and
Millington 2006).
For large organizations, size is a crucial factor that affects and indeed enhances
organizational visibility (Boje and Whetten 1981; Goodstein 1994; Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). When a sector is fragmented and populated by many SMEs, size is
not the best way to capture the visibility of a small firm and a good way to measure
the visibility of large firms. Size does affect visibility (Meznar and Nigh 1995) even
of small organizations but it is moderated by the layer of the environment on which an
organization functions.
In addition, the environment for small enterprises in transition environments is
characterized by high level of uncertainty and volatility. In unstable environments,
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organizational visibility is an important attribute that an organization has to build in
order to communicate not only its presence but also that “it is there to stay.” Hence, I
look at particular organizational attributes that can ensure that an organization has the
intention to evolve in a particular market in the long run. Even though organizational
visibility is a multi-dimensional construct, herein I particularly look at the dimensions
associated with the relational legitimacy38 - the access points where the stakeholders
meet the focal organization.
H 12: Organizational characteristics signaling organizational visibility will enhance
the relational legitimacy of SMEs evolving in transition environments.
Due to the multi-dimensional character of organizational visibility, there are two
measurements of the concept – physical footprint and virtual footprint. This is the
reason why hypothesis 12 is in fact regarded as hypothesis 12a and 12b.
In the section above, I presented the two independent constructs – functional and
relational legitimacy. In the section below, I look at the specificities of the dependent
construct – organizational legitimacy. In addition, the model is extended to test the
relationship between organizational legitimacy and the profit-making ability of the
firm.
8. Organizational Legitimacy
As it was mentioned earlier, in transitional contexts the most important legitimacy-
granting  constituencies  are  the  ones  that  are  directly  involved  with  the  focal
organization and that have high bargaining power towards it. Some examples include:
clients, employees and distributors.
Firm’s clients is the most important legitimacy-granting group of stakeholders since if
they make the conscious decision to partner with a particular organization in the long-
38 Some studies regard visibility as an important antecedent of firm’s prestige (Fuller et al. 2006, Stern
1981) and reputation (Brammer and Millington 2006). Based on the above-said, the organizational
visibility is said to enhance organizational legitimacy in general and its relational aspect in particular.
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run, this means that the latter is perceived to be more legitimate than the competition
(Shepherd and Zacharakis 2003). The mere fact of buying products/services has a
legitimating effect on the organization from which it is bought, especially in unstable
environments where numerous noisy (unreliable) signals exist.
The  clients  can  also  be  considered  as  the  most  important  legitimacy-granting  group
because the rest of the stakeholders (or institutions) have not been established yet, or
even if existent, they do not fulfill their purpose (i.e. government agencies). The
reason for this is abundance of opportunistic behavior by the economic actors in
transition environments.
Moreover, one can pose the question of why the current client support is not a part of
the  functional  or  the  relational  legitimacy  constructs  (which  are  perceived  to  be
independent from one another). This can be explained by the fact that the data used
for this study is cross-sectional – I compare organizations based on certain attributes
at one particular point in time. This means that potential partners make a decision
whether to engage with a particular organization relying on present information but
which has been generated in the past. Information about whether the current clients
are satisfied with their partner organization is not easily accessible. In addition, the
current clients themselves may not be aware of whether they are satisfied or not since
often  it  is  difficult  to  evaluate  the  quality  of  performance  during  the  process  of
performing a task.
In addition, I regard the support of another stakeholder group – the employees. The
employees are an important legitimacy-granting stakeholder group. In transition
environments, securing qualified employees is difficult due to labor shortages. The
employees with certain qualifications have a large pool of organizations to choose
from. Hence, the number of employees a small  firm was able to secure has a strong
legitimating effect on the organization.
Moreover, the number of employees is often used as a measure of organizational size
for technology firms. The relationship size? legitimacy has been already established
in the literature on organizational legitimacy (Freeman et al. 1983; Shane and Foo
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1999) and in the literature which examines organizations in transition economies
(Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010).
Another stakeholder group whose support may have an important legitimating effect
on the focal organization is the group of the distributors. The logic is similar since the
distributors agree to distribute the products of a company they perceive as having the
necessary resources/competencies (i.e. to provide maintenance services) as well as
being reliable (to provide them in a timely manner).
In highly fragmented sectors, distributors can choose among a pool of companies and
their products. Hence, they go through an evaluation process of the organizations and
their products. Since the products distributed imply long-term arrangements, they
evaluate the organizations based on signals of functional and relational legitimacy.
Moreover, I extend the analysis and test the relationship legitimacy-profit-making
ability of an organization.
9. Profit-Making Ability of an Organization
In general, organizational legitimacy is a valuable resource used to get an access to
additional resources organizations need for their activities (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). Hence, legitimacy ensures the survival of organizations (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). Some authors claim that based on the enhanced legitimacy, an organization can
improve its profit-making ability (Mazza 1999: 42). Therefore, the ultimate sign of a
legitimate organization is its profit making ability (Mazza 1999: 42).
To summarize, Fig. 7 presents the proposed research model.
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Fig. 7: Research Model
The research model presented in Fig. 7 is tested on data collected from the Bulgarian
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CHAPTER 5: THE BULGARIAN IT SECTOR
“…IT is like steam power in the 1800s and electricity in the 1900s – a general-
purpose technology with long-term impacts on the nature of production and
consumption throughout the economy.”
Alan Hughes and Michael S. Scott Morton
The theoretical framework presented in chapter 4 is tested on the Bulgarian
information technology (IT) sector. It provides a perfect empirical setting to test the
hypotheses developed in this study due to several reasons. First, the organizational
environment in Bulgaria represents a real transition environment. Even though some
sociologists (Raychev and Stoichev 2008) proclaimed that the transition was over39
with the accession of the country in the European Union (EU), it is in the process of
overcoming some difficulties inherent to the transition (such as opportunistic behavior
of economic actors) which show that the context in which the organizations function
in Bulgaria is still a transitional one.
Second, most of the companies that belong to the IT sector are small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs). There are approximately 4,000 companies that belong to the
Bulgarian IT sector. This means that the sector is highly fragmented and comprised of
mainly small organizations.
Third, due to the specificities of the IT business, the IT firms are indeed outsourcees,
their clients – outsourcers. Hence, the small IT organizations are trying to receive
long-term outsourcing arrangements. This implies that they attempt to demonstrate
their adherence to the expectations of relevant stakeholder groups, among which are
the clients.
39 Peng (2003) mentioned that the question “Are the transitions over?” was asked right after the
transition process was initiated. According to Williamson (2000), it may take from one to one hundred
years to develop a complete market-supporting infrastructure.
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The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I define the IT industry,
followed by the history of IT outsourcing in section 2. In section 3, the emphasis is on
the global aspect of the IT industry. Lastly, I look at the specificities of the Bulgarian
IT sector: history and current state, including advantages and challenges and
directions for future development.
1. What is Information Technology (IT)?
One definition of information technology (IT) is provided by the Information
Technology Association of America (ITAA): “the study, design, development,
implementation, support or management of computer-based information systems,
particularly software applications and computer hardware.” Powell and Dent Micallef
(1997) defined IT as “any form of computer-based information system including
mainframe as well as microcomputer applications.”
IT, like electricity, is general-purpose technology – it is used by all kinds of
organizations for multiple purposes (Carr 2005). This is one of the reasons why the
boundaries of the IT sector are blurred and not clearly-defined. Nevertheless, I look at
the categories of technology applications within the IT industry in order to define the
boundaries of the IT sector. Following McAfee (2006), the IT industry is comprised
of the following categories: function (FIT), network (NIT) and enterprise IT (EIT).
Below, the IT categories are presented.
1.1. Function IT
Function IT includes “technologies that make the execution of stand-alone tasks more
efficient” (McAfee 2006: 144). Some examples of technologies that belong to this
category are word processors and spreadsheets. The benefits associated with function
IT applications are various but the most common are: enhancing experimentation
capacity (i.e. simulation software) and increase precision (McAfee 2006).
1.2. Network IT
Network IT includes technologies based on which people or employees within an
organization can communicate with one another (McAfee 2006). This category of IT
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includes e-mail, instant messaging, blogs, and groupware like Lotus Notes (McAfee
2006). The benefits associated with network IT applications are: facilitated
collaboration, expressions of judgment (since this is egalitarian technology and people
can more freely express their opinion) and fostering emergence – high-level of
information because of low level of interactions (McAfee 2006).
1.3. Enterprise IT
Enterprise IT applications are technologies that an organization adopts in order to
restructure the interactions among groups of employees or between the company itself
and its business partners (McAfee 2006). Some IT applications that fall into this
category are: customer resource management (CRM), supply chain management
(SCM), enterprise resource planning (ERP) as well as electronic data interchange
(McAfee 2006). A specific characteristic of these technologies is their top-down,
which means that they are imposed by the senior management (McAfee 2006). They
are also associated with the introduction of new processes, interdependencies and
decision rights. The main benefits associated with this category of IT applications are
the following: redesigning business processes within an organization, standardizing
work flows and monitoring activities and events efficiently (McAfee 2006).
The three categories of IT service applications – their definitions and examples- are
presented in the table below.
IT Category Definition Examples
Function IT IT that assists with the

















Table 2: The Three Varieties of Work-Changing IT (McAfee 2006)
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1.4. IT Outsourcing
In a previous chapter (Chapter 3), I have already discussed the outsourcing concept –
its definition, typology and benefits for the outsourcer and the outsourcee. Herein, I
particularly look at the historical development of the IT outsourcing or the
deployment of the information technology activities to external parties. The history
help us better understand the current stage of the global IT outsourcing industry.
2. History of IT Outsourcing
2.1. Pre-1990s Era
The outsourcing of the IT services existed since the beginning of the data processing
(Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). In mid-1960s, financial and operational support areas
(general ledger, payroll, inventory control) started being externalized to the so-called
computer services bureaus (McFarlan and Nolan 1995).
This period of IT outsourcing is characterized by the emergence of large IT service
providers, such as Electronic Data Systems (EDS) (in the state and local government
sector), ADP and Anderson Consulting (in the private sector), CSC (in the public
sector) (McFarlan and Nolan 1995) as well as the smaller firms specialized in one
application or another (Mol 2007: 15). As McFarlan and Nolan (1995) noted that until
1990, the main drivers for outsourcing were: (1) cost-effective access to specialized or
occasionally needed computer power; (2) avoidance of building in-house IT skills and
(3) access to special functional capabilities.
In the 1980s, top managers became aware of the strategic role of information systems
(IS) as a key organizational capability that can provide a sustainable competitive
advantage (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). They learned that through IS they can fight
competition, develop loyal customer base, maintain long-term supplier relationships
and reduce the threat of new entrants (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). Due to their
strategic importance, executives thought they have to be kept in-house.
Very typical for the pre-1990s outsourcing era is that the applications created by the
computer services bureaus were both general use and customized programs, which
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were mostly done for small- and medium-size companies (McFarlan and Nolan 1995).
The  early  forms  of  IT  outsourcing  deals  were  usually  single-system  contracts  –  i.e.
they were related to the deployment of payroll, insurance processing, credit cards, or
mailing lists (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). Since organizations in general viewed the
IS as a source of sustainable competitive advantage, if they had the ability they kept
their IT departments in-house. Thus, large firms rarely outsourced their IT activities
and  if  they  did,  the  activities  were  either  very  specialized  or  confidential  (McFarlan
and Nolan 1995).
Even though most of the companies tend to outsource domestically during this first
wave of IT outsourcing, there were some that started considering offshore
destinations. In example, Pacific Data Services (PDS) outsourced its data entry
processes to China in 1961 (Apte and Mason 1995). Data entry was one of the easiest
service activities to be externalized globally since it does not require high level of
literacy and training (Apte and Mason 1995).
This changed in 1988 when Eastman Kodak decided to outsource the company’s IT
department (including 17 data centers, network and desktop systems and some 650 of
its 4,000 employees) to an external IT service provider (Linder 2004). The decision at
Kodak created a buzz (Linder 2004) and changed the way large companies looked at
IT outsourcing (McFarlan and Nolan 1995). It was a radical outsourcing decision at
the time (Linder 2004) since once of a sudden executives started viewing the IS as a
utility or a commodity rather than a source of sustainable competitive advantage
(Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). As Lacity and Hirschheim (1993) mentioned there was
a shift in the way they think about IS and as the authors stated information rather than
information systems was perceived to be the new source of competitive advantage.
This set the beginning of a new era in the IT service outsourcing, which herein is
called ‘post-1990 era.”
2.2. Post-1990s Era
Once the way the top managers perceived the IT activity changed (from strategic
capability to a commodity-like value-chain activity), companies started looking for
ways  to  provide  the  IS  services  at  the  lowest  possible  cost  (Lacity  and  Hirschheim
1993). Thus, they started outsourcing the IT activity to large, specialized vendors
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(which can realize economies of scale and thus provide the services at a much lower
price) (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). This led to a tremendous decrease in the cost of
outsourcing IT services – since the late 1950s, the price of computing power has
fallen more than 2,000-fold (Hughes and Morton 2006).
Very soon, a bandwagon effect occurred due to the outsourcing success of several
large corporations (i.e., Kodak, American Bankshares, Southeast and other) (Lacity
and Hirschheim 1993). As some authors mentioned the outsourcing decisions within
many companies were not well-thought and carefully implemented (Lacity and
Hirschheim 1993). As it happened with many other organizational forms or strategies,
they were adopted by companies not because of the increased efficiency but due to the
institutional pressures coming from the environment. Indeed, Lacity and Hirschheim
(1993) argue that the outsourcing of IT is rarely more efficient than the internalization
of the activity but at one point in time it became ‘management fashion” (Abrahamson
1996).
Due  to  the  two  above-mentioned  factors  –  the  shift  in  the  perception  of  the  IT
outsourcing and the bandwagon effect that it caused – there was a dramatic change in
the scope of the IT outsourcing (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993). IT outsourcing now is
multiple-system and it is associated with significant transfer of assets, leases and staff
to the supplier (Lacity and Hirschheim 1993).
According to McFarlan and Nolan (1995), there are two factors that contributed to the
recent boom of IT outsourcing – the acceptance of strategic partnerships as a method
of strategic development and the development of the information technology itself.
The importance of the first factor lies in the fact that most of the IT outsourcing
happens through strategic partnerships between the outsourcer and outsourcee. The
importance of the IT development is associated with the industry convergence
between computer and telecommunication industries.
McFarlan and Nolan (1995) have identified the factors that drive the development of
IT outsourcing after 1990s. These drivers include: concerns about costs and quality,
breakdown in IT performance, intense supplier pressures, simplified general
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management agenda, financial factors, corporate culture, elimination of internal
irritant, etc.
There are different opinions on how the IT industry will develop in the future. Carr
(2005) stated that as a general-purpose technology, if the supply of IT can be
consolidated, huge economies of scale can be realized (Carr 2005).
3. Global Information Technology Industry
3.1. What is a Global Industry?
There are only few industries (if any) that are not influenced by the global competitive
forces (Inkpen and Ramaswamy 2006: 3). The degree of globalization though differs
from industry to industry with some sectors proclaimed to be really ‘global’ (Inkpen
and Ramaswamy 2006: 14). The question what ‘global industry’ means does not have
one answer (Inkpen and Ramaswamy 2006: 14).  The higher the degree of
globalization within an industry, the greater the need to coordinate activities across
national borders as well as the higher the difficulty of making a decision where to
deploy the value-chain activities of the organization (Inkpen and Ramaswamy 2006:
15). The global industries have several characteristics that reflect the competitive
dynamics. Among these characteristics are the facts that the industry products are sold
internationally, companies can serve international customers, the same groups of
competitors are placed in all markets (Inkpen and Ramaswamy 2006: 15) and other
(see Appendix 1). Along with automobile, commercial aircraft, oil and gas, consumer
electronics, the IT industry is also considered to be a global industry (Inkpen and
Ramaswamy 2006: 17).
3.2. The IT Industry as a Global Industry: The Outsourcing Process
The list of the above-mentioned characteristics of a global industry (see Appendix 1)
shows  that  the  IT  industry  experiences  a  high  level  of  globalization.  The  IT
companies serve international clients and they realize that no one location can provide
them all they need (Ewing 2007). Thus, as some experts state, an IT company needs
“a multi-geography footprint” in order to draw from the pool of talent around the
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world (Ewing 2007). The globalization of the IT industry is directly associated with
the process of outsourcing of the IT activities to external parties located worldwide.
In terms of the outsourcing destinations, even though they change often, the leading
position for the past several years is kept by two countries - India and China.
3.3. IT Outsourcing in India and China
India is the unmatchable leader in the global services outsourcing (including IT) by
getting 11.5% of the global market in 2007 or $34.1 billion (Pinaroc 2007). In the
same year, China got 4.4% share of the global outsourcing market or $13.1 billion
(Pinaroc 2007). According to some analysts, China is lagging behind due to the fact
that English is not that widely-spoken in the country as well as the not very well
developed infrastructure (Ferguson 2007).
The Indian IT service providers also gained on their rivals worldwide – they hold 9%
of the global IT service outsourcing market. The future prospects sound promising for
India – the country is expected to lead the offshore segment up to 2010 with 15%
(Pinaroc 2007). Besides India, China also shows great potential to increase its
outsourcing capacity (Nairn 2004).
The two countries are leaders in the IT outsourcing attracting projects mainly due to
their unmatchable labor cost (Wagstyl 2004b). Labor cost is an important element of
any IT project (Wagstyl 2004s) and thus, a central consideration for the companies’
CIOs when considering which outsourcing destination to choose. Even though India
and China continue to lead the outsourcing revolution in terms of growth rate (101%
in 2007 for business process outsourcing  (BPO) contracts), there is a large number of
cities  worldwide  that  are  trying  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  big  outsourcers  –  i.e.
Budapest, Buenos Aires, Sofia, Moscow and other (Nairn 2004). Indeed, EMEA
region (Europe, Middle-East and Africa) outweighed the two other regions (Asia-
Pacific and America) by getting $12.45 billion of the BPO contracts in absolute value
terms (Yeo 2008). In comparison, Asia-Pacific got $8.62 billion and America - $2.09
billion of the global BPO market in 2007 (Yeo 2008).
A lot of Western European companies choose Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as
their outsourcing destinations since they are geographically and culturally close to
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them (Nairn 2004). In addition, some of the big Indian providers of outsourcing
services open offices in CEE region to take advantage of the same time zone and
physical proximity with their clients (Nairn 2004). Thus, the importance of the region
as  an  outsourcing  destination  grows.  Below,  the  focus  is  on  Central  and  Eastern
Europe (CEE) as a region with growing importance in terms of IT outsourcing.
3.4. IT Outsourcing in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
The region has developed as an outsourcing destination for many companies from
different industries, such as DHL (Wagstyl 2004a), Philips (Wagstyl 2004b),
Lufthansa, Accenture (Cienski, Anderson, and Condon 2006) as well as companies
from the IT sector – HP, Microsoft, IBM, Oracle. After the big privatization deals
have been almost completed and the investment in key manufacturing industries and
domestic services has slowed, the second wave of investment in the countries of CEE
is expected to be export-oriented services (Wagstyl 2004b), including the IT service
sector.
Many executives have acknowledged the advantages of the CEE region in terms of
market growth, highly-skilled work force, well-developed education system and
governments that support business (Wagstyl 2004a). In addition, people in CEE are
accustomed to change, which is important when it comes to dynamic technology
sectors (Wagstyl 2004a). Moreover, the countries in CEE offer language proficiency
not only in English but also in German, Spanish and French (skills hard to find in
Asia-Pacific), cultural affinity (important in fields, such as debt collection and
handling complaints), and geographic proximity (Wagstyl 2004b). The latter is
important for services that require frequent contacts with clients (Wagstyl 2004b).
Indeed, those are the main advantages of the region used to fight the low cost
advantage not only of India and China but also of other outsourcing destinations of
Asia-Pacific (Wagstyl 2004b).
In general, those advantages are common among many different industries. They are
particularly important for the IT service outsourcing sector and the reason why many
European companies prefer the CEE region as their outsourcing destination over India
and China. But besides the outsourcing initiatives of the global players in the IT
industry, which had an important legitimating effect for the region, there is another
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development associated with the intensive entrepreneurial activity of the local people
as well as some international entrepreneurship projects (or when foreigners establish
operations in a particular country).
Due to the foreign direct investments of the global IT players, government subsidies
and the intensive entrepreneurial activity in the countries of CEE, the IT market in
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  is  one  of  the  sectors  growing  with  the  fastest  rates.  In
general, it grows at a rate two or three times the overall rate of economic growth of
any country in the region (Wagstyl 2004a).
The region is characterized with a very big contrast between the fast developing
members of the EU, such as Estonia and the lagging behind ex-members of the
Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  (EIU  Report  2006).  There  is  a  sort  of
intra-regional competition that has been observed due to the fact that countries like
Hungary and the Czech Republic are losing ground to Romania and Bulgaria due to
the availability of skilled labor at lower cost (EIU Report 2006).
One of the Eastern European countries which became a real hot spot for the
development of IT is Bulgaria. Along with electronics, machine-building and electro-
technical industries, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector is one
of the sectors with good perspectives for development in Bulgaria (Stanchev 2007).
The  IT  market  is  one  of  the  most  developed  and  dynamic  markets  in  Bulgaria  with
traditions going back the Communist Era when according to the Warsaw agreement
COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), the country had to specialize
in informatics. Today, many Bulgarian companies try to get an access to the
international/global markets by getting outsourcing contracts in the IT services sector.
In order to better understand the specificities of the Bulgarian IT market, in the next
section I present the political and socio-economic situation in the country and the
current stage of development of the Bulgarian IT sector.
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4. The IT Sector in Bulgaria
4.1. Bulgaria – Economic Overview
Bulgaria is an Eastern-European country which was under the communist regime for
almost 45 years – after World War II until 1989 when the communist regime was
overthrown (Raychev and Stoichev 2008). Even though some sociologists claim the
opposite (Raychev and Stoichev 2008), Bulgaria is still considered an economy in
transition (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010).
Indeed, the extent to which the transition was completed is country-specific and it
depends on the communism legacy and the governmental policy. Bulgaria was one of
the countries lagging behind some Central European countries in its attempt to
incorporate some of the necessary reforms. There is a high level of corruption and
misuse  of  the  cohesion  and  structural  funds  from  the  European  Union  (Vassilev
2008). In addition, due to the immigration of around 1.5 million young Bulgarians
during the transition period and the negative demographic trends (the work force is
predicted to shrink by 50% by 2050). Hence, there is a shortage of skilled and
unskilled labor (Vassilev 2008) in many sectors.
On the positive side, I have to mention the economic growth, estimated at more than
5% for 2008, is one of the highest in the European Union (Vassilev 2008). The
country has a competitive edge in critical sectors, such as energy transit, food
processing and agriculture (Vassilev 2008). The property and construction markets are
very appealing for foreign investors (Vassilev 2008).
Bulgaria  has  one  of  the  lowest  tax  rates  in  Europe  –  10%  flat  rate  on  personal  and
corporate income (Vassilev 2008). This stimulates the entrepreneurial activity within
the country (Vassilev 2008). In addition, the dynamism of the Bulgarian economy is
not related to the political cycle (Vassilev 2008).
The IT has always been one of the traditional sectors of development in Bulgaria. In
the  next  section,  I  look  at  the  history  of  the  Bulgarian  IT  sector  going  back  to  the
socialist era and continuing with the period of transition from planned to open market
economy.
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4.2. History of the IT Sector in Bulgaria
4.2.1. The Socialist Era
As part of the former Soviet Bloc, Bulgaria had to specialize in creating, developing
and improving new technologies that were after that implemented in all member states
of COMECON (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile). This way, Bulgaria has gained more
an experience in the development of hardware, software and electronic products
(Bulgarian ICT Profile @ CEBIT 2006). As a result, Bulgaria has nurtured a pool of
highly qualified experts in IT as well as some large IT enterprises (Bulgarian ICT
Sector Profile). The country has long had an image of being technology and
innovation hub of Eastern Europe, often called the “Silicon Valley” of the region
(Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
4.2.2. The Period of Transition
The period of transition from planned to open market economy started in 1989 with
the  fall  of  the  communist  regime  and  has  continued  for  almost  20  years.  In  the
beginning of the 90s, the activity in the IT sector fell down but then quickly went up
(Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile). The enormous human potential of the country in the
IT sector  helped  it  regain  the  lost  position  in  the  IT  industry  (Bulgarian  ICT Sector
Profile). During its transition to a free market, Bulgaria managed to build on this long-
term  tradition  as  an  IT  location,  and  to  establish  itself  as  one  of  the  prominent
suppliers of software development and IT services in Eastern Europe (Bulgarian ICT
Profile @ CEBIT 2006).
Among the clients of the Bulgarian IT companies are the Canadian government
agencies, such as the Department of Transport, the Department of Environment as
well as some global companies, such as BMW, Boeing, Ford, Lockheed Martin,
Nortel, Hasbro, Xerox, Telesis Technologies, and Pricewaterhouse Cooper (Bulgarian
ICT Sector Profile).
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4.2.3. The Legitimating Role of the Big IT Players
Besides the big clients of the Bulgarian IT sector, it is important to note the decision
of the global industry players to build service and call centers in Bulgaria. This is an
important moment in the development in any offshore outsourcing destination and has
a big legitimizing effect. The companies that set up their facilities in Bulgaria first
were SAP (the German enterprise software giant), IBM (International Business
Machines – the US-based computer technology and consulting corporation) and HP
(Hewlett Packard – the US-based information technology corporation) (2005). Later,
Cisco Systems and Oracle followed the first movers to Bulgaria and also set up their
own facilities in the country (Robinson 2005).
4.3. The Current Situation of the Bulgarian IT Sector
4.3.1. Factors Contributing to the Current Situation of the Bulgarian IT Sector
One of the most important developments in the Bulgarian IT sector is the increase in
the number of outsourcing deals. Bulgaria is riding the outsourcing wave as CEE
emerges as a hub of outsourcing deals (Terzieff 2006). The reason for this is called
near-shoring –  shifting  work  to  countries  that  cost  less  but  are  physically  close  the
home market of the outsourcing company (Reinhardt 2004).
In 2005, Bulgaria was ranked number 13th on the global ranking of the best
outsourcing destinations by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) before countries
such as Romania and Chile (see Appendix 3). In addition, Bulgaria has been ranked
15th in the A.T. Kearney’s annual ranking of the most attractive destinations for
“offshoring” of service activities such as IT, business processes and call centers
(Terzieff 2006). The criteria used to rank the countries are: payroll costs, educational
system and infrastructure based on the opinion of 500 business managers from around
the world (Terzieff 2006).
Bulgaria is winning recognition as one of the world-class destinations for IT
outsourcing due to the growth in IT capabilities (EIU Report 2006). A combination of
factors, such as payroll costs, educational system, favorable policies at national and
local level, and infrastructure made it a preferred outsourcing destination for
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international firms. In addition, many domestic software and services companies have
appeared to serve the local market as well as the global marketplace.
A) Payroll Costs
Bulgaria is considered as one of the countries with the lowest pay for IT experts
(Simeonova 2007b). According to Mercer Consulting, Bulgaria is second after
Vietnam in  the  ranking  of  the  countries  with  lowest  pay  for  IT  experts  (Simeonova
2007b). In Bulgaria, an IT expert is paid on average $22,24040 while in Switzerland,
the salary is $140,960, Denmark - $123,080, Belgium - $121,170 (Simeonova 2007b).
The difference in the wages comes from the outsourcing of many of those jobs from
the US and Western Europe to countries with lower labor costs (Simeonova 2007b).
This results in lower number of IT experts that are left in the West and they have to do
more complex tasks, such as being consultants and IT business partners at the same
time, which increases their pay (Simeonova 2007b).
The Bulgarian IT sector is experiencing a steady increase in wages (Robinson 2005).
Indeed, after HP created their global delivery center in 2006, they managed to get the
best IT experts (system administrators) in Bulgaria (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
This led to an increase in the overall pay in the IT sector (Nikolova and Gavrilov
2007). This way, the advantage of having low cost IT labor that got paid 1/3 of the
wages in the European Union started to slowly disappear (Nikolova and Gavrilov
2007).
Of  course,  it  is  a  general  opinion  that  the  payroll  costs  are  not  the  only  reason  why
Western companies decide to outsource to Bulgaria (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
Another reason is the pool of talented human capital, which is capable of delivering
high quality service solutions (Reinhardt 2004; Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007). This is
due to a large extent to the well-developed educational system in Bulgaria in general
and the traditions in educating and training IT experts in particular (Nikolova and
Gavrilov 2007).
40 The wage differentials for the different positions in the field of IT are presented in Appendix 4.
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B) Education
With its 8 million inhabitants, Bulgaria is a country that cannot offer unlimited human
capital (Bulgarian ICT Profile @ CEBIT 2006). The educational system though is
well-developed with a particular focus on electronics, engineering, and computer
sciences (EIU Report 2006; Robinson 2005). In Bulgaria, there are more than 47
universities in 26 different cities (Robinson 2005). There are approximately 5,000
Bulgarian students majoring in computer sciences at any one point in time (Robinson
2005). And there are approximately 5,000 in electrical engineering, mathematics,
physics, and biotechnology (Robinson 2005).
Besides the technical education, there are specialized language schools where students
can learn foreign languages as well as selecting high level of science and technical
subjects (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile). In all district cities there are English
Language Schools that teach all of the curriculum subjects in English (Bulgarian ICT
Sector Profile). Schools that specialize in math also provide an intensive training in
foreign languages (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
The level of the Bulgarian educational system is comparable with the ones of the
developed countries (Robinson 2005). Indeed, it is ranked 5th among all countries in
sciences and 11th in mathematics according to the World Bank and The Economist
(Robinson 2005; Terzieff 2006). The country also ranks 2nd in the world in IQ tests
(MENSA International) and 2nd in SAT scores (Robinson 2005). The foreign language
education is very intensive – students study in Bulgarian and either English, French,
Spanish or German (Terzieff 2006). This results in a multi-lingual workforce (Terzieff
2006).
The Technology Achievement Index (TAI) ranks Bulgaria 28th worldwide and also a
leader in the field of information and communications technology (Bulgarian ICT
Sector Profile). In addition, Bulgaria hosts 122 local CISCO academics and 12
regional academies that educate around 1,800 people (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
In 2003, Bulgarians won 2 out of 6 annual CISCO academy awards (“Best Projects”
and “Best Student”) (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
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The result of the well-developed educational systems in place is that the country
provides a pool of highly-qualified, well-educated professionals who can provide high
quality services (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
C) Work Force
According to the Eurostat analysis, Bulgaria is well-positioned in terms of number of
people employed in high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing fields, including
the knowledge-intensive services (KIS) (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile). Out of the 2.8
million people employed, 5.3% are working in the field of high-tech sectors, which
ranks the country at the 5th place among the 10 Eastern European countries (see Table



















4 763 8.9 19.1 17.0 31.2 23.9
Estonia 581 3.4 18.6 15.4 31.8 30.9
Cyprus  315 1.1 11.1 16.2 45.4 26.2
Latvia 988 1.9 14.5 24.5 34.4 24.7
Lithuania 1 421 2.6 15.2 28.2 29.3 24.7
Hungary 3 846 8.5 16.4 15.3 33.3 26.4
Slovenia 922 9.2 21.9 17.0 29.1 22.8
Slovakia 2 111 8.2 18.8 17.7 31.2 24.0
Bulgaria 2 800 5.3 18.5 19.5 34.5 22.2
Romania 9 768 5.5 16.0 45.8 19.9 12.8
Table 3: Distribution of Employment by Selected Sectors in 2002 (Bulgarian ICT
Sector Profile)
Moreover,  Brainbench  Global  IT  IQ  Report  ranks  Bulgaria  8th globally  in  terms  of
number of certified IT professionals (Robinson 2005).
D) Infrastructure and Government Policy
In comparison to some countries in Asia, Bulgaria and the rest of the countries in CEE
have better IT infrastructure. In Bulgaria, the government is actively involved in
building the National State Network (NSN) for communication between ministries,
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regional authorities and municipalities, which includes high-speed fiber optic ring
with an initial transmission capacity of about 2.5Gbps and with an option for further
increase to 10Gbps (Stanchev 2007). Moreover, the governmental agencies are
working in the direction of developing IT skills in schools and universities – i.e., all
schools and universities are connected to the Internet and 80% of the students are
online (Stanchev 2007). To improve its IT infrastructure, Bulgaria will receive
European Structural Funds in 2007-2013 (Stanchev 2007).
In addition, the Bulgarian government is actively involved in the process of attracting
the big IT players to the country. For example, the global delivery center of HP,
which opened in 2007, received governmental subsidy of 1.2 million euro for training
of the newly-hired employees (Boychev 2006).
The Bulgarian government accepted legislature, which contributes to the development
of the ICT sector, such as Electronic Document and Electronic Signature Act
(EDESA), Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA), amendments in the Bulgarian
Criminal Code associated with computer crimes, amendments in the Copyright and
Related Rights Act and the Patent Act (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
In addition, the Bulgarian government has accepted several strategic directions for
development – Strategy and National Program for Information Society Development,
Strategy  and  Action  Plan  for  Bulgarian  Competitiveness  in  Global  ICT  Markets,
Electronic Government Strategy (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
E) Geographical Location
The time zone of Bulgaria is UTC/GMT + 2, which is one hour ahead than most of
the countries in continental Europe and two hours ahead than the UK and Portugal.
This makes the country an excellent location for offshoring services (or the so-called
near-shoring), especially when it comes to providing real-time solutions to the final
customer. The whole process of near-shoring was initiated due to problems associated
with the big time difference between Europe and North America from one side and
Asia-Pacific from the other side.
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In addition, the country has an important geographical location because it provides an
appropriate location for economic center on the Balkans and the entrance to the West
Balkans (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007) and countries, such as Serbia, Macedonia,
Albania and Croatia that are currently not members of the EU.
F) Culture
In general, countries in Europe have common historical and cultural background.
Many European companies consider certain cultural, linguistic and ethnical factors
when deciding where to outsource (Reinhardt 2004). Some examples – French
companies are drawn to Romania due to the linguistic and historical closeness and
German companies are attracted to countries like Hungary and the Czech Republic
due the large pool of German speakers in this country (Reinhardt 2004).
4.3.2. The Bulgarian IT Sector- Current Trends
The  Bulgarian  IT  market  has  shown a  steady  growth  over  the  past  several  years.  In
2007, the realized growth rate of the Bulgarian IT market was 23.4% (or $873 million
in value terms) based on data provided by the State Agency for IT and
Communications (ICT Media 2008). The growth rate of 23.4% in 2007 can be
explained with the EU accession of the country as well as the national strategies in
key industries, such as healthcare, education, e-government and others (ICT Media
2008).
The analysts predict that the average annual growth rate of the Bulgarian IT market
will be close to 15% until 2011 with IT services showing the greatest growth potential
– 17% and the hardware sector – 70% annual growth on average (ICT Media 2008).
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Bulgarian IT Market Prognosis













Table 4: Bulgarian IT Market Prognosis (Morozova 2008).
Based on the structure of the growth rates and the most demanded IT skills (Windows
administration, network technologies and applications development), the
organizations in Bulgaria are in the final stage of building their IT infrastructures (ICT
Media  2008).  Even  though the  Bulgarian  companies  still  do  not  externalize  their  IT
departments completely based on lack of trust41 (Stefanova 2008b), there is a potential
for growth in certain areas, such as the financial sector, utilities, healthcare (ICT
Media 2008).
The advantages of Bulgaria (and some other Eastern European countries) as an
outsourcing destination come from low-cost, highly educated work force, combined
with solid infrastructure, economic and political stability, geographic proximity and
fewer security concerns (Terzieff 2006).
Bulgarian ICT Sector –Mapping the Stakeholders
The most important players at the Bulgarian IT market are the Bulgarian companies
(most of which are small and medium-size), the global IT companies which have
established presence on the local market, and different government and non-
government associations and regulating bodies. Below, I present all of the above-
mentioned stakeholders.
41 Lack of trust is associated with fear of opportunistic behavior from the supplier of IT outsourcing
services in terms of stealing confidential information and clients (Stefanova 2008b).
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The Bulgarian ICT Companies
According to the Bulgarian ICT profile @ CEBIT 2006, there are approximately
4,350 companies operating in the ICT sector. More than half of those companies
(2,344) are part of the computers and related activities sub-sector (Bulgarian ICT
Sector Profile).
Most of these companies are small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) – they
employ up to 100 employees (Boychev and Monev 2007). This number includes
many small companies that are located out of Sofia (BAIT Expo 2006). There are also
50 to 80 companies that deal exclusively with outsourcing, whose results is difficult to
acknowledge because they do not announce their financial outcome (BAIT Expo
2006).
Forty-two percent of the Bulgarian IT employees are involved in software
development and distribution – and 70 percent of their annual production is exported,
almost exclusively through outsourcing contracts (Terzieff 2006).
The Bulgarian IT companies specialize in several technology niches (see Table 5).
Type of Specialization Number of Companies
System Integration 102
Testing Application Software 37




Fonts & Cyrilization 40
GIS 25
Graphic Software 32
Management Analysis IS 33




Test processing, text editors 59
Table 5: Specialization of the Bulgarian IT Companies (based on 500 companies
included in Who is Who on the Bulgarian Computer Market?) August 4, 2008.
International IT Companies in Bulgaria
SAP
SAP decision to set up small in Sofia (the capital city of Bulgaria) in 2002 (Robinson
2005) was very important for the development of the IT sector in Bulgaria. SAP sent
their Java software development for its worldwide product line (Robinson 2005).
Much of the work was done only in the German headquarters and in Bulgaria
(Robinson 2005). Indeed, the company chose Bulgaria over India for the development
of their Java-platform (Robinson 2005).
Today, there are more than 300 people that work for SAP-Bulgaria (Stanchev 2007)
and the company considers their decision to set up their facility in Bulgaria as being
very successful (Robinson 2005).
IBM
IBM is one of the US companies that has been very aggressive to move to Central and
Eastern Europe (Ewing 2007), in countries such as Poland and Bulgaria. IBM has
been in Bulgaria since 1930s when it helped the Bulgarian government to calculate
the national census (Robinson 2005). At the time, it also imported typewriting
machines (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007). The company officially moved to Bulgaria
in 1995 (Robinson 2005). Big Blue now has about 50 people working there (Robinson
2005). The company is very active in working with the Bulgarian universities – it
offers initiatives associated with training of students, summer internships and
scholarships (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
The  company  intends  to  open  global  delivery  center  in  Bulgaria  and  it  has  started
recruiting the personnel for it (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
HP
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Another US-based company that did not hesitate to aggressively move to Eastern
Europe is HP (Ewing 2007; Wagstyl 2004a). In 2004, the company had 12% of the
region’s spending on IT, including full product range – personal computers, printers,
software and services (Wagstyl 2004a). HP initially had around 40 employees in
Bulgaria (Robinson 2005). In 2006, HP opened global delivery service center to
provide remote infrastructure management assistance to its clients in Europe, Middle
East and Africa (Terzieff 2006). In 2007, the company introduced additional services,
such as business and financial analysis, administrative service and supply for HP and
other companies in the region (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007). As of today, the center
employs around 1,000 engineers and programmers (Terzieff 2006).
Microsoft
Microsoft has also opened a Call Screening & Pre-Sales Center in Sofia, Bulgaria
where they offer technical support, product activation of the customers in Central and
Eastern Europe (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
Besides the above-mentioned global players, there are also several other successful
stories, such as Oracle, Tumbleweed (US provider of secure Internet messaging
software in Bulgaria), and others (Stanchev 2007).
Associations
There are numerous associations at the Bulgarian IT market, including non-
government organizations (NGOs), government bodies and some business
associations.
Non-government Organizations (NGOs)
An important NGO at the IT market in Bulgaria is the ICT Cluster Association. The
ICT Cluster Association, which was created in 2004 by several business associations,
facilitates the information exchange between the companies at the Bulgarian IT




There are several government bodies that are involved and support the ICT sector –
State Agency for IT and Communications, Bulgarian Foreign Investment Agency
(www.bfia.org), Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Development
Agency  (ICT)  (www.ict.org), Consultative Council for ICT Development under the
Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Transport and Minister of Communications,
Coordination Center for Information, Communication and Management Technologies
(www.ccit.government.bg) (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
The main role of the above-mentioned government institutions is to manage the
investment, administration, spending of funds and the legal framework related to the
ICT sector in Bulgaria (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile).
In addition, there is another institution with governmental participation - European
Software  Institute  (ESI)  Center  Bulgaria.  The  institute  was  created  by  the  European
Software Institute, the Bulgarian Association of Software Companies (BASSCOM)
and the Information and Communications Technology Development Agency
(ICTDA) at the Bulgarian Ministry of Transport and Communication
(http://www.esicenter.bg/en/default.asp).
Private Sector Associations
The private sector in the field of IT is well-organized in order to promote the interests
of the participants in the sector through cooperation and coordination with the
government and the governmental institutions (Bulgarian ICT Sector Profile). The
private sector associations include Bulgarian International Business Association
(BIBA), Bulgarian Association of Software Companies (BASSCOM), Bulgarian
Association of Information Technologies (BAIT), and Bulgarian Internet Association
(BINA) (Bulgarian ICT sector Profile).
4.3.3. Challenges at the Bulgarian Market for IT Services
Based on the development of the IT industry on global and local level, the Bulgarian
IT companies face certain challenges. The challenges discussed below are not specific
to Bulgaria but to the IT sectors in many transition environments.
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A) Rising Costs
In 2007, Bulgaria was accepted in the European Union.  This led to changes in the
whole economic and socio-political life in the country. The suppliers and customers of
IT solutions are not sure whether this is a good thing in the long run because this will
lead to increase in wages and costs for the customers along with the positive side of
an increase in the market size (Robinson 2006). As some analysts show the wages in
the IT sector in Bulgaria grow steadily (Simeonova 2007b, Stefanova 2008b) due to
the qualified labor shortage (Simeonova 2007) and the resulting attempt of some IT
players to attract Bulgarians working and living abroad by offering competitive wages
(Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007). Another reason is the overall increase in the standard
of living.
B) Shortage of Qualified Labor
The shortage of qualified labor is one of the main issues that most of the countries in
CEE are facing. It challenges the development of many industries, including the IT
sector (ICT Media 2008). Some companies in the IT sector became very creative in
finding ways to solve the problem with the labor shortage. Indeed, they started
attracting Bulgarian employees working in foreign countries to come back to Bulgaria
by offering attractive wages (Nikolova and Gavrilov 2007).
Moreover,  some  companies  target  directly  the  universities  and  create  different
programs in order to tap the young talent there (ICT Media 2008).
C) New Skills Required
In terms of the IT experts needed, some analysts show that the IT experts of the future
will need to have complex skills, including the ability to plan, organize, solve
problems and effectively communicate with their clients (Simeonova 2007a) as it
happens in the Western countries (Simeonova 2007b). The reason for this is that
global companies are always on the search for lower cost locations (Simeonova
2007a). Thus, the IT jobs that are left in locations not that new and characterized with
rising labor costs will require new skills, such as project management and analysis of
business processes (Simeonova 2007a). Only the outsourcing destinations that will be
able to offer those skills will become outsourcing hubs in the long-run.
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This new developments at the IT market require an intensive relationship between the
IT organizations and the universities since the latter are very good in preparing
students in the technical fields but not good in developing business and
communication skills in the future IT engineers (Simeonova 2007a).
D) Lack of Investment Funds
Many foreign companies are interested by the Bulgarian IT sector due to the presence
of a large pool of highly-talented human capital (i.e. the US-based company VMware,
a provider of software solution showed interest toward Scient, one of the biggest
outsourcing companies in Bulgaria), the geographic location of the country (i.e. the
UK-based Velti bought Mtelecom due to its interest on the Balkan region) as well as
their innovativeness (i.e. the US multi-national company Apptix acquired
Webmessenger for their innovative corporate communication solution for mobile
message  exchange  in  real  time  (Boychev  and  Monev  2007).  The  Bulgarian  owners
usually agree to have their companies acquired because of the need of new
investments to continue the successful development of their organizations (Boychev
and Monev 2007).
E) Inability to Absorb the EU Funds
Another factor is the inability of small and medium enterprises to absorb the funding
from the EU as part of the structural programs (ICT Media 2008). Even though there
are a lot of initiatives to inform the SMEs for the opportunities they can take
advantage of after the EU accession, most of them do not rely and do not try to access
this funding (ICT Media 2008).
Besides the difficulties that many companies in the Bulgarian IT market face,
including the lack of investment funds, some companies manage very well and are





The Bulgarian Government is devoted to not only to establish regional, national and
international ultra-high speed network infrastructure but also to increase the share of
the IT investments, enhance the investments in R&D activities in the ICT sector and
develop a competitive, export-oriented ICT industry (Stanchev 2007). Also, the
government works to establish a venture capital fund targeted at SMEs with an ICT
profile (Stanchev 2007).
B) International Expansion
There are already Bulgarian IT companies that started the process of international
expansion within and outside the EU (Grigorova 2007). Some examples include Stone
Computers that opened an office in Macedonia, Fadata – in Serbia and Turkey and
CableTel in Macedonia and many others (Grigorova 2007).
Besides the corporate expansion, there are several international initiatives that have
been promoted by the Bulgarian IT associations, such the ICT Cluster Association and
ESI Center Eastern Europe (Grigorova 2007).
To conclude, the Bulgarian ICT sector provides an appropriate empirical setting to
test the herein developed hypotheses. The sector is fragmented and comprised of
many small organizations (Boychev and Manev 2007) trying to obtain long-term
outsourcing contracts with domestic and/or foreign clients. The Bulgarian
environment is an example of an environment going through a transition characterized
by a high level of uncertainty and vulnerability.
According to the signaling theory of legitimacy, if the organizations, subject to this
study, use signals of functional and relational legitimacy in order to demonstrate their
adherence to the requirements of the evaluating audiences (on the local, national and
international layer), they will obtain the support of interested stakeholder groups.
In the next part, I present the research methodology, including the epistemological
orientation of the study. I continue with a discussion on the variables and the
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measurement instruments used followed by a description of the data collection and
data analysis processes.
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CHAPTER 6: RESEARCH METHOD
Based on the theoretical development in Part I and II, the current research addresses
two main questions: First, what are the dimensions (and valid signals) of functional
and relational legitimacy (for small organizations in transition environments)?
Second, does using signals of specific types of legitimacy (depending on the liability
faced) enhance organizational legitimacy?
The research questions position the study within the realist epistemological paradigm
(Healy and Perry 2000) since the researcher tries to construct a reality (the dimensions
comprising the two legitimacy types – functional and relational legitimacy), which
exists independently from his/her mind (test whether the comprising dimensions of
the legitimacy types in fact enhance organizational legitimacy). In addition, a
quantitative methodology (structural equation modeling) is used to confirm a general
law - the signaling theory of legitimacy.
Based on the existence of multiple dependence relationships among the variables part
of the herein proposed research model and the fact that some variables are
unobservable (latent), the methodology used is structural equation modeling (SEM)
(Hair et al. 1998). The latent variables are the two independent constructs functional
and relational legitimacy and the dependent variable (organizational legitimacy).
Moreover, since the research addresses the relationship legitimacy-profit-making
ability of an organization, I add another latent variable – profit-making ability.
Depending on the direction of causality, the latent constructs employed are formative
and reflective (Diamantopoulos et al. 2008; Jarvis et al. 2003).
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I look at the epistemological orientation of
the study. Second, the specificities of the SEM as a multivariate statistical technique
are presented, including the two types of measurement models. Third, assessment of
the measurement model and the structural model is discussed. The chapter finishes
with a discussion on two particular SEM techniques – covariance-based (LISREL)
and variance-based (PLS).
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1. Epistemological Orientation of the Research
In  order  to  determine  the  epistemological  orientation  of  this  research,  I  consider  the
two main approaches to theory development dominating the debate in social science –
deductive theory testing and inductive theory building (Perry 1998). They reflect
different scientific paradigms42 - the deductive approach represents the positivist
paradigm and the inductive approach represents the phenomenological paradigm
(Perry 1998).
Positivism is the mainstream scientific paradigm in management science (Johnson and
Duberley 2000). There are several reasons for this. Since management research is
rooted in many disciplines (sociology, anthropology, mathematics, statistics, etc.), the
positivist approach has been suggested in order to overcome this fragmentation
(Pfeffer 1995). Recently, researchers in management start pointing the importance and
the contribution of the methods pertaining to the phenomenological paradigm (Mir
and Watson 2000). The specificities of the two research paradigms are presented
below.
1.1. The Positivist Paradigm
Positivism is “an approach to knowledge which restricts itself to observable facts and
their relationships and which excludes reference to non-observable entities” (Thomas
2004: 43). For positivists, the objects of scientific knowledge are different phenomena
(Azevedo 2005). They exist and possess properties that exist independently of the
observer (Thomas 2004). The knowledge itself takes the form of general laws tested
by experience (Azevedo 2005). It is obtained by observations expressed in the form of
descriptions (Thomas 2004), which consist in showing the logical links between
specific phenomena and these laws (Azevedo 2005: 718) and are valid to the extent
they depict the properties the object really has (Thomas 2004: 42).
42 A scientific paradigm is “a set of basic beliefs” which shapes the “worldview that defines, for its
holder, the nature of the world, the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible relationships to
that world and its parts” (Guba and Lincoln 1994:  107).
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1.2. The Phenomenological Paradigm
The phenomenological paradigm can be divided into three parts: critical theory,
constructivism and realism (Guba and Lincoln 1994). The critical theory approach
emphasizes a reality, which is apprehendable but shaped by various social, political,
cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender factors (Guba and Lincoln 1994). It is
perceived that the values of the investigator influence the research itself (Guba and
Lincoln 1994). Hence, findings are value-mediated (Guba and Lincoln 1994).
For the constructivists, “rules and principles do not exist independently of our
theorizing about them” (Mir and Watson 2000: 942). The theory of the researcher
drives all aspects of the empirical investigation (Mir and Watson 2000: 942). In fact,
constructivism does not question the existence of phenomena but rather the ability of
the researcher to understand them without a specific theory of knowledge (or
paradigms) (Mir and Watson 2000).
For the realists, the “real” world can be discovered even though it is only imperfectly
apprehensible (Healy and Perry 2000). It consists of abstract things that are born of
people’s minds but exist independently of any one person (Healy and Perry 2000).
The table below compares the differences between positivism, critical theory, realism
and constructivism along several dimensions – ontology, epistemology, and
methodology.
Approach DEDUCTIVE INDUCTIVE












































































Table 6: Scientific Paradigms and Epistemological Approaches (adapted from Healy
and Perry (2000) and Guba and Lincoln (1994).
In addition to Table 6, in Fig. 8, I present the different epistemological approaches
and the methodological orientation of each of them.
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Based on the presented epistemological approaches and the overall goal of this
research,  namely  to  reveal  the  dimensions  of  two  particular  type  of  legitimacy
(functional and relational) and assess their signaling value, I position it within the
realist  paradigm.  As  it  is  seen  from  the  table  and  the  figure  above,  in  terms  of  the
methodology applied – structural equation modeling (SEM) – the study also falls into
the realm of realism. To the extent of the researcher’s knowledge, organizational
legitimacy has not been regarded in the context of structural equation modeling
(SEM).
1.3. The Epistemic Nature of Organizational Legitimacy
In the center of these study is the concept of organizational legitimacy, which is a
socially-constructed concept (Berger and Luckman 1967). Legitimacy lies in the eye
of the beholder (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). From the signaling theory point of view,
legitimacy is granted on the basis of shared meaning between the sending (legitimacy-
claiming) and the receiving (legitimacy-granting) party. The shared meaning is
constructed based on signals.
Despite its centrality in institutional theory, the epistemic nature of organizational
legitimacy has not been examined yet. Although some qualitative measures of
organizational legitimacy exist (Elsbach and Sutton 1992), in general, the
measurements of legitimacy used in the extant literature are quantitative and
associated with specific legitimacy typology. Some examples include government
regulatory ratings used to measure regulatory legitimacy (Deephouse and Carter
2005), media rankings (Shane and Foo 1999) and number of journal advertisements
(Barron 1998) for normative legitimacy, and organizational age and size as an
example of cognitive legitimacy measurements (Shane and Foo 1999). All of the
above-mentioned measures are quantitative and reflect an understanding of legitimacy
within the positivist paradigm – the measures of organizational legitimacy are value-
free because they are directly observable (Healy and Perry 2000).
The paradigm within which this research is positioned depends on the research
questions addressed, namely:
1. What are the dimensions (and valid signals) of functional and relational
legitimacy (for small organizations in transition environments)?
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2. Does using signals of specific types of legitimacy (depending on the liability
faced) enhance organizational legitimacy?
In its essence, I try to build the two latent legitimacy constructs - the functional and
relational legitimacy. Since organizational legitimacy is perceived to be multi-
dimensional construct (Deephouse and Carter 2005), the same is valid for these two
different  (and  independent)  types  of  legitimacy.  Hence,  I  try  to  identify  their
dimensions following the index construction stages suggested by Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer  (2001).  I  base  this  decision  on  the  literature  review,  analysis  of  the
content of organizational writings and the opinion of industry experts. At this stage,
the researchers construct the meaning of the functional and relational legitimacy
largely based on their understanding of the legitimacy needs of organizations but
claiming (in the realist tradition) that the constructs exist beyond their minds (Magee
1985: 61).
In addition, I use quantitative methods (structural equation modeling) in order to
confirm a general law - the signaling theory of legitimacy. The basic premises of the
signaling theory of legitimacy is that evaluating audiences grant legitimacy to
organizations experiencing liability based on certain signals used to communicate the
adherence to stakeholders’ expectations.  Later, this general law is confirmed in the
context of small organizations evolving in transition environments. It was said that
these organizations experience liability of origin (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000), which
can be overcome by using signals of functional and relational legitimacy.
The research model that reflects the two research questions is presented in Fig. 9.
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Fig. 9: Research Model
In order to test the proposed research model, the methodology used is structural
equation modeling (SEM). As the model shows the concepts of functional, relational
and organizational legitimacy as well as the profit-making ability of an organization
are not directly observable. They are measured by other items (manifest) variables.
The existence of multiple dependence relationships among variables, some of which
are unobservable determines the usage of structural equation modeling (SEM) (Hair et
































2. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)43
Besides the traditional statistical techniques (i.e. chi-square, t-test assuming unequal
variances, and variance inflation factor) used to perform the preliminary statistical
analysis, I employ structural equation modeling (SEM) in order to test the proposed
research model. SEM is a multivariate technique which consists of a set of linear
equations examining two or more relationships among directly observable (manifest)
variables and/or unobservable (latent) variables (Hoyle 1995; Shook et al. 2004).
I chose SEM because it is a multivariate technique which provides researchers with
the ability to accommodate multiple dependence relationships in a single model (Hair
et al. 1998). Moreover, the dependent variable in one equation can be an independent
variable in another equation (Hair et al. 1998). This way, the researchers can model
complex relationships that are not possible with any other multivariate technique
(Hair et al. 1998). Based on the proposed research model, I first try to identify the
comprising elements of functional and relational legitimacy and then I test their
impact on organizational legitimacy (the dependent variable). As a next step, I also
test the relationship organizational legitimacy-profit-making ability of an
organization. This way, I try to test multiple dependence relationships among
variables, some of which are unobservable (latent) and others are directly observable
(manifest) variables (Hoyle 1995; Shook et al. 2004).
When applying SEM, the process includes the specification of “two conceptually
distinct models” (Anderson and Gerbing 1982: 453) - the measurement and the
structural models (Henseler, Ringle and Sinkovics 2009). In the next section, I regard
the specificities of the two models comprising the SEM.
2.1. Measurement and Structural Models
The measurement model specifies the causal relationships between the latent
variables44 or theoretical constructs and the indicators or manifest variables
(Anderson and Gerbing 1982; Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth 2008). The latent
43 Structural equation modeling was historically called ‘causal modeling’ (Shook et al. 2004).
44 Different terms are used to name latent variables, such as unmeasured variables, factors, unobserved
variables, constructs, or true scores (Bollen 2002). In this study, I use the above-mentioned terms
interchangeably.
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variables are not present in the dataset (Bollen 2002). They are assessed by manifest
variables (or indicators)45 that are directly observable (Diamantopoulos, Riefler and
Roth 2008).
The structural model specifies the relationships between the theoretical constructs
themselves (Anderson and Gerbing 1982; Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth 2008). In
some studies, the measurement model is referred to as the outer model while the
structural model – as the inner model (Henseler, Ringle and Sincovics 2009). For the
purpose of this study, I use the terms measurement and structural models.
Anderson and Gerbing (1982: 453) state that “the proper specification of the
measurement model is necessary before meaning can be assigned to the analysis of
the structural model.” Usually, each latent variable is measured by several indicators
(Anderson and Gerbing 1982). Each indicator is attached or is a comprising element
of only one theoretical construct (Anderson and Gerbing 1982). Hence, the indicators
are  said  to  be unidimensional and the measurement models are called multiple-
indicator measurement models (Anderson and Gerbing 1982).
Depending on the direction of the causality, there are two forms of relationships
between  the  constructs  and  the  indicators,  or  two  types  of  measurement  models  –
reflective and formative (Diamantopoulos 1999; Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth
2008).
2.2. Reflective and Formative Measurement Models
In general, the choice of the measurement orientation and the consequent choice
between reflective and formative measurement models should be based in the theory
(Henseler, Ringle and Sincovics 2009). The theoretical conceptualization of the
construct(s) indicates the nature and the direction of the relationship(s) between the
measurement items and their construct(s) (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). Most
studies in social sciences in general assume that the indicators used are reflective
(Bollen 1989: 65). Even though they were first introduced in the literature forty years
ago, the use of formative indicators for the operationalization of latent constructs is
45 Following Bollen and Lennox (1991), I use the terms indicator, item, observed measure, or observed
variable interchangeably in regard to manifest variables.
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rare (Diamantopoulos, Riefler, and Roth 2008) “despite their appropriateness in many
instances” (Bollen 1989: 65).
Before  I  examine  the  specificities  and  the  differences  between  the  two  types  of
measurement models, it is important to state that none of these measurement models
is inherently superior to the other one (Diamantopoulos 1999). Both of them can be
attractive to constructing multi-item measures (Diamantopoulos 1999), depending on
the theory used and the needs of the particular research framework.
2.2.1. Reflective Measurement Model
The most commonly used measurement model is the reflective measurement model,
also called principal factor model (Jarvis et al. 2003). It indicates causality from the
construct to the indicators, known as effect indicators (Bollen and Lennox 1991),
eliciting (Rossiter 2002) or reflective indicators (Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth
2008; Fornell and Bookstein 1982). This approach is based on the classical test theory
(Spearman 1910), which postulates that “the variation in the scores on measures of a
construct is a function of a true score, plus error” (Jarvis et al. 2003). In this case, the
indicators are functions of the latent variable and any change in the latter gets
reflected in them (Diamantopoulos 1999; Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006) causing
their intercorrelations (Jarvis et al. 2003). Or in other words, the indicators are the
dependent variables and the latent construct is the explanatory variable
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth 2008) (see Fig. 10).
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Fig. 10: Path Diagram of a Reflective Measurement Model (Diamantopoulos 1999:
446)
When the measurement model is reflective, the measurement items are reflective
indicators of the unobserved (latent) variables and multi-item scales can be developed
in order to operationalize the latent construct (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). In
addition, high correlation among the indicators is desirable because it enhances
internal consistency (Bollen and Lennox 1991), and that dimensionality, reliability,
and convergent/discriminant validity assessment are meaningful when reflective
indicators are involved (Diamantopoulos 1999).
2.2.2. Formative Measurement Model
The formative measurement model or also called composite latent variable model
(Jarvis et al. 2003) indicates the reverse (in comparison to the reflective model)
causality – the indicators jointly form the latent variable(s) (see Fig. 11)
(Diamantopoulos and Winkhofer 2001; Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth 2008;
Jarvis et al. 2003). This is the reason why the indicators in this case are called
formative (Fornell and Bookstein 1982), formed (Rossiter 2002) or causal (Bollen and
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Lennox 1991) (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). Since the latent variable is caused
by its formative indicators, a change in the former is not necessarily associated with a
change  in  the  latter  (Diamantopoulos  1999).  On  the  contrary,  if  one  or  more  of  the
indicators change, this will reflect in a change of the latent construct (Diamantopoulos
1999).
When the measurement model is defined by formative indicators, the approach used
to derive multi-item measures of the latent construct(s) is called index construction
(versus scale development for reflective measurement models) (Diamantopoulos and
Siguaw 2006).
Fig. 11: Path Diagram of a Formative Measurement Model (Diamantopoulos 1999:
446)
For a long time, the formative indicator variables have been largely ignored by the
researchers even though in some instances they might have been more appropriate
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(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). The reason for this is that the researchers
assumed all indicators are effect or reflective (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).
The formative measurement perspective goes back to the “operational definition”
model (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Bagozzi (1982: 15) stated that “the
entire meaning of a theoretical concept is assigned to its measurement and any
theoretical concept has one and only one measurement.” Thus, if P represents the
concept (i.e. unobserved or latent variable), and x is the empirical measure (i.e.
observed or manifested variable), then:
(1) P = x
But since one concept can have multiple measures xi (i = 1, 2,…n), Bagozzi and
Fornell (1982: 32) suggest that “a concept is assumed to be defined by or is a function
of its measurements,” which results in the following equation:
(2) P = ?1x1 + ?2x2 + …. + ?nxn ,
where ?i is a parameter reflecting the contribution of xi to the latent construct P
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Another specification for multiple measures
is shown in Fig. 11. The corresponding equation provided by Bollen and Lennox
(1991: 306) is the following:
(3) P = ?1x1 + ?2x2 + …. + ?nxn + ?,
where ? is a disturbance term with Cov(xi, ?) = 0 and E(?) = 0 (Diamantopoulos 2006).
Equation (1) presents the concept (P) depending on only one measurement and thus, it
makes the assessment of the measurement error problematic (Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer 2001). Equations (2) and (3) differ in terms of the presence of the ? term
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Indeed, equation 1 is consistent with a
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principal component model (Bagozzi and Fornell 1982; Nunnally and Bernstein
1994).
Following Bollen and Lennox (1991: 308), Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001:
271) identified several properties of formative indicators that distinguish them from
reflective indicators.
2.2.3. Differences between Reflective and Formative Measurement Models
The differences between reflective and formative measurement models are several.
Below, I look at them trying to distinguish between the two measurement models.
First, omitting an indicator is not as problematic for reflective as it is for formative
indicators since the former are interchangeable (due to high correlation between them)
(Diamantopoulos 1999). Omitting a formative indicator though means that unique part
of the latent construct will not be accounted for (Diamantopoulos 1999), and the
meaning of the latter might be altered (Jarvis et al. 2003). This is another reason why
the internal consistency measures should not be used to evaluate the adequacy of the
formative measurement models (Jarvis et al. 2003).  In  addition,  the  existence  of
multicollinearity among the indicators is a serious problem when the latter are
formative; when they are reflective, this is a virtue (Jarvis et al. 2003).
Second, the correlations among the formative indicators are not explained by the
measurement model (Diamantopoulos 1999). Hence, “...no specific pattern of
relationships is necessary among the indicators” (Diamantopoulos 1999: 447).
“Indeed, it would be entirely consistent for formative indicators to be completely
uncorrelated” (Jarvis et al. 2003: 202). This though leads to a difficulty assessing the
validity of formative indicators (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).
Third, as stated by Bagozzi (1994: 33), reliability and construct validity (the way they
are measured in reflective models) lose their meaning when indices with formative
indicators are constructed (Diamantopoulos 1999). This is due to the fact that the sign
and the magnitude of the correlation among them do not influence their contribution
to the unobservable (latent) construct (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001; Jarvis
et al. 2003). Low internal consistency does not make formative indicators invalid
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when  assessing  the  validity  of  the  construct  (Jarvis et al. 2003). Thus, in order to
assess validity, the researcher should use “nomological and/or criterion-related
validity” (Jarvis et al. 2003: 202).
Fourth,  unlike  the  reflective  counterparts,  formative  indicators  do  not  have  error
measurement terms. Error variance is represented only in the disturbance term ?,
which is related to the prediction of latent variable per se (Diamantopoulos 1999).
The disturbance term ? is uncorrelated with xi. It is worth mentioning that with
formative measures, the variance in true scores is higher than the variance in the
observed scores; in the reflective specification, the opposite is true (Fornell, Rhee, and
Yi 1991). Following Fornell, Rhee and Yi (1991), in the formative specification:
T = O + ?,
where T = true score, O = observed score, and? ? = disturbance term. However, ?
captures all the remaining causes of T other than O, and therefore
Cov(O, ?) = 0,
and
Cov(T, ?) ? 0.
Thus, Var(T) > Var(O) (Diamantopoulos 2006).46 In other words, the disturbance
term ? captures the impact of all remaining causes on the latent variable construct that
have not been included in the model (Diamantopoulos 2006: 11).
The error term in the formative measurement models has an important role in the
initial measurement model specification, i.e. before the data collection
(Diamantopoulos 2006). At this stage, the researcher should generate a
46 In  reflective  measurement  models,  O = T + ? ,  where  E(?)  =  0,  Cov(T,  ?)  =  0,  and Cov(O,  ?)  ? 0
(Diamantopoulos 2006, p. 9). The later equation shows that the error term and the observed score are
associated since their covariance is not equal to 0 (Diamantopoulos 2006). The fact that E(?) = 0 shows
that the measurement error term is assumed to be random (Diamantopoulos 2006).
186
comprehensive set of items and possibly exhaust the focal construct’s meaning
(Diamantopoulos 2006). In this case, the disturbance term ? can be excluded
(Diamantopoulos 2006). In practice though, it is difficult to contemplate that the
research framework contains all indicators that fully cover the focal construct’s
meaning.  In  this  case,  the  inclusion  of  the  error  term  is  necessary  (Diamantopoulos
2006).
There is a very real danger of model misspecification at the indicator specification
stage  if  the  omitted  indicators  are,  in  fact,  correlated  with  those  included  in  the
formative measure (Bollen and Lennox 1991). At the same time, one must be mindful
of multicollinearity problems, since in case of high multicollinearity among the
measured variables, formative specifications make it difficult to assess the individual
contribution of the variables (Fornell et al. 1991: 317).
Fifth, in formative indicator models, a necessary but not sufficient condition for
identifying the residual variance (i.e. the disturbance term) is that the latent emits at
least two paths to other latent variables measured with effect indicators (MacCullum
and Browne 1993). Or in other words, the formative model as specified in Fig. 11 is
underidentified and it has to be incorporated in a larger model, which includes
consequences for the latent variable (Diamantopoulos 1999).
Due to the specific characteristics of formative indicators, conventional procedures
used to assess the validity and reliability of scales composed of reflective indicators
(i.e. factor analysis and the assessment of internal consistency) are not appropriate for
construct variables with formative indicators (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).
As Bollen (1989: 222) points out, “unfortunately, traditional validity assessments and
classical test theory do not cover cause indicators.” Similarly, Bagozzi (1994: 333)
warns that reliability in the internal consistency sense and construct validity in terms
of convergent and discriminant validity is not meaningful when indices are formed as
linear sum of measurements.” Thus, alternative approaches must be followed to
evaluate the quality of measures that are based on formative indicators
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).
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The decision between the two different measurement models can be made by
answering the following questions (Jarvis et al. 2003).
DECISION RULES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A CONSTRUCT IS
FORMATIVE OR REFLECTIVE
FORMATIVE MODEL REFLECTIVE MODEL
1. Direction of causality
from construct to measure
implied by the conceptual
definition
Direction of causality is
from items to construct
Direction of causality is
from construct to items
Are the indicators (items)
(a) defining characteristics








Would changes in the
indicators/items cause
changes in the construct or
not?
Changes in the indicators
should cause changes in
the construct
Changes in the indicator
should not cause changes
in the construct
Would changes in the
construct cause changes in
the indicators?
Changes in the construct
do not cause changes in
the indicators
Changes in the construct
do cause changes in the
indicators
2. Interchangeability of the
indicators/items




Should the indicators have
the same or similar
content? Do the indicators
share a common theme?
Indicators need not have
the same or similar
content/indicators need not
share a common theme
Indicators should have the
same or similar
content/indicators should
share a common theme
Would dropping one of the
indicators alter the
conceptual domain of the
construct?
Dropping an indicator may
alter the conceptual
domain of the construct
Dropping an indicator
should not alter the
conceptual domain of the
construct
3. Covariation among the
indicators
Not necessary for
indicators to covary with
each other
Indicators are expected to
covary with each other
Should a change in one of
the indicators be
associated with changes in
the other indicators?
Not necessarily Yes
4. Nomological net of the
construct indicators
Nomological net for the
indicators may differ
Nomological net for the
indicators should not differ
Are the indicators/items
expected to have the same
antecedents and
consequences?
Indicators are not required
to have the same
antecedents and
consequences
Indicators are required to
have the same antecedents
and consequences
Table 7: Decision Rules for Determining whether a Construct is Formative or
Reflective (Jarvis et al. 2003)
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Indeed, it is very rare that the researchers defend their choice of measurement model –
reflective or formative (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). Based on the above-
mentioned characteristics of the formative and reflective constructs, the latent
constructs of functional and relational legitimacy are formative. The items comprising
the three constructs indeed are their defining characteristics – they contribute to the
constructs’ creation (Johansson and Yip 1994). The direction of the causality is
clearly from the items to the latent construct meaning that the indicators affect the
latent variable in a positive or in a negative way (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006).
An example of a formative construct that comes close to organizational legitimacy is
the one of organizational reputation, comprised of quality of products, commitment
to protecting the environment, customer orientation, value for money for a product,
etc. (Helm 2005). If any one of the above-mentioned indicators increases, the
reputation of an organization also goes up (Helm 2005).
It is similar for the functional and relational legitimacy constructs – i.e. signaling
superior managerial or innovative competencies will enhance the functional
legitimacy of the focal organization but the opposite is not true. The increase in the
functional legitimacy will not cause enhanced managerial competencies (in this case
measured by the Western education of the managers) or enhanced innovative
competencies (measured by the development of new products). Same goes for the
relational  legitimacy  –  an  increase  in  the  stability  as  one  of  its  building  blocks  will
enhance this latent construct. The opposite – the increase in the relational legitimacy
of an organization will not cause an increase in the company’s stability (measured as
organizational age).
In addition, the two sets of items comprising the functional and relational legitimacy
do not covary and clearly do not have the same antecedents. The result is that I build
the functional and the relational legitimacy as formative latent constructs.
The latent variables organizational legitimacy and profit-making ability of an
organization are reflective constructs. In this case, organizational legitimacy is
measured by the number of relevant stakeholders (clients, distributors, employees),
which based on the signals received decide to support an organization. The causality
189
goes from the latent construct to the items meaning that the higher the organizational
legitimacy (based on the accumulated legitimacy stock of signals), the higher the
stakeholders’ support. In addition, the latent construct profit-making ability is also a
reflective one. The direction of causality clearly goes from the latent variable to its
indicators (average fee/hour and growth rate), which means that higher profit-making
ability will get reflected in higher average fee/hour and growth rate for the focal
organization.
As it was mentioned above, the latent constructs of functional and relational
legitimacy are formative. The process of formative latent variable construction is
comprised of four distinctive stages as identified by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer
(2001). Below, I look at the overall assessment of the formative measurement models,
including the stages of the process of formative latent index construction.
3. Measurement Models - Assessment
The process of formative index construction is different from the process of
developing reflective scales (Helm 2005). While guidelines for reflective scale
development are widely discussed in the literature, the process of formative index
construction is not well-documented. Following Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer
(2001), below I discuss each stage in the process of formative index construction: (1)
content specification; (2) indicator specification; (3) indicator collinearity; (4) external
validity.
3.1. Stage One: Content Specification
The first step in the formative latent construction process is the Content Specification
stage which includes the definition of the construct itself (Helm 2005). This means
that the researcher has to determine the domain of content or the scope of the index
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). This step is very important because indices
are “more abstract and ambiguous” than reflective scale indicators (Bagozzi 1994).
All dimensions of the construct have to be considered and the relevant indicators
included since the failure to do so will result in an incomplete latent construct
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(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). If all facets are not considered, the content
validity of the construct can be questioned (Rossiter 2002).
3.2. Stage Two: Indicator Specification
In the second stage of the formative latent construction Indicator Specification, the
researcher is required to identify a census of indicators in order to capture all
dimensions of the formative latent construct (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001;
Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). The failure to do so may result in not being able
to capture the entire scope of the latent variable as described in the previous Content
Specification stage (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006).
In comparison to reflective indicators, which are picked randomly from the universe
of items, the formative indicators have to cover all facets of the construct (Helm
2005). In addition, in contrast to the reflective case, it is not necessary that each facet
is measured by multiple indicators (Helm 2005).
Since in this stage, many items are generated, it is important to know which of them
tap into the construct of interest. Or in other words, the substantive validity of the
measure has to be calculated. The substantive validity of a measure is “the extent to
which that measure is judged to be reflective of, or theoretically linked to, some
construct of interest” (Anderson and Gerbing 1991: 732). Substantive validity is
closely related to construct validity – measures that do not demonstrate adequate
substantive validity cannot have adequate construct validity (Anderson and Gerbing
1991).
In order to assess the substantive validity of a measure, Anderson and Gerbing (1991)
suggest the researchers to ask representatives of the main study sample or population
of interest to sort items and decide to which of the constructs they belong to (item-sort
task). Based on the respondents’ decision, two indices of substantive validity can be
calculated – proportion of substantive agreement (psa) and substantive-validity
coefficient (csv).
psa = nc / N
where:
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nc – is the number of respondents assigning a measure to its posited construct
N – is the total number of respondents
csv = (nc – no) / N
where:
nc – is the number of respondents assigning a measure to its posited construct
no – is the highest number of assignments of the item to any other construct in the set
N – is the total number of respondents
The values of psa vary from 0.0 to 1.0 with higher values indicating higher substantive
validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1991). The values of csv range from -1.0 to 1.0 with
larger values indicating greater substantive validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1991).
3.3. Stage Three: Indicator Collinearity
The third step in the process of building formative indices is to check for indicator
collinearity (Helm 2005). In contrast to reflective scale development, in formative
index construction it is desirable that the intercorrelations among indicator items are
low (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). The reason for this is that the formative
measurement  model  is  based  on  multiple  regressions  and  thus,  the  stability  of  the
indicator coefficients is affected by the sample size and the strength of the indicator
intercorrelations (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Strong collinearity among
indicators makes it difficult to measure the impact of any individual indictor on the
latent variable (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). If the intercorrelations are
high, this is a signal of existing multicollinearity among the indicator items and one or
more of them have to be excluded from the measurement model (Diamantopoulos and
Siguaw 2006). In formative index construction47, any unnecessary redundancy has to
be avoided (Rossiter 2002).
Often, (multi)collinearity is assessed based on the variance inflation factor (VIF)
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). ). A general rule of thumb when using VIF is
47 Under reflective measurement models, multicollinearity is not a problem because only simple
regressions are used – the latent variable is the predictor and the indicator is the criterion
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001).
192
that  it  should  not  exceed  10.0  (Hair et al. 1998). Above this level, the degree of
(multi)collinearity is perceived to be unacceptably high and one or more of the items
have to be excluded (Hair et al. 1998).
3.4 Stage Four: External and Nomological Validity
The last step in the formative index construction is checking for the external validity
and nomological validity of the construct (Helm 2005). Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer (2001: 272) mention that “the very nature of the formative measurement
renders an internal consistency perspective inappropriate for assessing the suitability
of indicators.”
There are several ways to proceed regarding this stage of the formative measurement
construction (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). First, in order to test for
external validity, “the formative index should explain a big part of the variance of an
alternative reflective measure of the focal construct” (Henseler et al. 2009: 302).
Second, in order to test for nomological validity, the entire construct can be induced
in a wider nomological context and linked to another construct with which it is
expected to be linked (i.e. antecedents and/or consequences) (Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer 2001). The latter though has to be measured by reflective items
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). If the construct has the theoretically
hypothesized relationship with the other construct, the nomological validity of the
measurement model is confirmed (Helm 2005).
The  table  below  summarizes  the  different  criteria  used  to  assess  any  formative
measurement model.
CRITERION DESCRIPTION
Significance of weights Estimated weights of formative
measurement models should be
significant
Multicollinearity Manifest variables in a formative
construct  should  be  tested  for
multicollinearity. The variance inflation
factor (VIF) can be used for such tests.
As a rule of thumb, a VIF greater than ten
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indicates the presence of harmful
collinearity. However, any VIF
substantially greater than one indicates
multicollinearity.
External validity The formative index should explain a big
part of the variance of an alternative
reflective measure of the focal construct.
Nomological validity The relationships between the formative
index and other constructs in the path
model, which are sufficiently well known
through prior research, should be strong
and significant.
Table 8: Assessing Formative Measurement Models (Henseler et al. 2009)
Next, I look at the assessment of the structural model as an integral part of the SEM
multivariate technique.
4. Structural Models – Assessment
The structural model assesses the inner path model estimates (Henseler et al. 2009).
An important criterion for assessment is R2 (coefficient  of  determination)  of  the
exogenous latent variable (Henseler et al. 2009) – in the current study, this is the
organizational legitimacy latent construct and the profit-making ability of an
organization. The acceptable R2 levels are as follows: weak (0.19), moderate (0.33)
and substantial (0.67) (Chin 1998). The substantial level of R2 is appropriate when the
endogenous latent variable is explained by more than two exogenous latent variables
while moderate level of R2 is  appropriate  when  the  exogenous  variables  are  one  or
two (Henseler et al. 2009).
In addition, when evaluating the inner structural model, the individual path
coefficients can be interpreted as standardized beta coefficients of OLS regression
(Henseler et al. 2009). If the sign of the path coefficients is in accordance with the
theoretically hypothesized relationship, this can be perceived as partial empirical
validation (Henseler et al. 2009). It is suggested by some researchers that one should
look  at  the  total  effect  (the  sum  of  all  direct  and  indirect  effects)  for  additional
interpretations (Albers 2009).
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One can also estimate the effect size by looking at f2 (Cohen 1988). The effect size is
the increase in R2 relative to the proportion of variance of the endogenous latent
variable that remains unexplained. The values of f2 that  are  perceived  to  be  small,
medium and large are as follows 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35, respectively.
The table below presents a summary of the criteria that can be used to assess the
structural model:
CRITERION DESCRIPTION
Of endogenous latent variable R2 values of 0.67, 0.33, or 0.19 for
endogenous latent variables in the inner
path model are described as substantial,
moderate, or weak (Chin 1998).
Estimates for path coefficients The estimated values for path
relationships in the structural model
should be evaluated in terms of sign,
magnitude, and significance (the latter via
bootstrapping).
Effect size f2 f2 = (R2included – R2excluded)  /  (1 – R2included)
values 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 can be viewed
as a gauger for whether a predictor latent
variable has a weak, medium, or large
effect at the structural level.
Table 9: Assessing Structural Models (Henseler et al. 2009)
After I presented the specificities of the SEM methodology applied to test the
proposed research, as a next step I look at the particular SEM techniques. I compare
LISREL and PLS and justify my choice of PLS as the modeling technique used for
data analysis and hypotheses testing in this study.
5. SEM Techniques
The SEM techniques are considered second generation methods (Fornell, Lorange and
Roos 1990). There are two big families of SEM techniques – covariance-based (i.e.
LISREL) and variance-based (or component-based) techniques (i.e. PLS) (Henseler,
Ringle and Sincovics 2009; Tenenhaus 2002). In the next section, the specificities of
each family of techniques are presented.
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5.1. Covariance-Based Techniques
The covariance-based modeling techniques are based on “a generalization of path
models, principal component analysis and factor analysis to the case of several data
tables connected by causal links” (Tenenhaus 2002: 871). The objective is to validate
the research model (Tenenhaus 2002). For this purpose the use of covariance-based
SEM requires large sample size – more than 100 observations (preferably even more
than 200 observations) (Tenenhaus 2002). The types of methods used are full
information methods, such as maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) or Unweighted
Least Squares (ULS).
LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1984) is a covariance-based SEM technique which
uses MLE (Fornell, Lorangeand Roos 1990).
5.2. Variance-Based Techniques
The variance-based modeling techniques, also called PLS (Partial Least Squares)
(Wold 1982), are considered “a generalization of principal component analysis to the
case of several data tables connected by causal links” (Tenenhaus 2002: 872). The
PLS technique is a two-step method: (1) the PLS algorithm is used to compute the
latent variables scores and (2) Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the latent
variables scores are used to estimate the structural equations (Tenenhaus 2002). The
PLS techniques can be carried out on very small samples – less than 100 observations
(Tenenhaus 2002). For example, Tenenhaus (2008) reports studies with 6
observations and 96 variables and another study with 21 observations and 27
variables.
According to Tenenhaus (2002), in comparison to the covariance-based modeling
techniques (i.e. LISREL), PLS demonstrates several disadvantages:
? the diffusion of the path modeling software is much more confidential than
that of covariance-based SEM software
? the PLS algorithm is more a heuristic than an algorithm with well-known
properties
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? the possibility of imposing value or equality constraints on path coefficients is
easily-managed in covariance-based SEM and does not exist in PLS
(Tenenhaus 2002)
At the same time, PLS has some advantages in comparison to covariance-based
techniques (such as LISREL):
? PLS path models can be very complex, including numerous manifest and
latent variables (in comparison to the number of observations), and still
allowing computation without estimation problems (Tenenhaus 2002)
? allows the unrestricted calculation of cause-effect relationship models that
employ both reflective and formative indicators (Diamantopoulos and
Winklhofer 2001)
? PLS can be used to estimate path models when the sample sizes are very small
(Chin and Newsted 1999)
? PLS path modeling can be used when distributions are highly skewed
(Bagozzi 1994); As Fornell (1982: 443) states “there are no distributional
requirements” when PLS is employed.
The table below presents some of the differences between the PLS and LISREL. The
table was built based on the work of Birkinshaw, Morrison and Hulland (1995), Chin
2000, Cool, Dierickx and Jemison (1989), Fornell, Lorange and Roos (1990),






Sample size >200 observations <100 observations
Type of methods Full information (ML, ULS) Partial information
Type of indicators Reflective and formative Reflective
Latent Variables (LV)
Linear combination of their
manifest variables










Small or moderate (<100
MV) Big (i.e., 100 LV, 1000 MV)
Identification Depends on the perfect Always identified
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model: 4 or more MV for 1
LV
Table 10: Comparison between SEM Techniques – LISREL and PLS.
The research framework of this study implies cross-sectional design – the data
collected reflects the characteristics (signals) of the Bulgarian IT companies at a
particular period in time. I compare them based on the signals used and the legitimacy
granted by interested stakeholder groups. In this case, “strong theoretical
underpinnings are critical to causality inferences” (Shook et al. 2004: 398).
The reasons why PLS was chosen over other SEM techniques are the following. First,
the sample size is small (77 observations). Second, the assumptions for normal
distribution of the manifest variables do not hold. Third, the study is in the early stage
of theory building and testing (Birkinshaw, Morrison and Hulland 1995). I develop
and test the signaling theory of legitimacy by examining small organizations evolving
in transition environments, trying to get long-term contracts. Forth, the two latent
constructs  (functional  and  relational  legitimacy)  are  formative  constructs.  As  it  was
mentioned earlier, LISREL does not permit testing formative latent constructs. The
latter can be tested only by applying the PLS modeling technique. Fifth, it has to be
determined whether the measures I developed are valid and reliable within the context
of the signaling theory of legitimacy (Chin 2000).
The PLS is already a well-established technique for estimating path coefficients in
causal models (Johansson and Yip 1994). It has been widely used in e-business
(Pavlou and Chai 2002), organizational behavior (Higgins, Duxbury and Irving 1992),
marketing (Reinartz, Kraft and Hoyer 2004), and consumer behavior (Fornell and
Robinson 1983).
In strategic management, there are also several studies that employed the PLS path
modeling technique in order to examine the risk-return outcomes (Cool, Dierickx, and
Jemison 1989), cooperative ventures (Fornell, Lorange and Roos 1990), knowledge
acquisition from international joint ventures (Tsang 2002), global strategy (Johansson
and Yip 1994), and global integration (Birkinshaw, Morrison and Hulland 1995).
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The table below presents research studies done in the field of strategic management
which use the PLS modeling technique. Information on the sample size and the
number of variables and indicators used by the authors in the particular study is also
provided.













































7 variables and 30
indicators
Table 11: List of Studies in Strategic Management Using the PLS Modeling
Technique
Therefore, the current study contributes to the literature on organizational legitimacy
based on the methodology applied to test the proposed research model, namely
structural equation modeling (SEM). The direction of causality between the items
(manifest variables) and the latent constructs implies the formative nature of the
measurement models for functional and relational legitimacy, and reflective nature for
the dependent variables (organizational legitimacy and profit-making ability). Hence,
the applied statistical technique to test the multiple dependence relationships between
the items and the latent constructs and between the latent constructs themselves is
PLS. This adds to the contributions of the study since PLS has not been extensively
applied in the field of strategic management.
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In the next section, I discuss the variables – latent and manifest – as well as the
measurement instruments used in this research.
6. Variables and Measurement Instruments
The measurements of the observable (manifest) variables that build the latent variable
constructs are introduced in the current section. I propose formative measurement
constructs for the two independent latent variables of functional legitimacy and
relational legitimacy, and reflective measurement constructs for the dependent
variables organizational legitimacy and profit-making ability.
Indeed, organizational legitimacy represents the two aspects of legitimacy-enhancing
efforts of the organizations and the legitimacy-granting of the interested stakeholder
parties. The emphasis is on the fact that the efforts of an organization to gain
legitimacy are different from the stakeholders’ evaluation and their subsequent
decision to grant legitimacy. According to the signaling theory of legitimacy,
organizations use signals to claim legitimacy. At the same time, evaluating audiences
use also signals to grant legitimacy. Hence, signals are the building blocks between
the two aspects of the legitimacy concept.
6.1. Measures of Organizational Legitimacy
Despite its centrality in institutional theory, there is little agreement among
researchers on how to define and/or measure organizational legitimacy (Deephouse
1996; Foreman and Whetten 2002). Legitimacy is a complex, multidimensional
construct linked to a variety of stakeholder groups (Deephouse and Carter 2005;
Foreman and Whetten 2002). There are several typologies of legitimacy developed in
the extant literature and usually the measurements proposed reflect the typology
applied.
Based on the three pillars of institutions, the most commonly accepted legitimacy
typology includes regulative, normative and cognitive legitimacy (Scott 2001). Later,
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Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) added a forth type – legitimacy derived from the
industry48.
Since regulative legitimacy reflects the conformity of organizational actions to
regulatory standards, it is usually measured using government reports and/or
accreditation (Deephouse and Carter 2005). Normative legitimacy reflects the
congruence of organizational action with broadly-accepted social norms and values
(Suchman 1995). Often, it is measured by examining the writings of a society –
content analysis of media sources (Deephouse and Carter 2005).  Cognitive
legitimacy is the conformity to widely-held cultural beliefs and taken-for-granted
assumptions or practices (Scott 2001; Zimmerman and Zeitz 2002; Westphal, Gulati
and Shortell 1997). Content analysis of newspapers is not only used to measure
normative legitimacy but also to measure cognitive legitimacy (Lamertz and Baum
1998) (see Table 12).
Higgins and Gulati (2006) used a different legitimacy typology applied to young
entrepreneurial firms. They introduced the concepts of resource legitimacy, role
legitimacy and endorsement legitimacy (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Resource
legitimacy is associated with the access to resources that an organization (especially
new ventures) can secure in order to improve its technology, competitive stance and
marketing capabilities (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Role legitimacy is related to the
ability of the TMT members to effectively fulfill certain top management roles of key
leadership positions (Higgins and Gulati 2006). Endorsement legitimacy is the ability
to attract key endorsers from the investment community (Higgins and Gulati 2006).






Deephouse and Carter (2005) Gov't regulatory ratings (categorical)Regulative,
Normative
Regulative
Singh et al. (1986) 1) Listing on a community directory
48 Industry legitimacy is the conformity to practices derived from the industry (Zimmerman and Zeitz
2002). To the extent of researchers’ knowledge, there is no empirical study that proposes a
measurement for industry legitimacy.
201
(dummy)
2) Issuance of charitable registration
number (dummy)
Ruef and Scott (1998) Accreditation by seven externalassociations (dummy)
Baum and Oliver (1991) Linkages with gov't and communityinstitutions
Delmar and Shane (2004) Legal incorporation of an entity(dummy)
Deephouse and Carter (2005)
Endorsing or questioning
organizational legitimacy in local
newspapers (content analysis)
Barron (1998) Number of advertisements in a specificjournal (continuous variable)
Shane and Foo (1999)
Media rankings (certification): 1) log of
annual rankings, 2) Rank1=1 if the
organization was ranked (dummy), 3)
Rank2=scale 1 to 9 (where 1 was
assigned to unranked system)
Normative
Delmar and Shane (2004)
Completion of a business plan
(dummy)









Shane and Foo (1999) Organizational size & age (continuousvariable)
Resource Higgins and Gulati (2003,2006)
Number of previous employment
affiliations of the TMT (continuous
variable)
Role Higgins and Gulati (2003,2006)





Endorsement Higgins and Gulati (2003,2006) Prestige of the underwriter
Table 12: Measures of Organizational Legitimacy
Signaling organizational legitimacy has been considered in contexts characterized by
very  high  level  of  uncertainty  and  ambiguity,  such  as  the  IPO  context.  In  the  IPO
context, organizations get evaluated by external constituencies and based on this
evaluation the IPO underpricing on the primary markets is determined. The IPO
underpricing reflects the legitimacy granted to a particular organization by its
evaluating audiences (in this case these are mainly different groups of investors).
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There are many signals (legitimacy antecedents) discussed in the literature that can
influence the investor valuation of an IPO. Some examples include CEO stock options
(Certo et al. 2003), reputation of investment banker (Titman and Trueman 1986;
Carter and Manaster 1990; Michaely and Shaw 1994), reputation of an auditor
company (Titman and Trueman 1986; Balvers, McDonald and Miller 1988; Beatty
1989), etc. The full list of signals is presented in Table 1, chapter 3.
Similarly to the IPO context, in the corporate governance literature, researchers
discovered that organizations adopt actions and policies that fit the expectations of
evaluating audiences at a broader level. Often, formally adopted policies are
decoupled from the on-going routines or actions emphasizing their legitimacy-
enhancing rather than efficiency-achieving role (Meyer and Rowan 1977). In the
corporate governance context, a common proxy used to measure organizational
legitimacy is the stock market reaction to the adoption of certain policies (Zajac and
Westphal 1998, 2004). The latter (which in fact represent signals or antecedents of
organizational legitimacy) are stock repurchase plans (Zajac and Westphal 2004) and
long-term incentives plans (Westphal and Zajac 1998).
It is clear that the literature on organizational legitimacy lacks widely accepted
measures of the concept (Deephouse 1996; Foreman and Whetten 2002). The
measurements of organizational legitimacy used reflect the type of legitimacy as well
as the context of research. Even though legitimacy is defined as a multidimensional
construct (Deephouse and Carter 2005), most of the measurements are one-
dimensional with some notable exceptions (Foreman and Whetten 200249).
According to Deephouse and Carter (2005), an ideal study will identify and measure
all dimensions of organizational legitimacy. Herein, I make an attempt to identify all
dimensions based on which a small organization evolving in a transition environment
makes its legitimacy claims in long-term arrangements. Keeping in mind that the
organizations under scrutiny evolve in an environment characterized by a lack of
institutional framework to guide organizational behavior, the stakeholder group whose
assessment will be the most precise and the least influenced by the environmental
49 Foreman and Whetten (2002) developed their own scale to assess the cognitive and pragmatic
legitimacy of the co-ops as an organization form.
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ambiguity is the assessment of the clients. A client purchases the necessary
products/services from organizations they perceive to be more legitimate (Shepherd
and Zacharakis 2003). Based on the outsourcing literature (Quélin and Duhamel
2003), the outsourcers (clients) consider two main aspects of the organization they
evaluate in outsourcing arrangements – whether the latter has the needed resources
and competencies (captured by the concept of functional legitimacy) and whether it is
a trustworthy player (captured by the concept of relational legitimacy). The functional
and relational legitimacy are regarded as formative (versus reflective) latent
constructs.
In building the formative latent constructs of functional and relational legitimacy, I
followed the stages suggested by Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001). Helm
(2005) followed the same approach to build a similar formative latent construct of
organizational reputation. Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001) propose a four step
approach for formative index construction which includes: (1) content specification;
(2) indicator specification; (3) indicator collinearity; and (4) external construct
validity.
In this chapter, I regard only stage 1) and 2) of the process of formative latent
construction. Stages 3) and 4) are part of the statistical analysis (chapter 7). In the next
section, the process of building the formative latent constructs of functional
legitimacy is examined followed by the same process for relational legitimacy.
6.2. Designing a Formative Measure for Functional Legitimacy
6.2.1. Content Specification
The first step in the formative index construction process represents the specification
of the domain of content the index has to capture (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer
2001). It is necessary that all facets of the construct are considered (Diamantopoulos
and Winklhofer 2001) in order to achieve a fit between the definition and its
operationalization (Helm 2005). Drawing on the literature on organizational
legitimacy, analysis of the content of the writings of the IT organizations (brochures
and websites) and interviews with industry experts, the dimensions of the functional
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legitimacy construct were identified in Chapters 3 and 4. These qualitative measures
grant content validity of the construct (Helm 2005, Rossiter 2002).
In the next stage of the index construction process, I attempt to identify the indicators
that represent the dimensions of functional legitimacy. The coding was done by the
main researcher and another doctoral student in strategic management. The main
researcher performed the literature review while the two researchers proceeded with
the analysis of the writings and the interviews with industry experts.
6.2.2. Indicator Specification
At the second stage of the index construction process, a census of indicators is
required for formative construct specification (Bollen and Lennox 1991). In order to
generate the indicators that enhance the functional legitimacy of a small organization
evolving in transition environments, I performed literature review, analysis of the
writings (brochures and websites) and interviews with industry experts and
academics.
Based on the literature review, I identified the following dimensions of the formative
latent construct functional legitimacy - managerial50, organizational, informational,
reputational and innovative (Chapters 3&4). One has to keep in mind that while the
dimensions of the functional legitimacy construct are universal, the indicators
(measurements) chosen to represent each dimension will be specific to the
organizations under scrutiny.
The researchers generated the census of items corresponding to the above-mentioned
dimensions of functional legitimacy by undertaking a three-step approach. In the first
stage,  we  looked  at  the  writings  of  the  IT  organizations,  such  as  brochures  and
websites in an attempt to outline important signals used by them. Since valid signals
have to be observable, we assumed that this is a good way to proceed. The brochure
50 It is important to note that I distinguish between the founding team managerial competencies and the
employees’ competencies (McKelvie and Davidsson 2009). I perceive the two as being directly related
to the task-related competency of a small organization in transition environment. The managerial skills
are needed in order to receive and successfully manage an outsourcing project while the employees’
skills are needed in order to complete the outsourcing value-added activity.
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we worked with is the Bulgarian ICT Profile @ CEBIT 2006.  It is important to note
that the text entered in the CEBIT brochure does not follow a certain format meaning
that each organization decides individually which items to present. A total of 17
companies were presented in the CEBIT 2006 brochures. The researchers went a step
ahead and analyzed their websites, as well as the websites of 15 other organizations.
This provided us with a total of 32 IT companies, whose websites were analyzed. The
researchers coded the signals based on two important criteria – observable and costly
(preventing imitation). The third criterion – conveying shared meaning between the
sending and receiving party – was difficult to establish since the study looks only at
the legitimacy-claiming entities. No information is collected from the receiving side
or the legitimacy-granting audiences.
Based  on  the  literature  review and  the  analysis  of  the  writings  of  organizations,  the
two researchers agreed upon the following items presented in Table 13 pertaining to
the functional legitimacy latent construct. Each item represents organizational
characteristic that carries certain informational value for the evaluating audiences (see
Table 13).
In the second stage, we interviewed 10 industry experts regarding the importance of
the items pertaining to the functional legitimacy construct. For this purpose, they used
a 4-point scale (1 – very important, 2 – important, 3 – not so important, 4 – not at all
important) (Helm 2005). We tried to recruit founders and/or managers that belong to
organizations functioning at the three different layers of the environment – local,
national, and international. We assumed that the layer on which an organization
functions determines the way the founders and/or managers view the industry as a
whole. This overall attitude will affect the way they will perceive the importance of
the  different  signals.  The  industry  experts  were  as  follows:  two  owners  and  one
manager of local companies, three owners of companies that specialized in
international outsourcing, two founders and two managers of companies at the
national layer of the environment.
We had to explain to the experts that we are looking at external representation of
certain organizational characteristics or signals of legitimacy. Organizational
legitimacy was presented as being two main types – functional and relational. While
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all  experts  agreed  on  the  way we divided  the  two types  of  legitimacy,  they  showed
concern in terms of the ways the relational legitimacy can be measured. The industry
experts had to answer a question regarding how important they consider the items we
identified in the first stage.
In the third stage, we asked 6 academics whether they will or not assign the items to
the functional legitimacy construct (Anderson and Gerbing 1991).  In other words, we
try  to  see  how  well  an  item  taps  into  the  construct  (Helm  2005).  Participants  were
provided with some background information on the organizations under scrutiny –
SMEs (and more specifically IT firms) in transition environments trying to get
outsourcing contracts with domestic and/or foreign clients. They were also provided
with the definition of organizational legitimacy in general, the two types of legitimacy
we  regard  for  the  purpose  of  this  study  –  functional  and  relational  legitimacy.  In
addition, they were explained the basics of the formative latent variable construction
process. The results of three stages of the process of item specification are presented
in the table below.
No. Company Characteristic Functional
Legitimacy –
Dimensions
N1 1 2 3 4 N2 nc no psa csv
1 Association membership Informational 10 3 2 4 1 6 4 2 0,7 0,3
2 R&D expenditures Innovative 10 0 0 2 8 6 2 4 0,3 -0,3
3 Own product Innovative 10 5 5 0 0 6 5 1 0,8 0,7
4 Business education Managerial 10 0 0 5 5 6 2 4 0,3 -0,3
5 Western
education/experience
Managerial 10 3 5 1 1 6 5 1 0,8 0,7
6 Certified partnerships Organizational 10 8 2 0 0 6 6 0 1 1,0
7 Specialist organizational
form
Organizational 10 2 3 2 3 6 3 3 0,5 0,0
8 Quality product awards Symbolic
reputational
10 3 5 2 0 6 6 0 1 1,0
9 Managerial awards Symbolic
reputational
10 0 3 0 7 6 2 4 0,3 -0,3
Table 13: Importance and Assignment of Items to the Functional Legitimacy Latent
Construct
In Table 13, N1 – number of respondents for pretest on the importance of
characteristics; N2 – number of respondents for pretest on item assignment to
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construct; nc – number of “correct” assignments; no – number of incorrect assignment
of an item to the construct. The proportion of substantive agreement psa = nc/N2. The
substantive-validity coefficient csv = (nc-no)/N2.
According to Helm (2005), only items with psa > 0.75 and csv > 0.50 have to be kept
in the measurement model. All the items we kept meet this requirement besides
association membership – psa = 0.70 and csv = 0.30. Since this was the only indicator
identified for the informational dimension of the functional legitimacy construct, we
decided to keep it in the measurement model.
We excluded the item business education as a measure of the managerial dimension
of the functional legitimacy construct due to very low psa = 0,30 and csv = -0,30. This
can be explained with the lack of a relationship between managerial competencies and
the education acquired. Due to the high level of corruption in the educational system
in  any  transition  environment  (i.e.  a  diploma  can  be  bought),  a  diploma  is  not
considered  a  meaningful  signal  of  the  possession  of  certain  competencies.  Hence,  a
diploma is a noisy signal in the labor market, meaning that its informational value  is
very low. This affects in a negative way the construction of shared meaning between
the sending and receiving party resulting in the diploma being not important when
considering the managerial competencies of an organization.
The item managerial awards was also excluded as an item measuring the symbolic
reputational dimension of functional legitimacy due to low psa = 0.30 and csv = -0.30.
Based on the comments provided by the interviewees, there is no direct link between
the managerial awards and the symbolic reputation of an organization itself. A
managerial award is perceived to be a personal rather than an organizational
achievement.
R&D expenditures (proposed as a measure of the innovative dimension of functional
legitimacy) was also not considered in the further analysis due to the fact that it is not
an observable signal. The respondents allocated a psa = 0.30 and csv = - 0.30.
In addition, we did not consider the manifest variable organizational form (specialist
versus generalist) since we got psa = 0.50 and csv = 0.00. The interviewees shared
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different  opinion  on  whether  following  a  specialist  or  a  generalist  structure  is  more
beneficial for small organizations in transition environments.
In the next section, the dimensions of the functional legitimacy and the respective
items that were chosen to represent each dimension are presented. There is only one
item  per  dimension  since  in  formative  constructs  there  is  no  need  to  have  several
indicators that pertain to the same dimension (Jarvis et al. 2003).
A) Informational Competencies - Measurement
The only observable organizational characteristic that applies to the informational
competencies dimension of the functional legitimacy construct is the association
memberships.  The  rest  of  the  possible  indicators,  such  as  the  social  network  of  the
founding team members, are not directly observable by the evaluating audiences.
Industry association membership of a small organizations evolving in transition
environment reflects an access to industry information. Industry (or trade)
associations are voluntarily collective strategies with moderate level of formalization
(Bresser 1988). In general, industry associations are initiated by the largest industry
organizations (Aldrich and Ruef 2006) and they are often related to major industry
changes – unexpected strong growth or decline, threats from external competition
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 177). Those organizations are particularly important in
fragmented industries with low level of industry concentration (Fombrun 1986).
Usually for a small cost, membership in industry association provides an access to a
bundle of intangible resources. It can help organization access valuable information
on trade statistics (such as industry sale, prices and costs) (Bresser 1988; Bell 2005)
credit references on customers (Bresser 1988), etc. It can also provide access to
support activities - i.e. legal and technical advice; help collect the bills (Bresser 1988).
Moreover, industry association membership provides several knowledge-based
benefits, such as new ideas (Sharma and Henriques 2005), “best practices” (Sine,
Haveman and Tolbert 2005).
In this study, the manifest variable association membership(s) (ASSOC) is a
continuous variable and it is coded as the total number of associations the focal
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company is a member of. More association memberships are expected to provide a
better access to various informational resources. In the questionnaire, a list of the ICT
(Information and Communication Technology) cluster associations was provided to
the respondents. In addition, they were left a field Other, where they could mark any
other association their organization is a member of, which was not part of the
presented list. Then, the total number of memberships was counted.
ASSOC = Number of association memberships
B) Innovative Competencies - Measurement
Organizational innovativeness can signal superior competencies and influence the
perception of the evaluating audiences regarding the focal organization. In volatile
environments, engaging in product innovation is more difficult but it leads to better
organizational performance (Covin and Slevin 1989). Some studies regard
innovativeness of organizations evolving in transition environments as administrative
and/or product-related innovativeness (Luk et al. 2008). Administrative
innovativeness aims at improving operational efficiency by cost reduction while
product-related innovativeness aims at differentiating the company based on
developing new features to existing products and/or new products (Luk et al. 2008).
To measure the two types of innovativeness Luk et al. (2008) used 5-point Likert
scales (see Appendix 5).
In addition, a common proxy for organizational innovativeness is R&D intensity
(Schoenecker, Daellenbach and McCarthy 1995). R&D intensity can be measured by
using a quantitative measure – R&D expenditures/sales (Schoenecker, Daellenbach
and McCarthy 1995), or a qualitative measure – categorical variable capturing the
degree to which a company is research-oriented (Coeurderoy and Murray 2008).
R&D intensity is not an appropriate measure for the current study because as a
general rule, small IT companies in transition environments do not allocate budgets
for  R&D.  Also,  the  R&D  intensity  of  an  organization  is  not  an  observable  variable
that can be easily evaluated by the legitimacy-granting audiences. Due to the above-
mentioned reasons, the item R&D expenditures received very low substantive
agreement and substantive-validity coefficients psa = 0.3 (<0,75) and csv =  -  0.3
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(<0,5). The same reasoning applies to the administrative innovativeness suggested by
Luk et al. (2008).
An appropriate external representation (or a signal) of a small IT firm’s
innovativeness  is  its  ability  to  develop  and  market  its  own product,  or  the  so-called
product-related innovativeness (Luk et al. 2008). Developing a product (i.e. ERP
system, anti-virus program, etc.) shows that the organization has mastered the
competencies related to its main business activity. Furthermore, it demonstrates the
capability of developing innovative solutions to solve and meet clients’ needs. Herein,
the manifest variable organizational innovativeness (coded as OWNPR) is
dichotomous taking the value of 1 when the company has its own product(s) and 0
when the company does not have its own product.
OWNPR = 1(if the company has its own product) and 0 (if the company does not have
its own product)
C) Managerial Competencies - Measurement
The educational and work background of the founding team members are the most
important characteristics influencing the management style in dealing with potential
clients.
There are many ways to measure the education and management competencies and
different studies capture different aspects of them. Some examples include top
management team industry experience measured as the average amount of time spent
working in a particular industry (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005), top management
functional diversity measured as the percentage of managers that have worked across
several functional areas (Boeker and Wiltbank 2005), level of education, business
education, managerial experience and industry experience measured as binary
variables (1/0) (McKelvie and Davidsson 2009).
For the purpose of this study, it is assumed that the managerial competencies of the
founding team members will be influenced if one or more members of the latter have
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Western or Western-like51 education and/or work experience. As it was mentioned
earlier, based on the low substantive agreement psa = 0.3 (<0,75) and even negative
substantive-validity coefficient csv = -0.3 (<0,5), the manifest variable business
education is not considered in the analysis. The interviewees did not see a direct link
between the type of education of the managers and their competencies.
Western or Western-like education and/or work experience impacts the attitude and
commitment exerted by small firms’ founding team members. Hence, herein, I would
like to capture the number of founding team members with Western or Western-like
education and/or work experience – a manifest variable called WEST.
The variable WEST is measured by the percentage of founding team members that
have acquired their education in a Western country and/or that have worked for
Western companies, including their subsidiaries in Bulgaria. The higher percentage of
founding team members with Western education/experience, the higher the
managerial capabilities since this captures the diversity of experiences. The latter
impacts positively the available stock of managerial knowledge and skills within an
organization.
WEST = (Number of founding team members with Western or Western-like education
and/or experience)/the total number of founding team members)*100
D) Organizational Competencies - Measurement
The organizational competencies examined in this research are related to the certified
partnerships of organizations as well as the organizational form. Indeed, certified
partnerships and organizational form are external representations (signals) of certain
task-related competencies.
In terms of affiliation with prominent industry players, I looked at the global IT
corporations which offer certified partnership programs – IBM, Microsoft, Oracle,
Macromedia,  Sun  and  others.  Since  organizations  vary  in  terms  of  the  number  and
level of partnership (registered, silver and golden), the variable PART is designed to
51 By Western-like, I mean an experience acquired by the founding team members in a subsidiary of a
Western company in Bulgaria.
212
reflect these two dimensions – the possession of a certificate and the level of
partnership. For simplicity, I adopted three level of partnerships – registered (the
lowest), silver (middle) and golden (the highest). In addition, different weights were
allocated to the three levels since the higher the level of partnership, the more
capabilities  a  company  has  to  prove  to  possess  in  order  to  be  granted  the  latter.  In
example, being a Registered Microsoft Partner means that the company only
distributes the products of Microsoft while being a Golden Microsoft Partner means
that the company’s employees went through a certification process and got Microsoft
certificates for the possession of certain skills. In addition, the higher the level of
partnership, the higher the technical support provided by the particular company that
granted the certificate. Hence, the following weights were allocated – 0.1 for
registered, 0.3 for silver and 0.6 for golden partner. And, the variable PART is
measured as follows:
PART = (# of Registered* 0.1 + # of Silver*0.3 + # of Golden*0.6)*100
The manifest variable organizational form (specialist versus generalist) was not
considered since the substantive agreement coefficient psa = 0,50 (<0,75) and the
substantive validity coefficient csv = 0,00 (<0,50). Even though according to
population ecologists (Hannan and Freeman 1977), the specialist form is preferable in
any environment, there was no one opinion among the interviewees regarding whether
following a specialist versus a generalist structure is better for small organizations in
transition environments. Hence, this manifest variable was disregarded in this
research.
E) Symbolic Reputational Competencies - Measurement
As it was mentioned earlier, awards are perceived as valid signals for superior
competencies of small organizations evolving in transition environment since they are
costly and observable.
Herein, I consider only the quality awards associated with superior product/service
offered to the clients, or in other words product and/or service awards. The item
managerial awards was excluded from the measurement model due to low values of
the proportion of substantive agreement coefficient psa = 0,3 (<0,75) as well as
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substantive validity coefficient csv = -0,3 (<0,5). The reason stated by the interviewees
is that the managerial awards signify an individual achievement rather than an
organizational one. In addition, some evidence exists in the literature that managerial
awards (such as CEO contests) does not affect firm’s profitability (accounting profits
and stock returns52) (Wade et al. 2006).
In comparison to managerial awards, quality awards were evaluated as follows –
proportion of substantive agreement coefficient psa =  1 and substantive validity
coefficient csv = 1. Hence, I decided to use the variable quality awards as representing
the symbolic reputational dimension of functional legitimacy latent construct. The
manifest variable AWARD was measured by the total number of quality
product/service awards that an organization received over the years of its existence. It
is  assumed  that  the  higher  the  number  of  awards,  the  higher  the  perceived  superior
task-related competency of the organization under scrutiny. Even though issues
related to corruptions of the institutions (associations, fairs, government bodies)
granting the awards were raised, the “stakeholders prefer organizations to be
publically evaluated even if the evaluative criteria are not completely comprehensive”
(Wade et al. 2006). Examples of quality awards include Best Product Award (from
fairs).
AWARD = total number of quality awards that an organization has received over the
years
In the next section, I follow the same stages as of functional legitimacy in presenting
the development of the formative latent construct of relational legitimacy.
6.3. Designing a Formative Measure for Relational Legitimacy
6.3.1. Content Specification
Similar to the development of the functional legitimacy construct, I drew on the
literature on organizational legitimacy, content analysis of the writings of the IT
organizations (brochures and websites) and interviews with industry experts and
52 Increased stock returns can be used as an indicator of enhanced legitimacy (Wade et al. 2006).
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academics in order to identify the dimensions of the relational legitimacy construct.
As it was mentioned earlier, this step ensures the content validity of the construct
(Helm 2005; Rossiter 2002).
Relational legitimacy is associated with the perceived worthiness of an organization
as an attractive partner (Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007). Relational legitimacy includes
valid signals of the worthiness of a partner based on the communication of two sets of
elements: partnership-related (trustworthiness including reliability) and organization-
specific (accountability, stability and visibility). Below, I specify the indicators of
each of the above-identified dimensions.
6.3.2. Indicator Specification
At this stage of the index construction process, a census of indicators is required for
formative construct specification (Bollen and Lennox 1991). I try to identify the items
that measure in the best possible way the different dimensions of relational legitimacy
identified based on the literature review - trustworthiness, stability, accountability and
visibility. As with the functional legitimacy, I keep in mind that while the dimensions
of the relational legitimacy construct are universal, the indicators (measurements)
chosen to represent each dimension are specific to the organizations under scrutiny.
Herein, a three-step approach was also undertaken. In the first stage, the researchers
looked at the writings of the IT organizations, such as brochures (the Bulgarian ICT
Profile @ CEBIT 2006) and websites in order to outline important signals of
relational legitimacy used by the organizations under scrutiny. We analyzed the
writings  in  the  CEBIT  brochure  of  17  companies  and  the  websites  of  a  total  of  32
companies. As a result, the researchers agreed upon the following items presented in
Table 14 pertaining to the relational legitimacy latent construct.
In the second stage, we tested for the importance of the items. For this purpose, we
asked the same 10 industry experts (as we did with functional legitimacy) to
determine the importance of each item on a 4-point scale.
In the third stage, in order to see whether an item taps into the construct, we asked 6
academics whether they will or not assign the items to the relational legitimacy
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construct (Anderson and Gerbing 1991).  As with functional legitimacy, participants
were provided with some background information on the organizations under scrutiny
(small IT firms) in transition environments, the definition of organizational legitimacy
in general  and the two types of legitimacy we regard for the purpose of this study –
functional and relational legitimacy. They were also explained the basics of the
formative latent variable construct. The results of the three stages of the process of






N1 1 2 3 4 N2 nc no psa csv
1 ISO Certificate Accountability 10 2 3 1 4 6 5 1 0,83 0,67
2 Capability Maturity Model Accountability 10 3 3 0 4 6 6 0 1 1
3 Age Stability 10 7 3 0 0 6 5 1 0,83 0,67
4 Client reputation Trustworthiness 10 7 2 1 0 6 6 0 1 1
5 Strategic alliances Trustworthiness 10 6 2 2 0 6 6 0 1 1
6 Number of refs Trustworthiness 10 4 1 3 2 6 3 3 0,5 0
7 Number of offices & HQ
location
Visibility 10 9 1 0 0 6 6 0 1 1
8 Website Visibility 10 5 3 1 1 6 5 1 0,83 0,67
Table 14: Importance and Assignment of Items to the Functional Legitimacy Latent
Construct
In Table 14, N1 – number of respondents for pretest on the importance of
characteristics; N2 – number of respondents for pretest on item assignment to
construct; nc – number of “correct” assignments; no – number of incorrect assignment
of an item to the construct. The proportion of substantive agreement psa = nc/N2. The
substantive-validity coefficient csv = (nc-no)/N2.
Only items with psa > 0.75 and csv > 0.5 have to be kept in the measurement model
(Helm 2005). Hence, the manifest variables number of references (psa = 0.5 and csv =
0.0) was excluded. We also excluded the manifest variables capability maturity model
and strategic alliances from the measurement model due to additional reasons. This is
explained in the next section where I look at all dimensions of relational legitimacy
and the respective items picked to represent or measure each dimension. Herein, for
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some dimensions, such as organizational visibility, more than one item is considered
since this dimension is a complex multidimensional construct itself.
A) Organizational Accountability
As it was mentioned earlier, organizational accountability is the ability of an
organization  to  account  rationally  for  its  actions  (Hannan  and  Freeman  1984).  It  is
related to both that it can document how resources have been used and to reconstruct
the sequences of organizational decisions, rules, and actions that produced particular
outcomes (Hannan and Freeman 1984).
In order to signal their accountability, small organizations in transition environments
can use certified standards. Two relevant certified standards were identified – the
quality management standard ISO 9001: 2000 (Terlaak and King 2007) and the
certified software development standard Capability Maturity Model Integration
(CMMI) (Davenport 2005). ISO 9001: 2000 is a type of standard that documents how
the resources have been used since it is a standard on the management process within
an organization. Being specific to the IT sector, the CMMI standard captures the
dimension of accountability related to following certain rules and standards in the
main business activity (i.e. software development). Even though the substantive
agreement psa = 1 and substantive validity coefficient csv = 1, I had to drop it from the
measurement model because I was not able to collect sufficient data on it. Only 3 out
of 95 IT companies reported that they have completed one or more levels of CMMI.
Hence, I measure the accountability dimension only by looking at ISO 9001.2000
standard.
ISO 9000 was created by the International Organization for Standardization (Terlaak
and King 2007). ISO 9000 is a quality certificate, which assures better documentation,
greater quality awareness by employees, enhanced internal communications,
increased operational efficiency and productivity, reduced scrap and rework expense,
and lower costs (Docking and Dowen 1999; Anderson, Daly and Johnson 1999). In
general, the costs associated with ISO certification varies from company to company
based on the size and the scope of the company but they are perceived to be high
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(Docking and Dowen 1999). It is more costly but at the same time more beneficial for
small firms to acquire ISO 9000 certification (Docking and Dowen 1999).
For the purpose of this study, the adoption of ISO 9000 is not coded as a binary
variable, which takes the value of “1” if the organization has an ISO certificate
(Terlaak and King 2007). Instead, I considered the number of years that a company
has had the ISO 9000 certificate for since the length of possession is expected to have
a direct influence on the management processes and practices within an organization
and therefore, its accountability. The longer a company had the certificate, the higher
the compliance with the set of required management practices. Companies certified
with ISO are subject to an ongoing evaluation by the third-party certificate-delivering
institutions. Thus, herein the manifest variable ISO is metric reflecting the number of
years of ISO possession:
ISO = number of years of possession of the certificate53
B) Organizational Stability
As it was mentioned earlier, organizational stability is associated with the existence of
certain routines within an organization. Organizational routines are not easily
observable and cannot be directly evaluated by interested constituencies. The latter
can use proxies implying that the routines are in place within an organization.  Herein,
only one measurement of organizational stability was considered– organizational age.
Age is an important attribute because it shapes “the internal ability and behavior of
firms while simultaneously interacting with the external environmental context to
shape the behavior and performance of firms (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010).
With age, an organization overcomes the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965).
This implies that the organization has developed certain rules, processes and roles
(routines) (Hannan and Freeman 1977) based on which its performance becomes more
reliable (Scott 2001). In transition environments, age is associated with the level of
53 If a company does not have an ISO 9000 certificate, the value of this variable was coded as 0. In
addition, if a company obtained the certificate in 2008 (the year of data collection), I still coded it as 1
even though the organization did not possess the certificate for one full year.
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firm’s relationships with institutions (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010). Due to
longevity of ties, older organizations are perceived to be more reliable (Freeman et al.
1983), and with higher legitimacy (Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010).
In general, the measurement of organizational age is very straightforward – number of
years (Baum and Oliver 1992; Deephouse 1996; Ruef and Scott 1998) or months
(Delmar and Shane 2004) since the organization has been founded (Delmar and Shane
2004 stated “initiated”) or legally incorporated.
Herein, I look at organizational age as the number of years since founding (Baum and
Oliver 1992) or since the entity was legally incorporated. I disregard the time when
the founders may have worked without having a registered company because when
presenting the company (to external audiences), the founding team can only mention
the age of the organization since its legal incorporation. This can be explained by the
fact that legally incorporated organization demonstrates stronger commitment by the
founders to build and maintain an ongoing organization (Singh, Tucker and House
1986: 176).
According to the Commercial Register Law (voted in 2006), all the Bulgarian
companies as well as the subsidiaries of foreign companies operating in Bulgaria have
to register again for a three-year period starting January 2008 (Commercial Register
Law). The Commercial Register is a centralized electronic database that contains
information on the actual status of all legally-incorporated entities in Bulgaria.
Initially, this information was available only in the regional courts. In order not to
confuse our respondents, in the questionnaire I specifically mentioned that I look for
the year of the initial registration (incorporation) of the company and not the year of
the company new registration (in compliance with the Commercial Register Law).
Hence, for the purpose of this study, organizational age is measured as:
AGE = number of years since the initial legal incorporation of the organization
C) Organizational Trustworthiness
Three items were considered to measure organizational trustworthiness as one of the
dimensions of relational legitimacy – client reputation, strategic alliances and number
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of references. I disregarded strategic alliances even though it received a substantive
agreement coefficient psa = 1 and substantive validity coefficient csv = 1 since most of
the alliances between small organizations in transition environments are opportunistic
and not formalized. Hence, it is difficult to observe them.
In addition, the other item considered number of references received very low psa =
0,50 and csv = 0,00 and  it  was  excluded  from  the  measurement  model  of  relational
legitimacy. The interviewees perceived references from past clients as being
important but they could hardly see a direct relationship between the total number of
references and organizational trustworthiness.
Hence, to measure the trustworthiness, I looked at organizational reputation based on
past performance. Since the content of firm’s reputation is information (Dollinger,
Golden and Saxton 1997), it can influence stakeholders’ economic choices regarding
a particular organization (Rindova et al. 2005), especially in incomplete information
settings (Dollinger, Golden and Saxton 1997).
Even though organizational reputation is a multi-dimensional construct, very often it
is measured in a unidimensional manner (Dollinger, Golden and Saxton 1997).
Herein,  one  indicator  is  also  used  to  capture  firm’s  reputation  –  client  reputation.  It
carries the reputational spill-over effect based on the clientele of an organization.
Client reputation (CLREP) is the informational (and emotional) content generated
based  on  the  company’s  past  projects  completed  with  domestic  and/or  international
clients.
The  client  reputation  of  an  organization  was  measured  as  a  function  of  the  level  of
operation of its clients. Four levels of operation were identified – local, local with
export activities, national and international. Local level of operation means that the
focal company operates only in the city where its headquarters (office) are located,
national level means that the market of the company is defined on a national level,
and international – that the company has expanded its operations internationally. In
addition, local with export activities means that market is locally defined but the
clients of the company have international activities. There is no clear cut between the
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three levels of operation and usually companies have clients on at least two levels.
Hence, I allocated different weights to the three above-mentioned layers of the
environment – local (0.1), local with export activities (0.2), national (0.3) and
international, such as a foreign subsidiary (0.4). The weights were allocated assuming
that the reputation of a company will go up if its clients move from local to
international  level.  Then,  the  number  of  companies  among  the  5  big  clients  was
multiplied by the particular weight depending on the environmental level on which
they function. In example, if among its 5 biggest clients a company had 1 local, 1
local with export activities, 2 national and one international, the equation looks as
follows:
CLREP = (0.1*1) + (0.2*1) + (0.3*2) + (0.4*1) = 1.3
D) Organizational Visibility
As it was mentioned earlier, in unstable environments, organizational visibility is an
important attribute that an organization has to build in order to communicate not only
its presence but also that “it is there to stay.” Similar to organizational legitimacy,
organizational visibility is a multidimensional construct. Initially, two organizational
attributes were identified in order to capture this dimension of relational legitimacy –
physical footprint (number of offices and location of headquarters) and virtual
footprint (website).
Physical capital resources are tangible or material resources, namely raw materials,
machines, equipment, buildings, production capacity, and geographic location
(Barney 1991). Grant (1991) perceived them as the input into the production process.
Herein, I look at the visible part of the physical capital resources, the one that can be
noticed and evaluated by the audiences. Hence, I call the physical resources physical
footprint. The physical footprint of a small IT organization operating in transition
environments includes the number of offices, or in other words all these physical
elements  (signals)  that  enhance  the  awareness  of  the  existence  of  the  firm  and  its
products/services. This way, the company can more easily become part of the clients’
consideration set (Pollock and Gulati 2007). The physical aspect of organizational
visibility  has  a  very  strong  legitimating  effect  since  it  represents  a  place  where  the
clients can have a direct contact with the organization.
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In addition to the physical footprint, a small organization in transition environments
may benefit from the virtual footprint.  By  virtual  footprint,  I  mean  creating  and
maintaining a company’s website. This is an observable and costly signal (especially
for a small organization), which enhances organizational visibility vis-à-vis its
evaluating audiences.
Physical and virtual footprints are in fact the physical and virtual assets of a small IT
firm. For the purpose of this study, I regard small organizations that have originated in
unstable environments and operate in fragmented sectors. This means that each and
every organization controls a small market share and it is visible to a limited number
of evaluating constituencies. Hence, the strategic decision regarding the number of
offices (NOFFICE) and the location (LOC) of the company’s headquarters (in terms
of the city) is very important since it impacts the number of constituencies exposed to
the company’s products/services. I decided to code only the location of the company’s
headquarters because it has a very huge impact on the overall definition of the
environmental layer on which a company functions. For example, if a company
decides to choose to compete on national level, it is very likely that its headquarters
will be based in the capital city.
It  is  important to note that the location strategy of each company is different.  Some
companies have a central office in the capital city and serve all their clients from
there. Other firms maintain a central office in the capital city and a number of regional
offices in order to be closer to their clients. And a third group decides to locate their
office(s) only outside the capital.
It is assumed that if the company’s headquarters is located in the capital city of Sofia,
its visibility will be higher in comparison to the other two options – big city (with
more than 100,000 inhabitants) or small city (less than 100,000 inhabitants). The
higher  visibility  is  due  not  only  to  the  size  of  the  capital  city  (more  than  2  million
inhabitants) and the concentration of business activity there but also due the
agglomeration  effect  based  on  the  concentration  of  the  IT  companies  themselves  in
Sofia. Thus, if a company’s headquarters is based in Sofia, I coded it as 3 (SOF=3), in
a big city as 2 (BIG=2), and in a small city as 1 (SMALL=1). Then, I multiplied the
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total  number  of  offices  to  the  weight  allocated  to  each  location.  The  higher  the
number received, the higher the number of potential constituencies the company is
exposed to, thus the higher its organizational visibility. For example if a company has
only one office in Sofia, it will receive a point of 3 (NOFFICE*LOC = 1*3 = 3),
where  1  represents  the  number  of  offices  (NOFFICE = 1)  and  3  the  location  of  the
headquarters (SOF=3).
NOFFICE*LOC54 = Total Number of Offices * Location of HQ (SOF=3, BIG = 2,
SMALL =1)
The virtual footprint is related to whether a company maintains a website
(WEBSITE). This variable is dummy (No=0, Yes=1). Surprisingly, not all companies
in the Bulgarian IT sector maintain their own websites. Usually, these are companies
that function on the local layer of the environment.
WEBSITE = 1(if yes) and 0 (if no)
In the previous two sections, I looked at the development of the formative constructs
of functional and relational legitimacy – the two independent latent variables in this
study. In the next section, I look at the development of the formative measurement
construct of the dependent variable organizational legitimacy.
6.4. Designing a Reflective Measure of Organizational Legitimacy
6.4.1. Organizational Legitimacy as a Continuous Dependent Variable
Building organizational legitimacy is a continuous process during which an
organization accumulates the required characteristics that fit the expectations of the
evaluating audiences. In this case, I look at this process of characteristics
accumulation and I compare companies in regard to their possession or not of certain
legitimacy-enhancing features. Hence, I compare organizations at one point in time
54 An underlying assumption when I measure visibility based on the location of the company’s
headquarters is that the location of the office in the city does not matter to enhance firm’s visibility. I
did not code whether the firm office is in the center of the city (which may have a positive effect on
firm’s visibility) or in the suburban area.
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based on their legitimacy stock. It is assumed that organizational legitimacy is a
continuous variable meaning that if compared organizations will be placed at a
different level of the continuum. Some organizations will be perceived as more
legitimate than others (Shepherd and Zacharakis 2003).
6.4.2. Organizational Legitimacy as a Reflective Latent Construct
The concept of organizational legitimacy indeed reflects two different aspects. From
one side, the focal organization is engaged in building its legitimacy through its
signaling efforts. From another side, interested stakeholders grant legitimacy based on
their interpretation of the signals (signaling theory of legitimacy). The organizations
claiming legitimacy base their efforts on expected common understanding and
interpretation of signals. Hence, signals are the building elements between the two
aspects of this multi-dimensional construct. These two aspects of legitimacy claiming
and legitimacy granting are reflected in the concept of organizational legitimacy and
its measurements.
On the side of the focal organizations (which in this case are SMEs evolving in
transition environments and trying to obtain long-term contracts), I identified the
legitimacy-claiming efforts based on signaling functional and relational legitimacy.
On  the  evaluating  audiences’  side,  I  look  at  the  relevant  stakeholder  groups,  in  this
case being the clients (the outsourcers), employees and distributors.
As Ruef and Scott (1998: 882) mentioned “all constituencies do not have equal weight
and their assessment do not have equal influence.” In transition environments where
the  old  institutional  framework  is  not  valid  anymore  and  the  new  one  has  not  been
developed yet, the support of the clients is a clear sign that an organization is
perceived to be legitimate. If an entity makes the decision to purchase the
products/services of another entity, it means the latter meets the requirements of the
former in the best possible way (Shepherd and Zacharakis 2003).
Besides the clients, I also consider the employees and the distributors as important
legitimacy-granting constituencies due to their direct involvement and high bargaining
power towards the organizations under scrutiny. The underlying assumption is that the
employees and the distributors make their decision to be associated with a particular
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organization based on the same signals of functional and relational legitimacy. In
terms of the employees, this can be explained by the fact that the market for highly-
qualified labor in transition environments experiences constant shortage. Hence, the
employees have a large pool of potential employers to choose from (and thus, high
bargaining power). Besides the pay, they take into consideration other criteria, such as
the resources and competencies of an organization and whether it is a reliable partner
since they are also concerned with the long-term potential of a job to provide them
with opportunities for future development.
The distributors of IT products/services are also directly involved and with high
bargaining power due to the high fragmentation of the sector. Therefore, they can
choose from a large set of organizations offering products/services in the IT sector.
Their evaluation will be based on the above-identified signals of functional and
relational legitimacy based on the nature of the product/service sold. The latter
assumes long-term arrangement between the buyer and the provider, hence the
distributors evaluate not only the product/services of a particular organization but also
their potential to assist clients in the long-run. In the current study, I had to drop this
variable due to lack of variance – only 10 out of 77 companies reported using
distributors.
Based on the direction of the causality from the latent construct to the items (manifest
variables), the dependent variable organizational legitimacy is measured through a
reflective construct that shows the stakeholder support. Or in other words, the higher
the legitimacy of an organization based on the stock of signals accumulated over the
years, the higher the support by stakeholders. The reflective latent construct of
organizational legitimacy is comprised of three manifest variables – number of
employees  (EMPLS)  and  number  of  clients  (NCLNTS).  Number  of  distributors
(NDISTR) was excluded from the analysis.
EMPLS = total number of employees
NCLNTS = number of current clients
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In addition, I brought the analysis a step further and tested the relationship
organizational legitimacy-profit-making ability of an organization. The latter is also a
latent variable construct.
6.5. Designing a Reflective Measure of Profit-Making Ability
Organizational legitimacy is viewed as a valuable resource, which organizations use
in order to gain access to other resources required for their activities (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). This way, organizations ensure their continuous adaptation and
survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Some authors go a step further and claim that
the additionally attracted resources based on the enhanced legitimacy influence
positively the profitability of an organization (Mazza 1999: 42). Therefore, the
ultimate sign of legitimate organization is its profit making ability (Mazza 1999: 42).
Based on this reasoning, I extended the analysis and tested the relationship between
organizational legitimacy and the profit-making ability of an organization. In this
case, the latter was measured by two reflective measures – average fee/hour (AVFEE)
and growth rate of the sales revenue for the year in which the data was collected in
comparison to the previous year (GRWTH).
AVFEE = average fee/hour for services rendered
GRWTH = growth rate in sales revenue (in %) in 2008 in comparison to 2007
The two measures are reflective because the higher the profit-making ability of a firm
(based on the accumulated legitimacy stock of signals), the higher the average
fee/hour it can allow itself to charge its customers. The same statement can be made
regarding the growth rate – the higher the legitimacy of an organization, the higher the
growth rate of its sales over a particular year.
To conclude, this chapter examines the specificities of SEM as a modeling technique.
A particular attention is paid to the formative latent constructs since the two
independent variables used in this research, namely functional and relational
legitimacy, are measured with formative indicators. The dependent latent variables of
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organizational legitimacy and profit-making ability of an organization are indeed
reflective constructs.
The chapter also looks at the process of indicator specification for the two formative
latent constructs of functional and relational legitimacy. One indicator was specified
to measure each of their dimensions since their measurement models are formative. In
addition, the measurement models of organizational legitimacy and profit-making
ability of an organization were also identified.
Once  the  measurements  are  specified,  as  a  next  step  (Chapter  7),  I  present  the
processes of data collection. As it was already mentioned, for the purpose of this
research data was collected from the Bulgarian IT sector. After the data was carefully
examined  and  cleaned,  the  PLS  statistical  analysis  was  performed  to  test  the  herein
proposed hypotheses. Based on the statistical analysis, the measurement and structural
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CHAPTER 7: DATA COLLECTION, DATA ANALYSIS AND
RESULTS
For this research, data was collected from the Bulgarian IT sector. Out of 311
companies contacted (225 via e-mail and 86 in person), representatives of 95
companies agreed to fill out the questionnaire. This corresponds to a response rate of
31%. After the consequent data examination and data cleaning, the final number of
observations came to a total of 77 companies.
In this chapter, I check for nomological and external validity of the two formative
latent  constructs,  which  indeed  are  stages  3)  and  4)  of  the  process  of  building
formative latent constructs (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). The first two
stages 1) content specification and 2) indicator specification were already discussed in
Chapter 6.  After checking for validity of the constructs, I proceed with the statistical
analysis. More precisely, partial least squares (PLS) was used to test the hypotheses
developed between the manifest variables and the latent constructs (the measurement
model) and between the latent constructs (the structural models).
The chapter is organized as follows. First, the process of data collection is explained
followed by the data cleaning procedures used to obtain a non-biased dataset. The
observations that have been excluded from the initial database were the ones that did
not meet the established criteria (B2B enterprises, foreign subsidiaries, previously
state-owned enterprises, etc.), observations with missing values on the manifest
variables  which  are  part  of  the  dependant  latent  construct  as  well  as  extreme values
(outliers) for the dependent manifest variables. Second, the data analysis starts with
checking for nomological and external validity of the two formative latent constructs
part of the research model. Third, the statistical analysis is performed by using PLS
as the most appropriate SEM technique for the purpose of this study.
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1. Data Collection and Data Examination
The data for this research was collected through face-to-face interviews and via e-
mail. The respondents were asked to answer 30 questions, part of a structured
questionnaire (see Appendix 7A and 7B). Their comments on the questions asked, the
answers provided as well as general comments on the state of the IT sector in Bulgaria
were carefully recorded. The e-mails were written and the interviews were conducted
in Bulgarian language. The questionnaire was translated from English to Bulgarian by
the main researcher. Then, it was back-translated into English (by a professor in
Bulgarian and English literature) in order to assure that the meaning of all questions is
kept intact (Filatotchev et al. 2000; Shinkle and Kriauciunas 2010). The original
English version was compared to the double-translated version (Shinkle and
Kriauciunas 2010) and it was discovered that the general sense of the questions did
not change.
1.1. Sample
I used the list of companies included in the IDG company catalogue (www.idg.bg).
IDG is a Bulgarian IT portal for news, services and prices. Its news bulletin is highly
valued among the Bulgarian IT experts. In addition, the IDG company catalogue is the
most representative catalogue of the ICT (Information and Communication
Technology) companies in Bulgaria.
In the IDG Catalogue, the companies are divided in 4 categories – Hardware,
Software,  Networks  and  Communication,  and  Services.  Only  the  category  Software
was considered with its 526 company entries falling into 13 groups (see Table 15). I
chose only one category because of the existing overlap among the company entries,
meaning that a company can be present in more than one category.
IDG COMPANIES IN CATEGORY 'SOFTWARE' #
Distribution Software 78
Standard Software Development 49
Customized Software 60
GIS Applications & distribution 13
CAD/CAM/CAE 23
Multimedia 38









Table 15: IDG Catalogue - IT Companies in the Software Category
It is important to note that one company can belong to one or more than one sub-
group in the Software Category. Thus, having in mind the overlap, the total number of
companies was reduced to 461. Moreover, additional 150 companies were excluded











Contact Info - Not Found 14
Main activity - not IT 27
New Company (<1 year old) 1
TOTAL 150
Table 16: Reasons for Exclusion of Companies
Hence, from the initial list of companies, I was left with only 311 firms. I proceeded
by contacting 225 of them by e-mail.  Due to the low expected response rate (3% to
4% as it was reported by one Bulgarian IT association), the researcher also attempted
to contact some of the companies personally by conducting face-to-face interviews.
Information  on  the  companies  contacted  by  e-mail  and  in  person  as  well  as  the









TOTAL companies considered 461
Total companies did not meet criteria 150
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Total companies that met the criteria 311
Total companies contacted via e-mail 225 21 9%
TOTAL in person 86 75 87%
TOTAL SET 311 95 31%
Table 17: Data Collection and Response Rates
Table 17 shows that the response rate was 9% when an e-mail with the questionnaire
attached was sent to potential respondents. One should keep in mind that the e-mail
was  sent  only  to  one  company  at  a  time.  It  was  also  personalized  and  sent  to  the
director and/or owner of the company if his/her name and contact information were
indicated on the company’s website. The message was written in Bulgarian language
and the name of the company was mentioned in the body of the e-mail (see Appendix
1A  and  1B).  In  addition,  a  reminder  e-mail  was  sent  one  month  later.  Overall,  this
resulted in a response rate of 9%, which is higher than previously reported response
rates in Bulgaria for online surveys – 3%-4%.
As expected, the response rate of the companies that were personally contacted was
much higher – 87% of the companies approached agreed to fill out the questionnaire.
The companies were contacted directly in their offices or at the International Plovdiv
Fair held in October 2008 (Plovdiv) and at the BAIT Expo held in November 2008
(Sofia).
In total, 95 questionnaires were filled out, which corresponds to an overall response
rate of 31% (see Table 17).
One of the concerns that can be raised is the nonresponse bias – the companies that
filled out the questionnaire may be different from the ones that refused to do so
(Armstrong and Overton 1977). There are several methods suggested to overcome the
nonresponse bias – comparison with known values for the population, subjective
estimates and/or extrapolation method (based on the assumption that subjects that
respond less readily are more like the nonrespondents) (Armstrong and Overton
1977). Keeping in mind the data collected and that the unit of analysis is the
organization, none of these remedies can be applied here.
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One remedy though that can help shed some light on the issue whether there is a
difference between the companies that responded and the ones that did not is to divide
and compare the dataset based on the way the data was collected – via personal
interviews and via e-mail. It seems that the sub-sample of companies that responded
personally is more representative of the population of companies due to its higher
response rate - 87%. The t-tests (Appendix 8) show that there is no difference along
the  various  items  besides  one  –  ISO  certificates.  It  seems  that  companies  that  were
contacted via e-mail on average report more ISO certificates than the companies that
were contacted personally. This can be explained by the fact that if they are part of a
catalogue and maintain a website, they most likely function on the
national/international layer where the ISO signal might be more meaningful. Based on




After the data collection process was concluded, the data was cleaned. As a result,
seven of the completed questionnaires were excluded from the dataset. This reduced
the overall number of observations to 88. In the table below, an explanation is




1 #7 B2C provider of IT services
2 #19 Subsidiary of a Russian company
3 #23 Wholesale provider of Internet
4 #48 Subsidiary of a US company
5 #52 Insufficient information provided (8 out of 30 questions filled out)
6 #58 Subsidiary of a US company
7 #63 Main business activity – clothing
Table 18: Data Cleaning – Reasons for Exclusion of Companies
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After checking for missing values, more companies were excluded from the final
database. In the section below, I present the missing data issues and the remedies
undertaken in order to minimize its effect on the statistical analysis.
1.2.2. Missing Data
As Hair et al. (1998: 46) pointed out “missing data are a fact of life in multivariate
analysis.” For the purpose of this research, I collected primary data through surveys
and as expected, I did encounter the missing data problem. Since missing data can
bias the statistical analysis and affects the generalizability of the results (Studenmund
2001), some actions were undertaken in order to address the issues raised by it.
Part of the data was completed by looking at the documents provided by the IT
companies registered with the Commercial Register. All Bulgarian companies are
supposed to register in the Commercial Register by 2011 according to the
Commercial Law. Unfortunately, at the time of the data collection, not all IT
companies were part of the Register. Some data on sales growth, number of total
founding managers and company age for several companies was compiled from this
Register.
In  addition,  some  data  was  collected  from  the  websites  of  the  companies  under
scrutiny. Since I address the issues of signaling, valuable signals, such as number of
offices  and  number  of  distributors,  are  expected  to  be  presented  on  the  companies’
website.
Even if some of the data was additionally collected, there were still some missing
values. According to Cohen et al. (2003), the researcher has to address the missing
data problem by looking at the reasons since the course of action depends on the
latter. Before checking for the randomness of the missing data, I looked at whether the
occupation of the respondent had anything to do with the level of missing data. Thus,
the chi-square was calculated by comparing the three groups of respondents and the
level of missing data per each (Howell 2004). The chi-square value showed that there
was no significant difference between the number of missing values provided by the
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three groups of respondents – (1) founder/owner, (2) manager or (3) other (software
engineer, secretary) in terms of the data provided (see Appendix 9A).
In the dataset, there were 18 variables (some of which were composite measures) and
88 observations. In total, 3.29% of the data was missing. The missing values were
mainly  distributed  over  three  variables  –  (1)  average  fee/hour  (AVFEE)  -  a
measurement of the profit-making potential of an organization (2) growth rate
(GRWTH) – a measurement of the profit-making potential of an organization, and (3)
number of clients (NCLNTS) – a measurement of organizational legitimacy.
Even though there is no reason to think that the missing data is nonrandom, I used one
of the methods described by Hair et al. (1998: 50) to check for its randomness. Except
one variable (WEBSITE, coded as dummy 1- the company has a website and 0 – no
website), the rest of the variables were metric. Thus, as suggested by Hair et al.
(1998), there were two groups formed – the group with missing values versus the
group with  valid  data  entries.  Then,  I  compared  the  two groups  across  all  the  other
variables by performing two-sampled t-tests assuming unequal variances (see
Appendix 9B, 9C and 9D). The t-test assuming unequal variances is a more
conservative t-test in comparison to the one with equal variances (Howell 2004).
The t-tests55 between the group of companies that provided the information on their
number of clients (NCLNTS) and the group of companies that did not provide
information show that there were no statistically significant differences across the
different variables besides one variable – size of the company (see Appendix 9B). The
latter means, on average, larger organizations were more willing to provide
information on their number of clients than smaller organizations.
The t-tests between the group of companies that provided information on the average
fee/hour (AVFEE) and the one that did not show that there were no statistically
significant differences across the different variables besides one variable – number of
quality awards. On average the group that provided information on the average
fee/hour had more quality awards than the group that did not (see Appendix 9C).
55 All the t-tests were two-tailed with significance level of 5%.
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Four t-tests turned to be statistically significant when I compared the group of
companies with missing values of the growth rate (GRWTH) and the group of
companies with valid data entries. The t-tests for client reputation, award,
partnerships, and number of employees showed significant differences. Organizations
that revealed information on their growth rate were the ones that showed higher client
reputation, number of quality awards, partnerships and employees. It was assumed
that firms with better positioning were not afraid to provide information on their
growth rate (see Appendix 9D).
In addition, in terms of the observations, there were two cases where 21% (4
variables)  of  the  data  was  missing.  First,  I  deleted  the  offending  cases  where
information on the manifest variables part of the dependent latent construct
organizational legitimacy (number of clients, number of employees and number of
distributors) was not provided by the respondent (Hair et al. 1998: 52). The total
number  was  10  observations  that  were  deleted  from  the  database.  Fortunately,  with
this operation the two cases with 21% of the data missing (# 19 and # 73) were also
dropped from the dataset. Thus, the overall number of observation was reduced to 78
companies and the overall missing data went down from 3.29% to 2.29% of the data.
Second, by looking at the missing data again, it was obvious that most of it was
concentrated over 2 variables – average fee/hour (AVFEE) and sales growth rate
(GRWTH) with 22% (19 entries) and 13% (11 entries), respectively56. In this case,
some estimation of the missing values could have been done. Hence, the entries with
missing values were not deleted. The refusal of the respondents to provide values for
these two variables is due to the sensitive character of the information demanded.
Some of the competitive advantage of the companies in the Bulgarian IT sector is
based on their pricing strategy, thus providing information on their average fee/hour is
perceived to be confidential. Similar explanation can be provided regarding the
growth rate since it is related to the company’s past performance.
The missing values of AVFEE and GRWTH were replaced with estimated values
based on the information available in the sample (Hair et al. 1998). Among all the
56 In terms of the observations, the missing values were spread over the cases and there was no case
with more than 10% missing values. Thus, I did not consider further deleting cases.
236
replacement methods discussed in the literature (Cohen et al. 2003; Hair et al. 1998),
the mean substitution method turned to be the most appropriate one since information
on another nonsampled observation (case substitution) and constant value derived
from external sources (cold deck imputation) was not collected. Thus, I replaced the
missing values with the mean value of the particular variable (Hair et al. 1998).
A) Average Fee/Hour
Almost 1/4th of the respondents refused to provide this information since they
considered it confidential. Thus, I substituted the missing values with the
corresponding such depending on the level of operation of the focal company (see
Table 19). The layer on which a company operates affects the average fee/hour – i.e.
companies engaged in international outsourcing charge more than companies engaged
mainly with local and/or national clients. Hence, if a company operates mainly on a
local level (> 50% of the sales comes from the respective layer), I calculated the
average fee/hour for the group of all companies operated on this layer of the
environment and I substituted the latter with it.
B) Growth Rate
In terms of the missing values of the growth rate of the company, I calculated the
average growth rate for companies per level of operation (see Table 19) and
substituted the missing values with it.
IMPUTATION METHOD: MEAN SUBSTITUTION
Mean Values




Table 19: Imputation Method - Mean Substitution
In addition to the missing data, I also checked the data for extreme values or outliers,
which is presented in the section below.
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1.2.3. Outliers
For the purpose of this study, a univariate perspective for identifying outliers was
adopted. It looks at the distribution of the variables (Hair et al. 1998). The outliers are
perceived to be those cases that are at the outer ranges (Hair et al. 1998). All the
values in the database were standardized (Hair et al. 1998) by calculating the z-scores
for the 13 metric variables57 (Howell 2004: 108) (see Appendix 2). For small samples
(80 or less observations), the guidelines suggest that one perceives as outliers cases
whose z-scores exceed a level of ±2.558 (Hair et al. 1998). Following the univariate
procedure, I identified a total of 21 outliers keeping in mind that there was an overlap
between some cases (see Table 20).
Table 20: Univariate Procedure for Outlier Identification
Table 20 shows that almost all variables (except WEST, CLREP, AVFEE, and AGE)
demonstrate some extreme values. I investigated the 21 outliers by looking at the
completed questionnaires for data entry mistakes. All of them corresponded to the
values indicated by the respondents. Since no observations were extreme on a
sufficient number of variables, it was assumed that there is no reason to think that
these values cannot correspond to population values (Hair et al. 1998).
57 Total  of  16  variables  are  metric.  Two are  categorical  –  whether  the  company has  its  own product
(OWNPR) and whether it has a website (WEBSITE).















AWARD 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 61,63,72
ISO 3 1 1 0 0 0 5   32,63,65,66,81
PART 0 1 1 0 0 0 2   57,86
ASSOC 0 2 0 1 0 0 3   55,66,86
WEST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CLREP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NCLNTS 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 17
AVFEE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GRWTH 5 0 1 0 0 0 6   18,20,45,68,75,77
AGE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EMPLS 0 0 3 0 0 0 3   31,37,66
NOFFICE*LOC 1 0 1 0 0 1 3   24,31,37
NDISTR 0 0 1 0 0 1 2   17,51
Total 14 4 9 1 0 4 28
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Nevertheless, particular attention was paid to the observations of 5 s.d. or higher,
which  came to  total  of  4  observations.  Regarding  the  number  of  clients  (NCLNTS),
which is a manifest variable part of the dependent formative latent construct of
organizational legitimacy, the extreme value belongs to company # 17. The data entry
is  correct  and  clearly  stated  on  the  advertising  materials  of  the  company.  Since  this
variable is part of the dependent latent construct of organizational legitimacy, I
excluded it from the final dataset
It is important to note that the profile of the excluded company is not typical for the
Bulgarian  IT  industry.  There  was  another  company  with  a  similar  profile  whose
representative was also interviewed but who did not provide information regarding the
company’s clients. This company was excluded earlier in the data examination
process. These companies follow a rather different strategy since they support large
structures and have very diverse modules of business process software and ERP
systems.  To  the  extent  of  the  researchers’  knowledge,  such  diversity  in  terms  of
product offering is not typical for most SMEs in the Bulgarian IT sector.
Regarding the number of distributors (NDISTR), the extreme value belongs to
company # 51. Some SMEs in the Bulgarian IT sector rely on a network of
distributors to build their market presence. Hence, this profile of companies exists at
the market.
The outliers regarding number of awards (AWARD) and number of offices and their
location (NOFFICE*LOC) were kept because they are valid data entries and they are
representative of a certain profile of Bulgarian IT companies.
Hence, based on the univariate procedure for outlier identification, companies # 17
was excluded from the database. As a result, the final number of observations used for
the purpose of this study is 77.
The descriptive statistics of the manifest variables used in this study are presented in
Table 21. The indicators are presented in alphabetical order.
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Indicator N Mean Min Max Std.Dev.
AGE 77 9,5455 0 19 5,2504
ASSOC 77 0,6104 0 5 1,0151
AVFEE 77 41,5974 3 400 46,7430
AWARD 77 0,5455 0 10 1,5857
CLREP 77 5,0260 1 10 2,8699
EMPLS 77 31,3117 2 250 54,7317
GRWTH 77 0,5267 0 2,5 0,5269
ISO 77 0,8571 0 9 2,1319
NCLNTS 77 367,3377 4 5200 1005,4306
NDISTR 77 6,4286 0 275 32,8154
NOFFICE*LOC 77 4,5065 1 36 6,0516
OWNPR 77 0,6104 0 1 0,4909
PART 77 42,5974 0 260 58,2057
WEBSITE 77 0,7792 0 1 0,4175
WEST 77 48,4459 0 200 66,4428
Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Manifest Variables.
2. Data Analysis
The formative latent constructs require a check for multicollinearity between the items
which comprise each construct (Henseler et al. 2009). In addition, the formative latent
constructs  have  to  be  tested  for  external  validity  (Henseler et al. 2009). Indeed,
checking for multicollinearity and external construct validity represent the third and
fourth stage of the four-step procedure of building formative latent constructs59
(Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). In the following section, I look at the two
stages in their respective order.
2.1. Formative Latent Constructs – Stages III and IV
2.1.1. Multicollinearity
As it was mentioned earlier, collinearity is an expression of the relationship between
two (collinearity) or more (multicollinearity) independent variables (Cohen et al.
2003). When multicollinearity exists among the indicators of a formative latent
59 The first stage in the formative latent construction process is Content Specification which includes
the definition of the construct itself (Helm 2005). The second stage is Indicator Specification when the
researcher  is  required  to  identify  a  census  of  indicators  in  order  to  capture  all  dimensions  of  the
formative latent construct (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). The Content Specification stage
was completed in chapter 3, Part I. The Indicator Specification stage was completed in chapter 2, Part
II.
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construct, it becomes difficult to assess the individual contributions of each indicator
(Fornell et al. 1991: 317). In formative latent constructs, any unnecessary redundancy
has  to  be  avoided  (Rossiter  2002),  implying  that  some  of  the  indicators  have  to  be
excluded from the construct (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006).
One way to check for multicollinearity among indicators is to use the variance
inflation factor (VIF) (Cohen et al. 2003: 423). In order to calculate VIF for the items
comprising the functional and relational legitimacy constructs, I used the software
package STATISTICA (StatSoft, Inc.). The results are presented in the table below:














Table 22: Collinearity Statistics for Terms in the Equation
From Table 22, it can be concluded that multicollinearity between the items
comprising the two formative latent constructs – functional and relational legitimacy –
is below the common cut-off level of 10 (Cohen et al. 2003; Hair et al. 1998). This
means that multi-collinearity should not pose a problem for the statistical analysis in
this research. As a result, all the items were kept in the model.
2.1.2. External Construct Validity
Checking for external validity of the two constructs is the forth and the last stage of
the formative index construction process (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). As
it was mentioned earlier, a way to check for the external validity of an entire construct
is when it is induced in a wider nomological context and linked to another reflective
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construct with which it is expected to be linked (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer
2001). If the construct has the theoretically hypothesized relationship with the other
construct, the nomological validity of the measurement model is confirmed (Helm
2005).
Following Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001), the two formative constructs – the
independent latent variables functional and relational legitimacy – were inserted in a
larger nomological context by separately linking them to the latent variable
organizational legitimacy measured by two manifest variables – number of employees
(EMPLS) and number of clients (NCLNTS) (Appendices 10A and 10B).
It is important to note that organizational legitimacy represents a reflective construct
meaning that the direction of causality goes from the latent construct to the manifest
variables (Bollen and Lennox 1991). Or in other words, the indicators are the
dependent variables and the latent construct is the explanatory variable
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler and Roth 2008). In this case, it is theoretically justified to
expect that organizations with higher functional and relational legitimacy will
demonstrate higher organizational legitimacy.
Indicator Description Variable Weight t-value p-value
FUNCTIONAL LEGITIMACY
X1 Association Membership ASSOC 0,4270 2,6560 0,0080
X2
Organization
Innovativeness OWNPR 0,3340 3,3336 0,0009
X3
Manager's Western
Education WEST 0,1660 1,6022 0,1094
X4
Prestigious Industry
Affiliates PART 0,5000 2,9386 0,0034
X5 Awards AWARD 0,1340 1,0179 0,3090
ORGANIZATIONAL
LEGITIMACY
Number of employees EMPLS 0,9730 42,1539 0,0000
Number of clients NCLNTS 0,4880 3,2027 0,0014
Path Coefficients Description Variable Weight t-value p-value
Functional Legitimacy FL 0,7230 15,1805 0,0000
Table 23: PLS Output on Testing for Nomological Validity of Functional Legitimacy
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Indicator Description Variable Weight t-value p-value
RELATIONAL LEGITIMACY
X6 Certified Standards ISO 0,2260 2,7100 0,0068
X7 Age AGE 0,4140 4,8385 0,0000
X8 Client Reputation CLREP 0,4910 6,2890 0,0000
X9 Physical Footprint NOFFICE*LOC 0,3080 4,0685 0,0001
X10 Virtual Footprint WEBSITE 0,0320 0,4756 0,6345
ORGANIZATIONAL
LEGITIMACY
Number of Employees EMPLS 0,8630 28,9443 0,0000
Number of Clients NCLNTS 0,7230 8,6205 0,0000
Path Coefficients Description Variable Weight t-value p-value
Relational Legitimacy RL 0,8170 23,3938 0,0000
Table 24: PLS Output on Testing for Nomological Validity of Relational Legitimacy
The two path coefficients (Functional Legitimacy ? Organizational Legitimacy and
Relational Legitimacy? Organizational Legitimacy) are significant at p = 0.01.  The
t-value of the path coefficient of functional legitimacy when linked to organizational
legitimacy reflective construct separately is t=15,1805 (see Table 23). The t-value of
the relational legitimacy when linked to organizational legitimacy reflective construct
separately is t=23,3938 (see Table 24). This means that the two formative latent
constructs demonstrate the theoretically hypothesized relationship proving their
nomological validity.
3. Results
The input EXCEL matrix is presented in Appendix 11.
As it was mentioned earlier, the SEM technique employed for the purpose of this
study is PLS. The software package used is smartPLS 2.0 (M3) (Ringle, Wende and
Will 2005). In order to get the indicator weights and path coefficients, I used the
computational option given under the PLS algorithm (with maximum iterations of
300). In order to get the t-values, I used the bootstrapping option (based on 1,000
samples) in smartPLS software package. P-values were calculated based on the t-
values with EXCEL.
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The results after running the PLS algorithm are presented in Fig.12.
Fig. 12: PLS Algorithm Output
After running the bootstrapping calculation option of smartPLS, I was able to obtain
the  t-values  of  the  indicator  (outer)  weights  presented  in  Table  25.  Based  on  the  t-
values, p-values were calculated in EXCEL using the function TDIST (t-value, d.f., 2-
tailed). The results of the data analysis are presented in the table below. The indicators
whose weights are significant at p=0.10 are highlighted.
Indicator
Desc




X1 Association Membership ASSOC 0,4510 2,8704 0,0042
X2
Organization
Innovativeness OWNPR 0,4000 3,7231 0,0002
X3
Manager's Western
Education WEST 0,1440 1,2584 0,2085
X4
Prestigious Industry
Affiliates PART 0,4300 2,5518 0,0109
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X5 Awards AWARD 0,1450 0,9782 0,3282
RELATIONAL LEGITIMACY
X6 Certified Standards ISO 0,2690 3,0839 0,0021
X7 Age AGE 0,3610 4,3870 0,0000
X8 Client Reputation CLREP 0,4650 5,9374 0,0000
X9 Physical Footprint NOFFICE*LOC 0,3300 4,8010 0,0000
X10 Virtual Footprint WEBSITE 0,0570 0,8676 0,3858
ORGANIZATIONAL
LEGITIMACY
X11 Number of Employees EMPLS 0,9150 36,2905 0,0000
X12 Number of Clients NCLNTS 0,6390 5,7908 0,0000
PROFIT-MAKING POTENTIAL
X13 Average Fee/Hour AVFEE 0,9700 26,8932 0,0000
X14 Growth Rate GRWTH 0,4050 2,0763 0,0381
Path Coefficients Description Variable Weight t-value
p-
value
FL – OL FL 0,2760 3,4178 0,0007
RL – OL RL 0,6490 8,0293 0,0000
OL - PROFIT-MAKING OL 0,4510 6,1704 0,0000
Table 25: PLS Output on Outer Weights and Path Coefficients
The statistical analysis above shows that not all hypotheses have been supported. In
Table 26, I present the results of the hypotheses testing.
H1 : The higher the functional legitimacy of an organization, the higher itsorganizational legitimacy.
V
H2 : The higher the relational legitimacy of an organization, the higher itsorganizational legitimacy.
V
H3: H 3: The higher the organizational legitimacy, the higher the profit-making potential of an organization.
V
H4 :
Organizational characteristics signaling superior informational
competencies will affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs
evolving in transition environments.
V
H5:
Organizational characteristics signaling superior managerial
competencies of founding team members will affect positively the
functional legitimacy SMEs evolving in transition environments.
NV
H6:
Organizational characteristics signaling superior organizational
competencies will affect positively the functional legitimacy of SMEs
evolving in transition environments.
V
H7:
Organizational characteristics signaling firm’s innovativeness will




Organizational characteristics signaling symbolic reputational





Organizational characteristics signaling organizational




Organizational characteristics signaling organizational accountability




Organizational characteristics signaling organizational stability will




Organizational characteristics signaling organizational visibility
(physical footprint) will enhance the relational legitimacy of SMEs
evolving in transition environments.
V
H12b:
Organizational characteristics signaling organizational visibility
(virtual footprint) will enhance the relational legitimacy of SMEs
evolving in transition environments.
NV
Table 26: Results of Hypotheses Testing
The assessment of the measurement and structural models are presented in detail in
the following section.
3.1. Assessing the Measurement Models
The assessment of the measurement model is based on the tests performed as part of
the formative latent variable construction process. These tests include
multicollinearity, external and nomological validity performed as part of stages 3) and
4) in the 4-step procedure of formative latent variable construction (Diamantopoulos
and Winklhofer 2001).
In  addition,  the  sign  and  the  weights  of  the  indicators  are  also  used  to  evaluate  the
formative latent measurement models (Helm 2005). The weights provide information
on what the make-up and relative importance of the indicator is in the formation of the
formative construct (Chin 1998; Helm 2005).  Based on the results presented in Table
25, the assessment of the measurement models is discussed below.
3.1.1. Functional Legitimacy Formative Latent Construct
Table 25 shows that all indicators of the functional legitimacy formative construct
besides product/service awards (AWARD) and Western education/experience of
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founding team members (WEST) are positive and significant at p = 0.05. This implies
that hypotheses H4, H6, H7 are supported at p = 0.05.
The indicator product/service awards AWARD has t=0,9782 and corresponding
p=0,3282 (> 0,10), which shows that hypothesis H8 is not supported. This means that
the  number  of  product/service  awards  still  enhances  the  functional  legitimacy  of  an
organization (due to the positive sign of the indicator) but the effect is not statistically
significant.
The indicator Western and/or Western-like education/experience of founding team
members (WEST) has t=1,2584 and a corresponding p=0,2085 (>0,10), showing that
hypothesis H5 is not supported. This means that Western education/experience of
founding team members still affects in a positive way the functional legitimacy of an
organization but the effect is not statistically significant.
3.1.2. Relational Legitimacy Formative Latent Construct
Table  25  shows  that  four  indicators  (ISO,  AGE,  CLREP  and  NOFFICE*LOC)
comprising the relational legitimacy formative construct are statistically significant
not only at p=0,10 but also at p=0,05. This means that hypotheses H9, H10 and H11
and H12a are supported.
The indicator showing whether a company has a website or not (WEBSITE) has
t=0,8676 and corresponding p=0,3858 (> 0,10). This means that hypothesis H12b is
not  supported.  The  indicator  WEBSITE  indeed  measures  a  sub-dimension  of  the
manifest variable organizational visibility, for which there is another measure
NOFFICE*LOC. WEBSITE measures the virtual footprint dimension of
organizational visibility while NOFFICE*LOC measures the physical footprint.
3.1.3. Organizational Legitimacy Reflective Latent Construct
In the reflective measurement model of organizational legitimacy, the indicators
number  of  clients  (NCLNTS)  and  number  of  employees  (EMPLS)  are  positive  and
statistically significant at p=0,5.
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3.1.4. Profit-Making Ability Reflective Latent Construct
In the reflective measurement model of profit-making potential, the indicators average
fee/hour  (AVFEE)  and  growth  rate  of  sales  revenue  (GRWTH)  are  positive  and
statistically significant at p=0,05.
There is no clear answer in the literature on how to handle indicators which are not
statistically significant (Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer 2001). Henseler et al. (2009:
302) state that “formative indicators should never be discarded simply on the basis of
statistical outcomes.” The reason is that if insignificant indicators are excluded, the
content of the latent construct may be altered (Jarvis et al. 2003). Hence, the
researcher should keep both significant and insignificant formative indicators as long
as they can find theoretical justification for this (Henseler et al. 2009). In addition, the
PLS structural model estimates almost do not change when the insignificant highly
collinear indicators are excluded (Henseler et al. 2009). This specificity of PLS as a
SEM technique provides additional support for the decision to keep the insignificant
formative indicators in the measurement model (Henseler et al. 2009).
3.2. Assessing the Structural Model
According to Henseler et al. (2009), the structural model can be evaluated based on
the following criteria – the coefficient of determination (R2), the individual path
coefficients  in  terms  of  their  sign,  magnitude  and  significance  as  well  as  the  effect
size (f2) which shows whether a predictor latent variable has a weak, medium or large
effect on structural level.
In this case, the coefficient of determination R2 = 0,720 for organizational legitimacy,
which means that 72% in the variation of this latent variable can be explained by the
signals of functional and relational legitimacy used by an organization. According to
Chin (1998), this level of R2 is substantive since it is higher than the threshold level of
0,67.
In  addition,  the  two  path  coefficients  of  the  functional  and  relational  legitimacy
formative latent constructs are positive and significant at p=0,05. The path coefficient
of the functional legitimacy construct has an inner weight of 0.276 (t=3,4178,
p=0,0007). The path coefficient of the relational legitimacy construct has an inner
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weight of 0,649 (t=8,0293, t=0,0000). Hence, hypotheses H1 and H2 are supported at
p=0.05 showing that signaling functional and relational legitimacy enhances the
organizational legitimacy of small organizations in transition environments.
The effect size (f2) of each of the independent variables (functional and relational
legitimacy) on the dependent variable organizational legitimacy can be calculated
(Cohen 1988). The effect size of the independent latent construct functional
legitimacy is f2 = 0,23, while the effect size of the second independent latent construct
relational legitimacy is much larger f2 = 0,72.  Hence,  the  signals  of  relational
legitimacy have much larger impact on the stakeholders’ decision to grant legitimacy
to a particular organization.
As it was mentioned earlier, I went a step further and tested the relationship
organizational legitimacy-profit-making ability of an organization. The coefficient of
determination for the profit-making ability is R2 = 0,203.  Even though this level of R2
is weak (Chin 1998), it shows that 20,3% of the variation in this latent variable can be
explained by organizational legitimacy measured as the support by two important
stakeholder groups – employees and clients.
To conclude, the results of the statistical analysis show that the functional legitimacy
of a small organization in transition environment mainly depends on the company’s
innovativeness, its access to industry information as well as the prestigious certified
partnerships granted by global industry leaders. In highly dynamic sectors, being able
to innovate sends an important signal that the company will exert an effort in potential
partnerships. Having an access to the newest information is appreciated by the
evaluating audiences since it ensures the adequate actions of the organization under
scrutiny. The effect is augmented for organizations evolving in transition
environments characterized by very high rate of change and instability. The
legitimacy imported from the established global players based on certified
partnerships is also highly appreciated by the stakeholders. The latter perceive the
prestigious affiliates as being able to make better decisions on who to associate with.
The relational legitimacy of small organizations in transition environment is mainly
based on client reputation, the physical footprint of the company and its age. Client
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reputation emphasizes the trustworthiness of an organization as a partner and hence, it
is highly valued by the legitimacy-granting constituencies. Physical footprint
represents the access points between the relevant stakeholders and the organization
and it is an attribute that evaluating audiences in transition environments place high
relative importance on. The reason is that being able to contact an entity increases the
perception of reliability of the focal organization. In addition, organizational age,
which conveys stability, is also highly valued by the constituencies due to the high
volatility of the environment in transition. In addition, evaluating audiences appreciate
organizations that are accountable for their internal processes the external
representation of which can be different management standards (ISO, etc.).
Overall,  the  results  show  that  signaling  functional  and  relational  legitimacy  is
important for small organizations in transition environments in order to get the
support of the evaluating audiences. Furthermore, the relational legitimacy signals
have more impact on the stakeholders’ decision to support a particular organization
than the signals of functional legitimacy. Due to the overall instability in the
environment and the excessive opportunistic behavior exercised by the actors,
demonstrating that a company is “there to stay” is crucial for its long-term success
and survival.
In  the  last  chapter,  I  discuss  the  results  of  the  statistical  analysis.  Based  on  them,  I
emphasize the theoretical and methodological contributions of this research as well as
its practical implications for the managers of small organizations in transition
environments and the public policy. The study’s limitations and avenues for future
research are also examined.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS
AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Small organizations in transition environments face liability of origin. In order to
overcome  it,  they  can  signal  two  types  of  legitimacy  –  functional  and  relational
legitimacy. The goal of the current study is to address two main research questions:
1. What are the dimensions (and corresponding items/signals) of functional and
relational legitimacy (for small organizations in transition environments)?
2. Does using signals of specific types of legitimacy (depending on the liability
faced) enhance organizational legitimacy?
As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the dimensions of functional and
relational legitimacy were identified and relevant measurements of each dimension
were proposed. All the items besides three (quality awards, Western
education/experience of founding team members, and website) contributed to their
respective latent constructs.
In addition, the results of the study show that the identified dimensions (signals) of
functional and relational legitimacy enhance the organizational legitimacy of small
organizations in transition environments. This supports the signaling theory of
legitimacy, which states that when faced with liabilities, organizations can rely on
valid signals in order to communicate their adherence to the stakeholders’
expectations. As a result, they expect to receive stakeholders’ support. In the
particular case of small organizations in transition environments, which face liability
of origin, signaling their task-related competencies and reliability as partners helps
them achieve more support from interested constituencies.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, I provide a discussion on the results of the
statistical analysis. Second, I present the theoretical and methodological contributions
of the study. Third, I look at the practical implications for managers of SMEs in
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transition environments and public policy. Forth,  the  limitations  of  the  research  are
discussed followed by the avenues for future research.
1. Discussion of Results
The  discussion  of  the  results  looks  at  the  measurement  models  and  their  respective
indicators.  Afterwards,  the  structural  model  is  discussed  in  terms  of  the  path
coefficients  of  the  two  independent  latent  constructs  (functional  and  relational
legitimacy) as well as organizational legitimacy – profit-making ability of an
organization.
1.1. Functional Legitimacy Formative Latent Construct
In  terms  of  the  functional  legitimacy  construct,  it  is  clear  that  all  of  the  above-
identified indicators besides quality awards (AWARDS) and Western education/
experience of founding team members (WEST) are significant and contribute to the
formation of the latent construct. The indicator with the highest weight is own product
(OWNPR). This shows that the evaluating audiences place very high importance on
the innovative capacity of an organization demonstrated by its ability to develop and
market its own product and related services. An organization that offers its own
product is expected to be able to provide adequate maintenance services once the
product is installed within a company. It is also expected to provide innovative
solutions when problems are faced. In addition, based on the responses of several
interviewees in the indicator generation stage, a company that offers its own products
also demonstrates higher level of involvement (i.e. in marketing the product/service,
etc.).
The relative weight of association membership (ASSOC) and prestigious affiliates
(PART)  is  also  high  showing  that  clients  place  high  importance  on  the  access  to
relevant industry information and the competencies granted by prestigious global
players.  The  importance  of  PART  does  not  depend  on  the  level  of  operation  of  the
company – local, national or international. All the evaluating audiences have
knowledge about the big global players and even if they do not understand the
technical aspect of the certificates granted to the employees of the company, the mere
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name attached to the certified partnership is a meaningful signal of the possession of
certain resources.
In addition, the evaluating audiences place high importance on the prestigious
affiliates because they are outside the transition environment. Hence, they are not
expected to exhibit opportunistic behavior. Therefore, the certified partnerships the
prestigious industry players grant are considered to be valid (and not noisy) signals of
the possession of certain task-related resources.
In terms of the manifest variable association memberships ASSOC, it is important to
note that it was included in the construct only because it was the only indicator to
represent the informational dimension of the functional legitimacy formative latent
construct. Half of the industry experts thought that association membership is not
important in building the functional legitimacy of an organization. ASSOC is a proxy
of an organization being associated with the most important players within an
industry, having an access to the newest information and being able to incorporate it
in the decision making or product/service creation and offering.
The two indicators, part of the functional legitimacy formative latent construct which
are not statistically significant at p=0,10 are the number of quality awards (AWARD)
and Western education/experience of founding team members (WEST). In fact, only
15 companies (out of 77) reported at least one quality award. The lack of enough
observations on this item can explain the fact that it is not statistically significant
component of the functional legitimacy formative construct.
One explanation of the low number of quality awards reported is that SMEs simply do
not apply for them. The reason is the high level of corruptive practices in granting a
product/service  award  to  a  company not  only  in  the  IT  sector  but  in  any  sector  in  a
transition economy. The issue was raised several times by the respondents while
completing the questionnaire. Some authors state that stakeholders prefer
organizations that have been publically evaluated even if the criteria based on which
they were evaluated are not completely comprehensive (Wade et al. 2006).
Nevertheless, the meaning of an award as a valid signal is lost if the evaluating
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audiences know that it was not granted based on merit. Hence, the item AWARD is a
noisy signal lacking the expected informational value associated with it.
The other indicator part of the functional legitimacy latent construct which is not
statistically significant is the Western education/experience of the founding team
members (WEST). This indicator is a proxy of the management style. The underlying
assumption is that a founding team member with Western or Western-like education
will be able to transfer the knowledge and skills acquired at his/her previous
employment to the organization which (s)he has established. One explanation why
this indicator is that managers without Western and/or Western-like education can
behave in a similar way based on vicarious learning or their personality traits.
1.2. Relational Legitimacy Formative Latent Construct
In the relational legitimacy formative latent construct, the indicator with the highest
relative weight is the client reputation (CLREP). The current and/or previous clients
(and successful outsourcing projects) represent an important signal regarding the
worthiness of an organization as a partner. It enhances the trustworthiness dimension
of the relational legitimacy construct since it demonstrates that in the past the focal
organization has maintained successful relationships with business clients.
The indicator physical footprint (measured by the number of offices and location of
headquarters NOFFICE*LOC) also has a high outer weight because the offices
provide an opportunity for the clients to contact their providers and ensure them that
the company is “there to stay.” In many occasions, clients are tricked by fictitious
entities supposedly providing certain product/services which rarely have an office.
Hence, having an office and this way providing an access point for the clientele is
very important for organizations in transition environments where the level of
uncertainty is very high.
Clients also place high importance on organizational age (AGE) and certificates
(ISO). The two indicators are statistically significant at p=0.01. This is not surprising
keeping in mind that age demonstrates that an organization was able to handle the
instability in the environment over the period of its existence. Management
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certificates, such as ISO, show that the organization is willing to be accountable for its
internal processes and procedures.
The only indicator, part of the relational legitimacy construct, which is not statistically
significant is the virtual imprint (WEBSITE). It is not significant even at p=0.10. One
explanation why this variable was not statistically significant lies in the way it is
measured (dummy = 1 if the organization has a website and =0 if the organization
does not have a website). A more elaborated measure may have given different
results. In example, if the IT firms’ websites were evaluated based on the signals they
contain, these may have been a significant variable. Even though it is unthinkable that
an  IT  organization  will  not  have  a  website,  it  is  indeed  a  fact  for  some  IT  firms  in
Bulgaria. As a general rule, these firms operate on the local environmental layer. In
the small worlds of local communities, third-party referrals by a trusted source are
much more important than any signal employed by the focal organization.
1.3. Organizational Legitimacy Reflective Latent Construct
In the reflective measurement model of organizational legitimacy, the manifest
variables number of employees (EMPLS) and number of clients (NCLNTS) are
statistically significant. The third item considered – number of distributors (NDISTR)
– was excluded from the analysis due to lack of variance – only 10 out of 77
companies reported having distributors. In fact, I control for the number of employees
since they are part of the constituencies with high bargaining power towards the
organizations subject of this study. In addition, the number of employees is also a
measure of organizational size for technological firms. The relationship size-
organizational legitimacy has already been established in the literature (Shane and
Foo 1999).
In this case, the number of employees (EMPLS) demonstrates a very high outer
weight. One explanation lies in the fact that the IT sector in Bulgaria is highly
fragmented and experiencing labor shortage. Hence, organizations that can grow and
secure more employees are organizations that have good long-term prospects and are
not hesitant to invest in signals.
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The item client support (NCLNTS) is statistically significant at p=0,05, which implies
that the legitimacy-building efforts of IT firms (in terms of communicating their
internal characteristics via observable signals) will grant them the support of clients. It
is assumed that the decision of clients to outsource to a particular organization has a
very strong legitimating effect since in transition environments there may be many
noisy signals.
1.4. Profit-Making Ability Reflective Latent Construct
The reflective latent construct profit-making potential was measured by average
fee/hour (AVFEE) and the growth rate (GRWTH). The two indicators are statistically
significant at p=0,05.
1.5. Structural Model
In addition, the inner path coefficients of functional and relational legitimacy are
positive and statistically significant at p=0,05 (even at p=0,01). This means that
signaling functional and relational legitimacy is important for small organizations in
transition environments to gain stakeholders’ support. Moreover, relational legitimacy
shows higher effect size than functional legitimacy. This means that stakeholders
place more importance on signals of relational legitimacy rather than functional
legitimacy. The explanation lies in the specificities of the transition environment.
Many economic actors demonstrate shortsightedness and engage in excessive
opportunistic behavior. Therefore, demonstrating the reliability of an organization as a
partner is very important and it ensures its long-term success and survival.
In addition, the relationship organizational legitimacy-profit-making ability of the
organizations was assessed. According to some authors (Mazza 1999), the ultimate
sign of a legitimate organization is its profit-making ability. The inner path coefficient
is significant at p=0,05 (even at p=0,01).
Based on the discussion of the results, in the next section I present the contributions of
the study. Following the contributions, I discuss the implications, limitations, and
avenues for future research.
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2. Contributions
The contributions of this study will be regarded in three main areas: theoretical,
methodological and practical. I firstly discuss the theoretical contributions, followed
by the methodological contributions and at the end the practical contributions will be
presented.
2.1. Theoretical Contributions
The main theoretical contribution of the current research lies in the proposed signaling
theory of legitimacy. In addition, the study contributes to several other fields, such as
the institution-based view of strategy, the literature on transition economies (herein, I
use the broader term transition environments), outsourcing, and SMEs. Below, the
above-mentioned contributions are discussed in detail.
2.1.1. Signaling Theory of Legitimacy
Based on the signaling theory in economics (Spence 1973, 1974) and the strategic
perspective on organizational legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990; Dowling and
Pfeffer 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik [1978] 2003), herein I propose and test the
signaling theory of legitimacy. I  built  the  theory  on  the  assumption  that  any
organization that faces a liability (newness, smallness, market newness and origin)
can  employ  valid  signals  of  legitimacy  in  order  to  demonstrate  its  adherence  to  the
stakeholders’ requirements and expectations. Based on the use of portfolio of signals,
which indeed represents its legitimacy stock, an organization can claim and eventually
be granted legitimacy. This way, it can enhance its chances to succeed and survive in
the long run.
The processes of legitimacy claiming and legitimacy granting are different. They
comprise the communication process between organizations based on shared
meaning. The development of shared meaning is a process that corresponds to the
process of institutionalization or the creation of institutions (formal and informal)
within an environment. Indeed, the signals are institutions and as such, they help the
legitimacy-claiming and the legitimacy-granting entities interpret the signals in the
same  or  at  least  in  a  similar  way  (see  Fig.  13).  Without  institutions,  the
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communication process between organizations is impeded. Therefore, claiming and
granting legitimacy becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
Fig. 13: Signaling Theory of Legitimacy
Based on the above-said, the signaling theory of legitimacy enhances the signaling
theory in economics (Spence 1973, 1974). Indeed, the signaling theory in economics
(Spence 1973, 1974) assumes stable environment where the sending and the receiving
actors have the same or at least similar understanding of the informational content of
the signals used. Hence, there are only two requirements for a signal to be valid – 1)
observable, and 2) costly to imitate (Spence 1973). Herein, I add a third requirement:
the  signal  has  to  carry  the  same  or  similar  informational  content  (based  on  the
institutions developed) for the sending and the receiving party. In uncertain
environments characterized by intensive change processes, the latter is becoming an
integral part of the communication process between economic actors.
The signaling theory of legitimacy is important to explain the difficulties organization
face when they move from one layer of the environment to another one.  In general,
organizations evolving on the same environmental layer (international/global, national
and  local)  develop  over  time  the  same  interpretation  of  signals  based  on  the














occurs when an organization moves from one layer of the environment to another one
(i.e. an organization that tries to internationalize its activities – moving from the
national to the international/global layer).
In addition, the signaling theory of legitimacy can be used to explain the difficulties
organizations face when they operate in highly dynamic and unstable environments as
well as environments going through institutional transitions. Such environments
experience low level of institutionalization meaning that signals may not be
understood the same way by all actors. Also, in such environments, there are many
noisy  signals.  A noisy signal is a signal whose informational value is deterred. The
noisy signals can occur as a result of the highly opportunistic behavior of the
economic actors – i.e. a diploma or an award that was granted based not on merit but
on the existing corruptive practices.
In general, signaling theory of legitimacy tries to increase our understanding of how
the communication process between the organization and its evaluators can be
improved. Even though the role of corporate communications based on mission
statements, press releases and other is not underestimated, I do not place the focus on
the meaning of words (rhetoric). I rather concentrate on communicating meaning
through signals, which is indeed the basis of the signaling theory of legitimacy. The
weight evaluating audiences place on the signals is higher than on corporate
communications since the former are proxies for certain internal organizational
characteristics or processes. Plus, while the corporate communication is fully
controlled by the organization, one part of the signals is partially-controlled. The
informational content of the partially-controlled signals is more reliable for the
evaluating audiences.
In relation to the development of the signaling theory of legitimacy, an enhanced
understanding on several related concepts emerges - organizational liabilities,
determinants vs. antecedents of legitimacy, and organizational reputation. Below, I
present these concepts with their extended meaning.
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A) Organizational Liabilities
In general, organizations are prone to signal adherence to the evaluating audiences’
expectations when they face liabilities. The liabilities determine not only the need to
signal legitimacy but also the type of legitimacy sought. Hence, I attempt to extend
the general understanding of the concept of organizational liabilities as well as to
explore the relationship between the latter and the legitimacy types sought.
For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  the  term organizational liability is  defined  as  the
perceived misfit with the stakeholders’ expectations. The organizational liabilities
were grouped into two main categories – internally-defined liabilities (based  on
certain organizational characteristics) and externally-defined liabilities (based  on
environmental specificities). The internally-defined liabilities include newness
(Stinchcombe 1965) and smallness (Freeman, Carroll and Hannan 1983) related to the
age and the size of the organization, respectively.
The externally-defined liabilities include market newness (Certo 2003 introduced the
term) and origin (Bartlett and Ghoshal 2000). Liability of market newness is
associated with the perceived misfit with the stakeholders’ expectations when an
organization moves from one layer of the environment to another one (i.e., from local
to national layer), or when an organization enters a new market (i.e., diversification).
Liability of foreignness (Zaheer 1995) is a type of liability of market newness since it
is associated with the discount that the evaluating audiences can place on an
organization when moving from the national to the international layer
(internationalization).
The second type of externally-defined liability is the liability of origin – a term coined
by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2000). Liability of origin is related to the discount that the
evaluating audiences (both domestic and foreign) can place on an organization due to
its context of origin. Environments experiencing profound change and shift from one
institutional framework to another one (such as transition environments) represent
specific settings where organizations import instability from the environment.
Organizations evolving in such environments experience liability of origin.
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The concept of organizational liability can be further explored and its content
enriched. Furthermore, researchers can study the relationship between the liabilities
faced by organizations and the types of legitimacy they attempt to acquire. As an
example, herein, I try to develop a relationship between the liability experienced by
the organizations under scrutiny (SMEs evolving in transition environments) and the
type of legitimacy sought – functional and relational legitimacy. To the extent of
researcher’s knowledge, this relationship has not been explored yet.
In addition, based on the signaling theory of legitimacy, I distinguish between
legitimacy as a process and legitimacy as a condition which can be achieved at one
particular point in time. As a process, organizational legitimation has its determinants
(Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). And as a condition, organizational legitimacy has its
antecedents.
B) Determinants vs. Antecedents of Organizational Legitimacy
The determinants of organizational legitimacy are those internal or external (to the
organization) conditions that trigger the process of legitimation (see Fig. 13).  The
antecedents of organizational legitimacy are those characteristics of the organization
that precede the legitimacy as a condition60 which can be achieved by an organization
at a particular point in time (see Fig. 13). Antecedents are also called “sources” or
signals of legitimacy.
The determinants of organizational legitimation can be changing societal norms and
values (institutional change), competitive dynamics between the focal organization
and other actors functioning in the same field (selection pressures), organization’s
methods of operation and organization’s output (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975). The
determinants of legitimacy create liabilities for the focal organization and hence
trigger the process of legitimation.
The antecedents of organizational legitimacy (also called sources or signals) as a
condition are organizational characteristics based on which an organization can be
60 Herein, I think that instead of the term “property” (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975) regarding legitimacy
as a characteristic of the organization, it is more appropriate to use the term “condition” as it implies
certain dynamic aspects of the status of being legitimate.
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evaluated by the external audiences. Legitimacy as a condition is not independent
from the process of legitimation. It is in fact, a result of the legitimation process. The
determinants of the process of legitimation in fact trigger the process of signal
accumulation that can demonstrate the adherence of an organization to the
requirements of the evaluating audiences. Consequently, the signals become
antecedents of the legitimacy condition.
The signaling theory of legitimacy considers organizational legitimacy as a
continuous variable – companies can be compared at any given point in time based on
their legitimacy stock. In the extant literature, legitimacy is usually considered a
dichotomous variable in comparison to reputation, which is continuous. Hence, the
herein proposed theory sheds also some light on the distinction between legitimacy
and reputation.
C) Organizational Legitimacy vs. Organizational Reputation
Reputation and legitimacy are not identical concepts (Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007)61.
They are overlapping concepts since they represent an assessment by external
stakeholders (Deephouse and Carter 2005)62 or key resource providers (employees,
customers, investors, and communities (Fombrun 2001). The two concepts are
multidimensional and comprised of a set of organizational characteristics (Deephouse
and Carter 2005). While legitimacy reflects the degree to which a firm’s products and
practices adhere the societal norms, values and beliefs (Rindova et al. 2007),
reputation is a social comparison between organizations along a set of organizational
characteristics (Deephouse and Carter 2005). It contains expectations about the future
performance of an organization inferred from its past actions (Weigelt and Camerer
1988).
Even though reputation is perceived to be a result of the process of legitimation (Rao
1994; Zuckerman 1999), for the purpose of this study, reputation is a building block
of  legitimacy.  The  reason  why  organizations  first  build  their  reputation  before  they
acquire legitimacy is the lack of established standards and norms (or institutions) in
61 According to Dacin, Oliver and Roy, legitimacy is a broader concept.
62 It is important to note that when formulating their propositions, Deephouse and Carter (2005)
assumed that the industry itself is not a subject to legitimacy challenges.
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transition environments. In these conditions, it is easier to build reputation based on
past performance (previous clients) before building legitimacy. Since reputation
influences the perception of trustworthiness of an organization (Dollinger, Golden and
Saxton 1997), it enhances its legitimacy since trustworthiness is one of the identified
dimensions.
The signaling theory of legitimacy was tested on small organizations evolving in
transition environments and trying to obtain long-term outsourcing contracts. Based
on the specificities of the environment in which they operate, these organizations face
liability of origin. As it was mentioned earlier, the liability experienced by the
organizations will make them seek a particular type of legitimacy. The legitimacy
typology, proposed herein meets in a better way the needs of the organizations under
scrutiny  than  the  existing  typologies  (i.e.  regulatory,  normative,  and  cognitive  as  of
Scott 2001). This typology is one of the main contributions of the study. It consists of
functional and relational legitimacy. The two types of legitimacy are not only defined
but their relevant dimensions and corresponding items (signals) are also identified.
2.1.2. New Legitimacy Typology - Functional and Relational Legitimacy
 The new legitimacy typology in fact corresponds to the main risks perceived by the
outsourcers when choosing an outsourcee – the risk of the outsourcee’s deficient
capabilities (addressed by the concept of functional legitimacy)  and  the  risk  of
overdependence on the outsourcee (addressed by the concept of relational legitimacy)
(Quélin and Duhamel 2003). Functional legitimacy is related to whether an
organization meets the requirements in terms of resources and capabilities and
addresses the outsourcer’s concern regarding deficient capabilities. And relational
legitimacy reflects whether an organization is a reliable partner and addresses the
outsourcer’s concern regarding the dependence on the outsourcing service provider.
Functional and relational legitimacy are perceived as building blocks of the
organizational legitimacy concept.
In addition, the two types of legitimacy are perceived to be independent from one
another – an organization may have all the resources and capabilities necessary to
perform a task (functional legitimacy) but this does not imply that an organization is
reliable as partner (relational legitimacy) and vice versa.
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Organizational legitimacy is a multi-dimensional construct (Deephouse and Carter
2005). The functional and relational legitimacy are also multi-faceted concepts. Based
on a qualitative study comprised of literature review, analysis of the writings of
organizations (brochures and websites) and interviews with industry experts and
academics, the dimensions of functional and relational legitimacy were identified and
relevant items (signals) to measure them were chosen.
Functional legitimacy is comprised of the following dimensions: informational,
managerial, organizational, innovative and symbolic reputational competencies of an
organization. The relational legitimacy is comprised of the following dimensions:
trustworthiness, accountability, stability, and visibility.
The signaling theory of legitimacy extends the strategic perspective on legitimacy
(Ashforth and Gibbs 1990) as well as the institution-based view on strategy (Peng et
al. 2008).
2.1.3. Strategic Management and Institution-Based View on Strategy
Valid signals of legitimacy are organizational characteristics that are observable,
costly to imitate and for which there is a shared meaning between the sending and the
receiving party. It is in the discretion of the focal organization to build and manage its
portfolio of signals. This way, the organization has an active role in choosing among
many alternative signals. The challenge is to pick the most appropriate signals, which
implies very good knowledge of the evaluating audiences’ expectations and
requirements.
In addition, the study adds to the institution-based view on strategy since the latter
looks at the importance of the relationship between institutions and organizations
(Peng et al. 2008). As it was already mentioned, the transition environment is
immensely different from that of the developed economies. This affects the
relationship between the latter and the organization. Organizational legitimacy exists
on the borderline between the environment and the organization and it reflects the
dynamism of the relationship between the two. The mere understanding of the
legitimacy concept when applied to transitional contexts changes - herein, I perceive it
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as being a continuous variable and compare organizations in terms of their legitimacy
stocks while in institutionally-developed environments, legitimacy is considered
dichotomous – organizations are either legitimate or not.
In addition, the study contributes to the literature on outsourcing and transition
environments, including the research on small organizations evolving in transition
environments. In the next sections, these contributions are presented.
2.1.4. Outsourcing
Even though the current study looks at the outsourcee’s point of view, it sheds some
light on the process of outsourcing partner selection. Besides de Fontenay and Gans
(2008), who looked at the dichotomous choice between outsourcing to an established
company or an independent company, to the extent of researchers’ knowledge, there
are still no empirical studies done on partner selection in outsourcing arrangements.
The  results  of  the  study  show  that  organizations  that  signal  their  functional  and
relational legitimacy receive higher support from relevant stakeholder groups. The
importance of relational legitimacy for organizations evolving in transition
environments is higher in comparison to the functional legitimacy meaning that
evaluating audiences place more importance on the reliability of the partner rather
than on its task-related competencies.
Future studies in the outsourcing literature can focus on the partner selection in
outsourcing  arrangements.  They  can  look  at  the  stages  of  the  evaluation  process
(Power, Desouza and Bonifazi 2007) and see how the decision on a service provider is
made at every stage of the process. More specifically, the studies can look at the
evaluation criteria and measure their relative weight. This way, the other side of the
communication process between the sending party (outsourcee) and the receiving
party (the outsourcer) can be examined.
2.1.5. Transition Economies. SMEs in Transition Economies
The research contributes to the literature on transition environments, including
transition economies. In particular, this study looks at the second stage of the
transition process characterized by some level of maturation of the market-based
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institutions (Peng 2003) and tries to identify some challenges organizations face
during the late phase of transition.
The  study  also  contributes  to  the  literature  on  small  organizations  in  transition
economies. Some authors mentioned that there is almost no research regarding the
challenges faced by SMEs in emerging (including transition) environments (Peng et
al. 2008). Typically, transition economies rely on the growth of SMEs in order to spur
economic growth (Peng 2000b). Even though small organizations are very important
for the economic development, little is known on what distinguishes more successful
small ventures from the less successful ones, especially in the transition context
(Danis, Chiaburu and Lyles 2010). Based on the signaling theory of legitimacy, this
research  provides  an  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on  what  makes  some  small
organizations more successful than others in the context of institutional upheaval
(Newman 2000).
The study looks at the impact of legitimacy on the profit-making ability of an
organization. The results show that the higher the legitimacy stock of an organization,
the higher its profit-making ability. Hence, legitimacy is important to be pursued by
small firms in transition environments since this can help them assure higher
stakeholder support and eventually higher profit-making potential.
Besides the theoretical contributions, the study has several methodological
contributions, regarded below.
2.2. Methodological Contributions
The  methodological  contributions  of  the  current  research  consist  of  the  way  the
concept of organizational legitimacy has been operationalized as well as the statistical
technique used to test the research model, namely PLS. These contributions are
discussed below.
2.2.1. Organizational Legitimacy – Measurement Models
In most of the extant studies, legitimacy is measured in a unidimensional manner. In
some cases, two or more legitimacy types are identified and each type is measured by
one measurement (i.e. Deephouse and Carter 2005). I propose first-order formative
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latent constructs (under the PLS structural equation modeling technique) in order to
identify and quantify all dimensions of functional and relational legitimacy – the two
building blocks that construct organizational legitimacy. Hence, I tried to follow the
suggestions of Deephouse and Carter (2005) that the perfect measure of legitimacy
has to reflect all of its dimensions.
Moreover, the type of measurement models used (formative) gives the opportunity to
match the legitimacy claims of organizations (via the functional and relational signals)
and  the  legitimacy  grants  based  on  the  support  of  the  stakeholder  groups  in  the
concept of organizational legitimacy. This would not have been possible with the
traditionally used reflective latent constructs.
In addition, most of the previous studies on organizational legitimacy, perceive it as
being  a  dichotomous  variable  –  an  organization  is  either  legitimate  or  it  is  not  at  a
particular  point  in  time  (Ruef  and  Scott  1998).  Herein,  I  propose  to  look  at
organizational legitimacy as being a continuous variable. This means that
organizations can be compared in terms of their legitimacy – some will have more
than others based on the characteristics possessed (or their legitimacy stock). I
measured organizational legitimacy by looking at the support of the most important
stakeholder groups – the clients and the employees.
Another methodological contribution of this study is the usage of PLS as a statistical
technique to test the proposed research model.
2.2.2. Strategic Management - PLS SEM Technique
In addition, by using PLS software package, this research contributes to the studies in
strategic management that employ this variance-based SEM technique. Even though
PLS is a well-established SEM technique (Johansson and Yip 1994), in the field of
strategic management there are still only few studies that use it (Birkinshaw et al.
1995; Cool et al. 1989; Fornell et al. 1990; Johansson and Yip 1994; Tsang 2002).
Hence, with this research, we contribute to the growing number of articles employing
PLS. One of the advantages of this SEM technique is that it accommodates small
samples as well as it gives the researchers the opportunity to test formative latent
constructs, not possible with the covariance-based techniques (i.e. LISREL).
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In addition to the theoretical and methodological contributions, this study has several
practical contributions, which are explained below.
2. 3. Practical Implications
The current research has important practical implications for the managers of small
organizations evolving in transition environments as well as the public policy agents.
2.3.1. Implications for Managers of Small Organizations
As it was previously-mentioned, one of the requirements of valid signals of legitimacy
is  that  they  have  to  be  costly  to  obtain  in  order  to  prevent  imitation.  The  resource
endowments of all organizations and especially the small ones evolving in transition
environments are limited (Hitt et al. 2000).  Hence, their  managers have to be aware
which signals are valued by the various stakeholder groups, especially their clients
(one of the main evaluating audiences in transition environment) and try to acquire
and consequently demonstrate them in order to be granted legitimacy.
Even though some interviewees in the process of qualitative data collection expressed
their concern regarding the way relational legitimacy can be measured, they all agreed
with the fact that it is very important to be communicated to relevant stakeholder
groups. Based on the results of the analysis, signals of relational legitimacy
demonstrated better relative weight in comparison to the signals of functional
legitimacy. Hence, demonstrating reliability as a partner is more important than
demonstrating the possession of resources (which also came to be statistically
significant). A potential explanation of this is the proliferation of the opportunistic
behavior by economic actors in transition environments. This is important to be
known  by  the  managers  of  small  organizations  since  not  all  of  them  realize  the
importance of demonstrating their relational legitimacy, such as in example, clients’
reputation based on references.
Besides clients support, we also looked at the support provided by employees. As an
employer, an organization also has to demonstrate the access to task-related resources
and  competencies  as  well  as  its  reliability.  The  market  was  on  the  constant  growth
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before the Financial Crisis. In the highly fragmented sectors with labor shortage,
attracting employees becomes important for an organization in order to ensure that the
projects will be completed on time.
In addition, managers of small organizations evolving in transition environments tend
to undermine certain signals – i.e. association memberships. Based on the results, this
signal was highly valued by the evaluating audiences showing that having an access to
the newest information within a particular sector is important for interested
stakeholders.
2.3.2. Implications for Public Policy Agents
Since many SMEs in transition environments are backward and occupy protected
niches (Dallago and McIntyre, 2003), public policy (such as government agencies or
cluster associations) can stimulate them to identify and adopt valuable signals in order
to gain access to global markets. In example, Capability Maturity Model Integration
(CMMI) - a specific process standard in the IT industry – is promoted by the
European Software Institute, which has branches in many European countries. One of
the main purposes of this institute is to disseminate information and assist small IT
organizations adopt CMMI process standard.
Besides the contributions, the current study has several limitations, some of which
present interesting avenues for future research.
3. Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Even though some areas for future research were already presented in the section
above, herein I try to outline several important limitations of the current study. Some
of them also represent avenues for future research.
3.1. Cross-Sectional Design of Survey
One of the limitations of this research is the type of data collected – cross-sectional.
Indeed, I compare companies along several dimensions in one particular point in time.
Even though the research design is based on a structured questionnaire as a data-
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collection instrument (Stevens et al. 2006), it does not provide a dynamic examination
of  the  phenomenon  under  scrutiny.  Studies  based  on  cross-sectional  data  fail  to
provide “temporal benchmarks for organizational transformation” (Newman 2000:
616). Therefore, the results may be valid at a given point in time but may not hold
longitudinally (Peng 2003).
In  addition,  the  cross-sectional  design  of  the  surveys  relies  on  the  memories  of  the
respondents (Stevens et al. 2006), which sometimes can lead to inaccurate answers. In
this case of the legitimacy challenges faced by SMEs in transition environments, a
longitudinal study can capture the process of signals accumulation over time.
3.2. Type of Outsourcing Arrangements
For the purpose of this study, I do not distinguish and control for the type of the
outsourcing arrangement from the outsourcer’s point of view as well as from the
outsourcee’s point of view. As it was mentioned earlier, from the outsourcer’s point of
view, the arrangements can be on-site or off-site, substitution-based or abstention-
based and based on purchasing, subcontracting or strategic outsourcing. I also do not
distinguish between whether the outsourcing arrangement is capability-enhancing or
performance-enhancing from the point of view of the outsourcee as well as whether it
is on local, national, and/or international level. Future studies can control for the type
of outsourcing arrangement since the latter may affect the signals used by
organizations in order to communicate their legitimacy.
3.3. Layers of the Environment
One of the limitations of this study is the fact that it does not regard the specificities of
the evaluating audiences on each layer of the environment (local, national,
international)  (see  Fig.  14).  Testing  the  model  on  three  sub-samples  comprised  of
companies functioning only on the local, national, and international level was not
possible due to problems with the measurement models of the latent constructs. Some
indicators turned to be negative implying that they do not contribute to the latent
constructs they are assigned to. Negative indicators show problems with the dataset or
multicollinearity issues which can be a result of small sample size. When
multicollinearity exists, indicator weight estimates are distorted and researchers have
to be careful when interpreting the results (Henseler et al. 2009).
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Nevertheless, some results based on the exploratory study show interesting findings
for  organizations  evolving  on  the  different  layers  of  the  environment.  Some  signals
are not meaningful on certain environmental layers – i.e. local companies do not aim
at getting quality awards since they place very little importance on it. In addition,
even if  they are in the IT sector,  not all  of them maintain a website.  Based on some
tests, functional legitimacy is much more important for companies evolving on the
international layer than the relational legitimacy. For companies on the national layer,
it is the opposite.
Hence, a future study can control for the layer of the environment on which the focal
organization functions – internal, local competitive, national and the global
marketplace (see Fig. 14) (Thomas, Pollock and Gorman 1999).
Fig. 14: Layers of the Environment (Thomas et al. 1999)
Controlling for the environmental layer can produce interesting results because of
several reasons. First, each layer consists of different audiences and their importance
may  vary  –  i.e.  on  the  local  layer  of  the  environment,  due  to  the  dense  social






word-of-mouth information (third-party signals) regarding the organizations under
scrutiny. The community is not relevant on the national and international layer of the
environment, or at least not to the same extent.
Second, even within the same stakeholder group (i.e. clients) there can be different
expectations regarding the qualities of a potential partner on the different
environmental layers. More importantly, they can rely on different signals in order to
make their decisions, or allocate different weight on the signals. In example, a large
number of companies operating on the local layer of the environment do not maintain
a website since their potential clients in most of the cases make their decisions based
on third-party referrals. At the same time, maintaining a good quality website is very
important for organizations engaged in international outsourcing.
Hence, a future study can examine the differences between the requirements and the
expectations of the evaluating audiences at the different layers of the environment.
The study can also look at the importance the various stakeholder groups place on
different signals at each layer. This is essential not only for the managers operating on
one layer of the environment but also for the managers of organizations trying to shift
layers (i.e. moving from national to international layer).
The  layers  of  the  environment  can  be  related  to  the  one  of  the  typologies  used  to
classify the outsourcing arrangements – domestic, foreign and global outsourcing
arrangements based on the location of the outsourcer and the outsourcee (Murray and
Kotabe 1999).
3.4. Measurement of Organizational Legitimacy
Another limitation of this study is that I considered all the specificities of the
outsourcing markets (uncertain, reputational and non-commodity) besides the fact that
they are relational markets. This has an implication on the way the dependent variable
organizational legitimacy should be measured. The clients are one of the important
legitimacy-granting stakeholder groups. The variable is measured as the number of
current clients. But I did not consider the number of recurrent clients, which has an
even higher legitimating effect on the focal organization.
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3.5. Signaling Theory of Legitimacy
Future studies can test the signaling theory of legitimacy in different contexts – i.e.
compare organizations evolving in transition environments and in developed
economies, or organizations that evolve in different type of transition environments
(i.e. Eastern Europe vs. China). Although transition economies exhibit similar
economic and institutional characteristics, there are many differences among them –
the social norms, culture, level of business and political risks (Acquaah 2007; Chikan
and Demeter 1995). Hence, a comparative study may yield interesting results which
can enhance the theory building efforts.
It will be also interesting to test the theory for large organizations evolving in
transition environments and see whether they utilize the same or different signals in
comparison to small organizations. The role of organizational size is very important
since by itself size has a very strong legitimating effect on a particular organization.
Moreover, for the purpose of this study, I look at small organizations in the B2B
market of outsourcing services. Organizations operating in the B2C markets most
likely have to demonstrate different types of legitimacy since the needs and
requirements of the final consumers are different in comparison to the expectations of
the outsourcers. One has to keep in mind that the final consumer in B2C settings does
not have the same bargaining power. Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether in
transition settings, organizations in B2C markets consider their clients as being one of
the most important legitimacy-granting audiences at all.
In addition, signaling theory of legitimacy can be tested on organizations facing
different types of liabilities – i.e. liability of market newness for an organization
moving from one layer of the environment to another one or from one market to
another one (diversification strategy). Relevant legitimacy typologies might be also
developed in order to reflect in a better way the different organizational liabilities.
An example of a different typology is imported versus domestic legitimacy. Imported
legitimacy will be based on signals that originate outside of the transition environment
(i.e. certified partnerships with global players, reputation of foreign clients) while
domestic legitimacy is based on signals that originate within the transition
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environment (i.e. quality awards from domestic competitions, domestic clients). This
is an alternative way to address the liability of origin faced by organizations evolving
in transition environments. The dimensions of these types of legitimacy can be
identified and test whether the imported legitimacy will have higher effect size in
comparison to the domestic legitimacy or vice versa. A future research can also
control for the layer of the environment on which the evaluating audiences are located
and whether they will give a priority to domestic or imported signals.
The role of meaning construction which is the basis for the communication process
between organizations can also be regarded in future studies. As it was already
mentioned, the shared meaning is built on formal and informal institutions. As it was
said it is constructed based on the same (or similar) interpretation of signals. The issue
is whether organizations on the different layers of the environments “speak the same
language” or have the same or similar interpretation of the signals used.
To conclude, the value of the current research lies in proposing and testing the
signaling theory of legitimacy by looking at the particular case of small organizations
evolving in transition environments. The proposed theory is a fertile research area,
which presents an opportunity to enhance our understanding of the challenges
organizations in unstable contexts face and some actions that can be undertaken in
order to overcome them.
276
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The study proposes a signaling theory of legitimacy which states that when faced with
a liability, an organization can use valid signals in order to demonstrate
(communicate) its adherence to the requirements and expectations of relevant
stakeholders’ groups. Signals are the basis of the inter-organizational communication.
Indeed, this communication process resembles the non-verbal way of communicating
which constitutes around 90% of the communication between individuals. The
analogy made here is that signals are part of the “non-verbal” communication between
organizations, the “verbal” one being corporate communications (i.e. mission
statements, press releases, etc.). As the larger part of the communication between
individuals consists of non-verbal signaling, similarly most of the communication
between organizations is related to the usage of organizational characteristics with
certain  informational  content  (or  signals).  Hence,  depending  on  the  evaluating
audience regarded (i.e. clients, suppliers, ultimate consumer, government, etc.), an
enhanced understanding of the role of signal in the inter-organizational
communication can be helpful in fields, such management, marketing, advertising,
etc.
Signaling is particularly important in contexts characterized by high level of
uncertainty and instability meaning environments with poor level of
institutionalization (i.e. transition and emerging economies). In such environments,
the meaning of signals as institutions is not fully established. From one side, the need
to use signals/institutions is very high (due to the existing information asymmetry
between actors), on the other side – a shared meaning of their informational value is
not completely formed. In addition, in such environments due to the low level of
institutionalization, many noisy signals exist. This creates an immense difficulty for
the actors operating in poorly-institutionalized contexts based on: 1) lack of complete
understanding of the signals employed, and 2) the difficult choice on which signals to
use in order to communicate the desired organizational characteristics. Additional
research can look at the way signals are chosen, the way the meaning is formed as
well as the role of imported (from more stable environments) vs. domestic signals.
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In addition, our understanding of institutions is still very limited (Williamson 2000).
By studying signals and the signaling between organizations we can indeed
understand the institutions in a better way. Moreover, the development of shared
meaning between the sending and the receiving party coincides with the process of
institutionalization or institution formation. Hence, studies regarding signals and
signaling can be helpful to enrich organization theory in general and institutional
theory, in particular.
The study also demonstrates that one has to be careful when applying theories and
concepts to contexts characterized by high level of uncertainty and instability. Most of
the existing theories have been developed in the stable contexts of the developed
economies (Peng et al. 2008). Hence, when applied to poorly-institutionalized
contexts, they are either not valid or they need to be adjusted. In example, for the
purpose of this study, the concept of organizational legitimacy is employed to
examine the dynamic relationship organization-environment. It is clear that the
concept has different nuances when applied to organizations evolving in transition
environments. Herein, organizational legitimacy is perceived to be continuous and
being able to be established on organizational level during the second phase of the
transition process. In addition, I could not use the commonly-accepted legitimacy
typology.  Hence,  a  new  typology  of  legitimacy  was  proposed  in  order  to  meet  in  a
better way the needs of organizations in emerging contexts.
In general, signaling is an important way to communicate between organizations and
other social structures. An enhanced view on this type of communication may shed
some  light  on  the  behavior  of  economic  actors  as  well  as  on  the  ways  the
communication can be improved. Signaling in unstable environments is an important
aspect of the process of institution creation.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Characteristics of Global Industries (Inkpen and Ramaswamy
2006)
CHARACTERISTICS OF GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
1 Industry products are sold internationally.
2 Companies have the ability to serve international customers.
3 Companies use coordinated (but not necessarily the same) approaches
throughout the world.
4 The same group of competitors is present in all major markets.
5 Competition takes place on a global scale.
6 Strategic positioning in one market fundamentally affects position in other
markets.
7 Cross-subsidization of markets by major competitors is common.
8 Headquarters are not country-specific.
9 Headquarters management reflects the international makeup of the workforce.
10 Value-chain activities are performed at optimal locations.
11 Companies rely on inputs sourced from around the world.
12 Companies combine advantages created in the domestic arena with others that
result from doing business in many nations (e.g., economies of scale and
transferable brand reputation).
13 Leading companies create the same type of advantage in multiple markets
(e.g., a firm with differentiation advantage in country A has the same
advantage in country B, C, etc.)
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Appendix 2: Global Ranking of Top Locations for Off-shoring in 2005 (The
Economist Intelligence Unit)



















Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005
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0.25 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.05
Estonia 6.71 6.60 7.81 5.60 6.96 6.40 7.50
Slovenia 6.43 5.90 7.45 5.45 6.50 6.80 7.50
Czech Rep. 6.14 4.90 7.39 6.00 6.84 5.60 7.50
Hungary 6.14 4.80 7.34 5.85 6.86 6.00 7.50
Poland 5.76 4.30 7.28 5.05 6.46 5.80 7.50
Slovakia 5.65 4.05 7.35 4.50 6.38 6.40 7.00
Lithuania 5.45 4.65 7.28 3.85 5.99 5.40 7.00
Latvia 5.30 3.95 7.21 3.85 6.09 5.60 7.00
Bulgaria 4.86 3.85 6.72 3.30 5.71 5.00 5.75
Turkey 4.77 3.60 6.68 4.35 4.97 4.40 5.25
Romania 4.44 2.90 6.36 2.90 5.68 4.80 5.75
Russia 4.30 3.45 6.16 2.60 4.01 5.40 5.50
Ukraine 3.62 2.50 5.46 1.85 3.85 4.80 4.75
Kazakhstan 3.22 2.10 5.37 1.95 3.42 3.60 3.50
Azerbaijan 2.92 1.85 5.54 1.80 2.68 2.80 3.25
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Appendix 4: Average Net Monthly Salary (in euro, without bonuses).
Position
Average Net Monthly Salary (in
euro, w/o bonuses)
Technical Director € 878
IT Director/CIO € 713
Manager of IT Company € 651
Marketing/PR Specialist € 590
Teacher in Informatics/ Lecturer € 513
Chief Security Officer € 513
Project Manager/ Team Leader € 472
Trade Rep/ Business Consultant / Sales Consultant € 462
System Administrator/Support/Helpdesk/Technical
Assistant € 441
Software Developer/ Software Engineer € 436
Network Engineer € 421
Communications Specialist € 405
Web developer / Web designer € 349
Hardware Expert € 328
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Appendix 5: Five-point Likert scale measurement of administrative and product-
related innovativeness (Luk et al. 2008)
Administrative Innovativeness
1. We are more innovative than our competitors in deciding what methods to use
to achieve our targets and objectives.
2. We are more innovative than our competitors in initiating new procedures or
systems.
3. We are more innovative than our competitors in developing new ways in
achieving our targets and objectives.
4. We are more innovative than our competitors in initiating changes in the job
contents and work methods of our staff.
Product-Related Innovativeness
1. The degree of innovation in our products and services.
2. The uniqueness of our products and services.
3. The degree of customization to individual customer requirements.
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Appendix 6B: Body of the e-mail in English
Hello Mr./Ms. [insert the name of the manager/owner of the company]  ,
My name is Olga Ivanova and I’m conducting a research of Bulagrain companies,
which are part of the ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) sector. In
fact, the survey is done by two French higher education institution Université du Sud
Toulon Var (USTV)?? EDHEC Business School  and  it is part of my doctoral
dissertation. The topic is “Sources of legitimacy for small- and medium-size
enterprises in transition economies” or what are the factors that help companies like
yours to get business and/or corporate clients.
Up to now, the survey was filled by … [insert the number of companies] companies
from the Bulagrian ICT sector. Your company [insert the name of the company] is
important for this research and I’d be happy if you agree to fill out the attached
quationnaire.  My thesis director Jean-Luc Arrègle (jean-luc.arregle@edhec.edu) and I
guarantee you the confidentiality of the information provided. It will not be published
anywhere besides the processed results, which we would like to publish in academic
journals.
This is an independent study and if the results are of interest to you, I could send them




Université du Sud Toulon Var &
EDHEC Business School
FRANCE
Subject: USTV & EDHEC Business School – Survey
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Université du Sud Toulon Var &
EDHEC Business School
393 Promenade des Anglais, BP 3116
06202 Nice, France
Tel. +33 (0)4 93 18  99 66
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6. ?????????????????????????????? ISO 9001:2000? ??????????????????,
????????????????????????????????????????????????????.
a. ??, ?????????????????????????????? ISO 9001:2000 ? ……….
??????
b. ??, ??????????????????????? ISO 9001:2000
7. ?????????????????????????????? CMMI (Capability Maturity Model
Integration)? ??????????????????, ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????????.
a. ??, ?????????????????????????????? CMMI, ? ………. ??????
b. ??, ??????????????????????? CMMI
8. ??????? ?????? ?? ????????????? ????????? ??? ???? ??? ??????????? ???????
????????? ????, ?????????????????????????????????. ?????????????????
??????????????, ??????????????????????????????:
64??????????????????????????: ???????, ??????, ????????, ?????, ?????, ?????, ???????,
?????????, ???????, ????????, ??????, ???????, ????????, ??????, ??????, ?????,
??????????, ?????, ????????, ?????, ??????????, ???????, ????????, ????????, ???????,
??????, ????????????????.
65??????????????????????????: ???????, ???????, ???????????, ???????, ???????????????????,
?????????, ??????, ????????, ?????????, ?????????, ???????, ??????????, ????????, ?????,




















































































16.????????????????????? 5 ???????????????????????????????????? ????,


















?????? 20, 21, 22  ? 23? ??? ???????? ????? ??? ?????, ?????? ????
















23. ???????????????????????????????????????????????? (????????) ?
??????????????????????????? _________
24. ?????????????????????????????????????????????? (??????????)? _________
25. ???????????????????????????????????????????
a. ?? 2007 ????????????? 2006 __________ %

























?????????? (????. Microsoft- ?????????????, Oracle- ???????????????
??.)? __________
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Appendix 7B: Questionnaire in English
SURVEY
SOURCES OF LEGITIMACY FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZE ENTERPRISES
(SMEs) IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: THE BULGARIAN INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) SECTOR





393 Promenade des Anglais, BP 3116
06202 Nice, France
Tel. +33 (0)4 93 18  99 66





Your opinion is very important for the success of this study. Thus, if possible answer honestly
to all the questions in the survey. The purpose of the study is purely academic. Your
anonymity and the confidentiality of the information presented are guaranteed (see the
accompanying document).
Please, keep in mind that anytime we ask a question regarding ‘contracts’ or ‘clients’, we
mean business clients (B2B). The B2C contracts although important are not taken into
consideration in this study.
In addition, some questions refer to ‘foreign’ clients – those clients are companies that reside
outside Bulgaria. Subsidiaries of foreign companies in Bulgaria are not considered as being




1. What is the distribution of your company’s revenue (in %) by activity?
a. Hardware Delivery ……….%
b. Software Sales and Distribution ……….%
c. Services ……….%
d. Outsourcing of IT services66 ……….%
e. Other...…………………………………… ……….%
2. In the field of services, your company specializes in which of the below-mentioned
areas? Please, check mark whether the service is intended for the internal (Bulgarian),
the external (foreign) market or both.
Type of Service Bulgarian Market Foreign market
Business Process Management
CAD/CAM/CAE Services
Call centers – development, support and services
Computer Animation and Graphics
Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
Data Warehousing and Business Intelligence
eBusiness Support and Services
Engineering Services
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)
Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
Information Security
Internet – supply and maintenance
IT Consulting
IT Training and Education
Linux-based Work Stations and Servers
Multi-Media Services
Networks – Development and Management






3. Does your company develop its own products in the field, in which you specialize?
Yes No
66 Outsourcing of IT services refers to services provided to clients outside the country.
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4. Has you company received any type of award for a product/service?
Yes No
If the answer is Yes, please specify the type of award.
__________________________________________________________________
5. What is your company’s revenue distribution (in %) by geographic location of your
clients?
a. Bulgaria ……….%
b. European Union (EU)67 ……….%
c. North America (USA and Canada) ……….%
d. Asia ……….%
e. Africa ……….%
f. Australia and New Zealand ……….%
g. Other European countries68 (outside the EU) ……….%
6. Does your company have ISO 9001:2000 certificate? If the answer is yes, please mark
in which year you obtained the certificate.
a. Yes, the company obtained the ISO 9001:2000 certificate in..........year
b. No, the company does not have ISO 9001:2000 certificate
7. Does your company have CMMI (Capability Maturity Model Integration)? If your
answer is yes, please mark in which year you obtained the certificate.
a. Yes, the company obtained the CMMI certificate in ………. year
b. No, the company does not have CMMI certificate
8. Your company is a certified partner of which of the following software and/or
hardware corporations? Please, specify the level of partnership having in mind that the
level maybe indicated in a different way by the different companies. For the purpose
of this study, we adopted the following categories:
a. registered partner – the lowest level
b. silver partner – the second level
c. gold partner – the highest level
d. other partner – please, specify the type of partnership
67 The European Union includes: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark , Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, the
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
68 This group of countries includes: ? Albania, Armenia, Azarbaidjan, Belarus, Bosnia and Hertzegovina,
Croatia, Georgia, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine.
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If the companies, with which your company has partnerships, are not included in the
list, please add their names and the type of partnership.
Name of the Company Level of Partnership
















9. Which of the ICT (Information and Communication Technology) sector associations
your company is a member of?
a. Our company is not a member of an ICT association
b. Our company is a member of an association, which is not part of the ICT
sector
c. Our company is a member of the following ICT associations (please, mark
with a circle all associations, your company is a member of).
i. BAIT (Bulgarian Association of Information Technology)
ii. BASSCOM (Bulgarian Association of Software Companies)
iii. BBKEPI (Bulgarian Branch Chamber of Electronic Industry and
Informatics)
iv. BWA (Bulgarian Web Association)
v. CLICT (Center for ICT Law)
vi. Club for Innovative Scenarios
vii. E-Health Bulgaria
viii. Internet Society Bulgaria
ix. Interspace
x. SEC (Society for Electronic Communications)
xi. NBDN (National Business Development Network)
xii. NRN (National Research Network Association)
xiii. Association iCenters
xiv. High-Technology Business Incubator – Gabrovo
xv. High-Technology Incubator – Varna
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xvi. Other………………………….
10. What is the number of the founding team members in your company? _________
11. How many founding team members in your company have foreign education?
_________
12. How many founding team members in your company have experience in foreign
companies? _________
13. How many founding team members in your company have business education?
__________
14. What is the percentage distribution of your new clients based on the way your
company obtains a contract with them?
a. Third party referral (i.e. previous client) ……….%
b. Social contacts of the founding team members ……….%
c. Presenting the firm in specialized magazines, fairs and catalogs ……….%
d. Participating in an auction ……….%
e. Other……………………………………………………. ……….%
15. How many references from past business clients you present to potential future
clients? __________ of which __________ are from foreign clients.
16. Could you list 5 of your biggest business clients? Please, check mark the box that
corresponds to the level at which your client operates – local, national or international.





17. What is the total number of corporate clients you have in the moment? _________
18. With how many of them do you have contractual arrangements? __________
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19. What is the average length per long-term contract (in months) with a business client?
__________
Question 20, 21, 22 and 23 are related to companies that have outsourcing contracts
with foreign clients. If you do not have such contracts, please go to question 24.
20. How many references from past foreign business clients you present to potential future
clients? __________
21. What is the percentage distribution of your new foreign business clients based on the
way your company obtains a contract with them?
a. Third party referral (i.e. previous client) ……….%
b. Social contacts of the founding team members ……….%
c. Presenting the firm in specialized magazines, fairs and catalogs ……….%
d. Participating in an auction ……….%
e. Other……………………………………………………. ……….%
22. How many contracts with foreign business clients do you have as of today?
_________
23. What is the average length per contract with a foreign business client (in months)?
_________
24. What is your company’s price per hour ratio (in euro/hour)? It applies also to service
fee. __________
25. What was the sales growth of your company
a. In 2007 in comparison with 2006? __________%
b. In 2008 in comparison with 2007? __________%


















f. Business Development Manager
g. Other (please specify)
_______________________________________________
28. When was the company established? …………………………………
29. Number of employees in the company……………, from which …………are certified
engineers.
30. What is the total number of certificates that the employees of the company have (i.e.,
Microsoft-certified, Oracle-certified, etc.)? __________
331
Appendix 8
Checking for Nonresponse Bias
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
OWNPR AWARD
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 0,566038 0,72 Mean 0,490566 0,8
Variance 0,250363 0,21 Variance 2,370102 3,25





df 51 df 41
t Stat -1,34395 t Stat -0,74028
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,092456 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,231673
t Critical one-tail 1,675285 t Critical one-tail 1,682878
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,184912 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,463346
t Critical two-tail 2,007584 t Critical two-tail 2,019541
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
ISO PART
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 0,45283 1,84 Mean 41,69811 50
Variance 1,598694 9,973333 Variance 3687,446 3466,667





df 28 df 48
t Stat -2,11764 t Stat -0,5753
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,021609 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,283888
t Critical one-tail 1,701131 t Critical one-tail 1,677224
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,043218 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,567776
t Critical two-tail 2,048407 t Critical two-tail 2,010635
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
ASSOC WEST
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 0,509434 0,88 Mean 40,98113 66,33333
Variance 0,908563 1,276667 Variance 3221,211 6654,8





df 41 df 35
t Stat -1,41887 t Stat -1,40205
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,081747 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,084854
t Critical one-tail 1,682878 t Critical one-tail 1,689572
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,163494 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,169709
t Critical two-tail 2,019541 t Critical two-tail 2,030108
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
BIZ CLREP
Interview Web Interview Web
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Mean 31,38994 50,2381 Mean 4,735849 5,84
Variance 1674,358 1737,056 Variance 8,851959 7,056667





Df 46 df 52
t Stat -1,87478 t Stat -1,64728
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,03359 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,052766
t Critical one-tail 1,67866 t Critical one-tail 1,674689
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,067181 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,105531
t Critical two-tail 2,012896 t Critical two-tail 2,006647
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
FGNREP NCLNTS
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 0,421509 0,6028 Mean 825,8679 260,56
Variance 0,816355 0,771254 Variance 9804669 980363,2





Df 48 df 70
t Stat -0,84296 t Stat 1,193876
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,201717 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,118278
t Critical one-tail 1,677224 t Critical one-tail 1,666914
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,403434 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,236557
t Critical two-tail 2,010635 t Critical two-tail 1,994437
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
AVFEE GRWTH
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 34,90566 55,32 Mean 0,503962 0,56744
Variance 506,8659 5531,227 Variance 0,220612 0,399805





Df 26 df 37
t Stat -1,34371 t Stat -0,44713
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,095326 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,328694
t Critical one-tail 1,705618 t Critical one-tail 1,687094
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,190652 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,657388
t Critical two-tail 2,055529 t Critical two-tail 2,026192
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
AGE EMPLS
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 9,301887 10,2 Mean 25,81132 44,92
Variance 26,56096 29,66667 Variance 1946,425 5107,743





Df 45 df 33
t Stat -0,6913 t Stat -1,23081
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,246463 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,113547
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t Critical one-tail 1,679427 t Critical one-tail 1,69236
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,492926 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,227095
t Critical two-tail 2,014103 t Critical two-tail 2,034515
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Var.
NOFFICE*LOC WEBSITE
Interview Web Interview Web
Mean 4,264151 5,32 Mean 10,4717 2,96
Variance 29,54427 53,47667 Variance 1819,946 96,29





df 37 df 63
t Stat -0,64299 t Stat 1,21552
P(T<=t) one-tail 0,262099 P(T<=t) one-tail 0,114352
t Critical one-tail 1,687094 t Critical one-tail 1,669402
P(T<=t) two-tail 0,524199 P(T<=t) two-tail 0,228703
t Critical two-tail 2,026192 t Critical two-tail 1,998341
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Appendix 9A
CHI-SQUARE – OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS AND MISSING DATA
MISSING DATA











Result No significant difference
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Appendix 9B
Checking for Randomness of the Variable NCLNTS
T-TESTS
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
CLREP OWNPR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 6.692308 5,70 Mean 0.615385 0.5
Variance 26.995 31.34444 Variance 0.23976 0.277778





Df 11 Df 11
t Stat 0.531892 t Stat 0.656915
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.302688 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.262371
t Critical one-tail 1.795885 t Critical one-tail 1.795885
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.605376 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.524742
t Critical two-tail 2.200985 t Critical two-tail 2.200985
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
AVFEE AWARD
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 41.44872 30.35133 Mean 0.589744 0.4
Variance 2158.257 379.9646 Variance 2.634699 01.???





Df 35 Df 13
t Stat 1.440689 t Stat 0.431037
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.07928 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.336751
t Critical one-tail 1.689572 t Critical one-tail 1.770933
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.158559 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.673503
t Critical two-tail 2.030108 t Critical two-tail 2.160369
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
GRWTH ISO
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 0.524308 0.5884 Mean 0.897436 0.6
Variance 0.274488 0.800714 Variance 4.612721 2.488889





Df 10 Df 14
t Stat -0.22168 t Stat 0.535919
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.414512 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.300213
t Critical one-tail 1.812461 t Critical one-tail 1.76131
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.829024 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.600426
t Critical two-tail 2.228139 t Critical two-tail 2.144787
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Appendix 9B Cont.
Checking for Randomness of the Variable NCLNTS
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
AGE PART
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 9.589744 10.33333 Mean 44.35897 34
Variance 27.36197 27.75 Variance 3585.947 982.2222





Df 10 Df 19
t Stat -0.40126 t Stat 0.862661
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.348335 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.199541
t Critical one-tail 1.812461 t Critical one-tail 1.729133
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.69667 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.399082
t Critical two-tail 2.228139 t Critical two-tail 2.093024
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
EMPLS ASSOC
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 31.9359 14.88889 Mean 0.628205 0.5
Variance 2987.048 243.8611 Variance 1.041792 0.5





Df 39 Df 14
t Stat 2.108088 t Stat 0.509343
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.02075 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.309223
t Critical one-tail 1.684875 t Critical one-tail 1.76131
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.041501 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.618445
t Critical two-tail 2.022691 t Critical two-tail 2.144787
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
NOFFICE*LOC NDISTR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 4.602564 4 Mean 8.064103 0
Variance 36.86597 14.44444 Variance 1271.515 0





Df 16 Df 77
t Stat 0.435194 t Stat 1.997297
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.334618 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.024663
t Critical one-tail 1.745884 t Critical one-tail 1.664885
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.669235 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.049326
t Critical two-tail 2.119905 t Critical two-tail 1.991254
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Appendix 9C
Checking for the Randomness of the Variable AVFEE
T-TESTS
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
REP OWNPR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 6.457627 7.421053 Mean 0.627119 0.57894737
Variance 28.35593 23.36842 Variance 0.237873 0.25730994





df 33 Df 30
t Stat 0.736637 t Stat -0.36337
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.233274 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.359439
t Critical one-tail 1.69236 t Critical one-tail 1.697261
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.466548 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.718877
t Critical two-tail 2.034515 t Critical two-tail 2.042272
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
NCLNTS AWARD
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 40.77966 272.4737 Mean 0.627119 0.15789474
Variance 2783.287 567630.7 Variance 0.237873 0.14035088





df 18 Df 39
t Stat 1.339418 t Stat -4.3911
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.098551 P(T<=t) one-tail 4.18E-05
t Critical one-tail 1.734064 t Critical one-tail 1.684875
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.197103 P(T<=t) two-tail 8.36E-05
t Critical two-tail 2.100922 t Critical two-tail 2.022691
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
GRWTH ISO
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 0.87661 0.619789 Mean 0.915254 0.84210526
Variance 6.571264 0.321526 Variance 4.94097 3.80701754





df 72 Df 34
t Stat -0.717 t Stat -0.13723
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.237848 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.445828
t Critical one-tail 1.666294 t Critical one-tail 1.690924
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.475696 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.891655
t Critical two-tail 1.993464 t Critical two-tail 2.032244
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Appendix 9C Cont.
Checking for the Randomness of the Variable AVFEE
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
AGE PART
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 9.542373 9.736842 Mean 0.915254 0.84210526
Variance 27.80421 27.4269 Variance 4.94097 3.80701754





Df 31 Df 34
t Stat 0.140537 t Stat -0.13723
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.444572 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.445828
t Critical one-tail 1.695519 t Critical one-tail 1.690924
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.889145 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.891655
t Critical two-tail 2.039513 t Critical two-tail 2.032244
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
EMPLS ASSOC
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 32.23729 51.26316 Mean 0.644068 0.57894737
Variance 4520.012 10687.43 Variance 1.233197 0.47953216





Df 23 Df 50
t Stat 0.752589 t Stat 0.303164
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.229665 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.381511
t Critical one-tail 1.713872 t Critical one-tail 1.675905
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.459331 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.763023
t Critical two-tail 2.068658 t Critical two-tail 2.008559
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
NOFFICE*LOC NDISTR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 3.881356 6.842105 Mean 5.135593 17.15789
Variance 24.34775 72.25146 Variance 423.602 3958.918





Df 22 Df 19
t Stat 1.442059 t Stat 0.818879
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.081686 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.211504
t Critical one-tail 1.717144 t Critical one-tail 1.729133
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.163371 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.423008
t Critical two-tail 2.073873 t Critical two-tail 2.093024
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Appendix 9D
Checking for the Randomness of the Variable GRWTH
T-TESTS
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
CLREP OWNPR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 7.074627 4.363636  Mean 0.6268657 0.545455
Variance 28.61556 12.05455  Variance 0.2374491 0.272727





Df 19  Df 13
t Stat 2.196762  t Stat 0.4836194
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.020323  P(T<=t) one-tail 0.3183501
t Critical one-tail 1.729133  t Critical one-tail 1.7709334
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.040646  P(T<=t) two-tail 0.6367002
t Critical two-tail 2.093024  t Critical two-tail 2.1603687
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
NCLNTS AWARD
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 674.597 462.4545  Mean 0.6716418 0.090909
Variance 7988856 1111037  Variance 3.0117594 0.090909





Df 39  Df 76
t Stat 0.452043  t Stat 2.5174148
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.326871  P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0069637
t Critical one-tail 1.684875  t Critical one-tail 1.6651514
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.653742  P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0139273
t Critical two-tail 2.022691  t Critical two-tail 1.9916726
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
AVFEE ISO
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 43.3209 30.04545  Mean 0.9850746 0.363636
Variance 2466.02 176.3227  Variance 5.1058345 1.454545





Df 60  Df 24
t Stat 1.826357  t Stat 1.3611615
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.036386  P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0930535
t Critical one-tail 1.670649  t Critical one-tail 1.7108821
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.072773  P(T<=t) two-tail 0.1861071
t Critical two-tail 2.000298  t Critical two-tail 2.0638985
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Appendix 9D Cont.
Checking for the Randomness of the Variable GRWTH
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
AGE PART
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 9.955224 7.363636 Mean 48.208955 20.90909
Variance 26.8313 27.25455 Variance 3969.4708 709.0909





df 13 Df 33
t Stat 1.527597 t Stat 2.4544855
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.075286 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.0097759
t Critical one-tail 1.770933 t Critical one-tail 1.6923603
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.150571 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.0195517
t Critical two-tail 2.160369 t Critical two-tail 2.0345153
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
EMPLS ASSOC
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 35.26866 11.63636 Mean 0.6268657 0.636364
Variance 3389.109 104.4545 Variance 0.9950249 1.454545





df 76 Df 12
t Stat 3.048895 t Stat
-
0.0247657
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.00158 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.4903245
t Critical one-tail 1.665151 t Critical one-tail 1.7822875
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00316 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.9806489
t Critical two-tail 1.991673 t Critical two-tail 2.1788128
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var. t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Uneq. Var.
NOFFICE*LOC NDISTR
Info No Info Info No Info
Mean 4.820896 3.272727 Mean 8.835821 3.363636
Variance 40.02804 17.41818 Variance 1467.927 74.05455





df 19 Df 69
t Stat 1.048334 t Stat 1.022497
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.153819 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.155059
t Critical one-tail 1.729133 t Critical one-tail 1.667239
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.307638 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.310117
t Critical two-tail 2.093024 t Critical two-tail 1.994945
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Appendix 10A
Functional Legitimacy – Testing for Nomological Validity
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Appendix 10B
Relational Legitimacy – Testing for Nomological Legitimacy
343
 Appendix 11: Input EXCEL Matrix
COMPID LVLOPT OWNPR AWARD ISO PART ASSOC WEST CLREP
1 1 0 0 0 10 0 100 1
2 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 3
3 1 0 0 4 30 1 0 3
4 1 0 0 0 40 1 0 3
5 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 3
6 1 1 0 0 50 1 0 3
8 1 0 0 0 0 0 100 4
9 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 3
10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
11 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
13 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 1
14 2 1 0 0 20 0 50 6
15 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
16 2 1 0 0 10 1 100 10
18 2 1 0 0 60 0 200 7
20 2 1 2 0 10 0 50 7
21 1 0 0 0 10 0 100 1
22 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
23 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
24 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 10
25 1 1 0 0 50 0 0 4
26 1 0 0 0 10 0 0 3
27 1 0 0 0 30 0 0 1
28 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
29 1 0 0 0 0 0 25 1
30 3 1 0 0 20 0 200 7
31 2 1 0 4 180 0 125 7
32 3 1 0 7 170 2 67 7
33 1 0 0 0 20 0 0 1
34 1 0 0 0 60 0 0 3
37 2 1 2 5 180 1 0 7
38 3 0 1 0 10 0 100 4
39 1 1 0 0 10 0 0 1
42 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
43 3 1 1 0 70 1 67 7
44 1 1 0 0 10 0 50 4
45 1 1 0 1 60 1 80 7
46 2 1 0 0 0 0 100 6
47 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 10
48 2 1 0 0 60 1 0 7
49 2 1 2 4 80 1 0 3
50 2 1 0 0 100 1 0 7
51 2 1 1 0 90 2 200 10
52 2 0 0 0 90 0 100 3
53 2 0 0 0 50 1 0 7
54 2 1 1 0 10 0 100 9
55 2 1 0 0 30 4 200 3
344
56 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
57 2 0 0 2 260 1 0 10
58 2 0 0 0 10 0 100 3
59 3 1 0 0 100 0 100 7
60 3 0 0 0 10 0 0 7
61 3 1 10 0 130 3 50 7
62 3 1 0 0 30 0 50 7
63 2 1 5 8 0 0 200 10
65 3 1 1 9 70 2 50 7
66 2 1 0 7 190 5 0 10
67 1 1 0 0 70 0 0 4
68 1 0 0 0 110 0 0 1
69 3 1 1 0 30 2 171 8
70 2 0 0 0 10 1 200 9
71 1 1 0 0 20 0 200 6
72 3 1 7 0 10 1 0 5
75 2 0 0 0 20 1 29 3
76 3 0 0 0 10 0 0 4
77 2 1 0 0 0 1 200 3
78 1 0 0 0 10 1 0 1
79 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
80 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 7
81 2 1 0 7 60 1 50 8
82 2 0 0 0 20 0 0 7
83 2 1 1 0 50 2 0 3
84 2 1 0 0 20 1 100 7
85 1 0 0 4 110 1 0 1
86 3 0 2 4 250 4 67 7
87 3 1 4 0 0 0 0 7
88 1 1 0 0 10 0 50 3
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Appendix 11 : Input EXCEL Matrix
NCLNTS  AVFEE GRWTH AGE EMPLS NOFFICE*LOC NDISTR  WEBSITE
20 25 0,41 3 4 1 0 0
97 21 0,20 14 3 1 0 1
30 20 0,41 7 8 1 0 0
250 25 1,00 7 6 1 0 0
85 30 0,10 11 5 1 0 1
580 25 0,15 17 12 1 0 0
13 21 0,41 2 3 2 0 1
20 18 0,40 12 5 1 0 0
6 20 0,60 6 2 1 0 0
150 30 0,00 4 2 1 0 1
6 17,5 0,41 2 3 1 0 1
75 18 0,50 2 3 1 0 0
100 21 0,45 4 3 1 0 1
3347 57 0,77 11 25 15 28 1
400 57 2,00 13 10 3 0 1
1000 40 2,00 12 25 4 0 1
40 22,5 0,28 14 6 1 0 0
20 15 0,41 10 2 1 0 0
6 36 0,41 2 3 1 0 0
5200 23 0,07 19 130 21 75 1
79 20 0,45 4 5 3 0 1
45 15 0,20 7 5 1 0 0
7 18 0,50 2 4 1 0 0
12 3 0,15 9 4 1 0 0
200 21 0,30 10 3 1 0 0
10 49 1,13 8 30 18 0 1
20 57 0,40 7 250 36 0 1
20 49 0,38 18 155 12 0 1
4 15 0,00 0 2 2 0 0
8 15 0,30 11 7 4 0 1
100 38 0,38 16 250 28 0 1
5 49 0,00 11 15 4 0 1
70 10 0,24 14 18 6 0 0
80 35 0,20 7 9 3 0 1
80 49 0,58 6 25 3 0 1
500 40 0,20 15 6 3 7 1
6 21 2,00 15 18 3 0 1
1000 21 0,35 18 10 3 15 1
1500 35 0,77 13 28 6 9 1
100 43 0,75 3 13 3 0 1
460 70 0,35 14 50 18 0 1
70 57 0,84 4 43 6 0 1
275 57 0,92 18 20 3 275 1
10 57 0,00 0 15 6 2 1
24 57 0,30 6 32 4 0 1
20 20 0,30 7 4 2 0 1
35 25 0,77 7 17 3 0 1
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4000 30 1,50 13 16 3 10 1
1500 120 0,15 14 55 6 0 1
25 80 0,50 9 15 12 0 1
50 52 0,97 16 60 3 0 1
25 40 0,50 5 15 3 0 1
41 100 0,37 8 40 3 0 1
20 49 0,50 10 95 6 0 1
5000 30 0,22 13 24 3 45 1
55 45 0,32 12 75 3 0 1
110 60 0,30 17 250 6 0 1
30 30 0,41 18 10 2 0 1
185 35 2,50 14 4 3 0 1
45 50 0,53 5 110 3 0 1
270 57 0,34 13 15 3 21 1
42 10 0,30 15 8 2 0 1
20 50 0,30 9 38 3 0 1
22 400 1,85 4 30 3 0 1
6 40 0,10 6 5 2 0 1
10 14 2,00 3 10 3 0 1
50 12 0,10 18 22 2 0 1
5 20 0,30 2 6 3 0 1
16 30 0,20 6 2 3 0 1
50 100 0,17 9 22 3 0 1
8 45 0,15 2 3 2 0 1
200 30 0,20 17 8 6 8 1
20 40 0,35 5 5 3 0 1
210 21 0,25 15 14 3 0 1
20 50 0,11 8 150 3 0 1
30 60 0,80 13 2 3 0 1
35 15 0,50 14 4 1 0 0
